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UNIVERSITY OF TORONTOP II E F A C E
Tins book professes to be only what its name
suggests a study of Mill s Philosophy: its
aim is to examine some ideas which underlie
his work rather than to give a summary of his
opinions, or a detailed account of his contribu
tions to the philosophical sciences. In a book
addressed chiefly to students of philosophy it
seemed best to say little of the life or even of
the intellectual development of Mill
; and where
biography does occur its introduction is largely
an accident. If my criticism or interpretation
of Mill should seem to suggest philosophy other
than his, 1 hardly feel impelled to apologise forvi Preface
this; for systems of thought are never under
stood except in their relations to one another.
Eeferences to Mill s works are made to the
most recent Library Editions, except in the cases
of the Logic/ Political Economy, and Liberty/
in which it seemed better to refer to the original
People s Editions.
1
In connection with the special subject of Mill s
Philosophy, I have laid myself under obligations
to the work of those who have preceded me : to
the late Professor Green s Lectures on Mill s
Logic ; to Professor Bain s John Stuart Mill
;
to Mr Courtney s Metaphysics of J. S. Mill/
and to his attractive Life of John Stuart Mill ;
to Professor Masson s appreciative and pointed
criticism;
2 to Professor Hoffding s Einleitung
in die Englische Philosophic unserer Zeit
; and
to the late M. Taine s delightful study.
3 Other
1 Messrs Longmans, (Jreen, & Co.
- V. Recent British Philosophy
: a Review with Criticisms ;
including some Comments on Mr Mill s Answer to Sir William
Hamilton.
:1 Le Positivisine anglais, etude sur Stuart Mill.Preface vii
and more detailed obligations are acknowledged,
so far as possible, where they occur.
The whole of this book has been read in proof
by the Piev. A. Halliday Douglas, of Cambridge.
Part of it has also been read in manuscript by
Professor Andrew Seth, of this University, and
all of it by Professor Henry Jones, of Glasgow
University, and by Mr J. A. Smith, of Balliol
College, Oxford. I am indebted to all these
gentlemen for criticisms and suggestions ; and
my thanks are especially due to Professor Jones,
but for whose help my work must have been
still more imperfect than it is.
UNIVERSITY OF KDIXUUKGH,
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CHAPTER I
I X T K D U C T 11 Y
THE work of John Stuart Mill marks an im
pressive transition in many departments of
thought. There is probably no other English
writer who lias had so definite an effect on the
development of so many philosophical sciences;
and there is none whose personal philosophy
contains more striking evidence of radical
changes in the speculative outlook of his
generation.
Current ideas of Mill s philosophical work do
but scant justice to its nature and proportions.
Like many other philosophers, he has been
&quot; more criticised than read
&quot;
; and the criticism2 John Stuart Mill
to which he has been subjected has generally
been rather a controversial disproof of certain
theories, common to him with other writers, than
an attempt to discover the distinctive ways of
thinking to which his philosophy owes its special
interest.
We inherit, for the most part, that clerical
prejudice against Mill which resulted from his
attack on Mansel, in whose Agnosticism dis
tressed but imprudent apologists found tem
porary shelter
; or we generalise about
&quot; lack of





if our penetration be somewhat greater, we are




In all this there is little enough explanation
f that in Mill which yet needs to be explained
/his real contribution to the development of
/ knowledge and practice ; and indeed this con-
/ ception of him, which makes him merely an
inconsistent and eccentric disciple of Hume,
omits all that is most individual in his philo
sophical attempt. The following pages are in
tended to show that such an account of his
philosophy is misleading and one-sided, and that,Introductory 3
even where it lias most appearance of truth, it
is incomplete.
It is not, indeed, to be denied that Mill is
deeply imbued with the sensationalist prejudice,
that he accepts from his English predecessors
that conception of knowledge, which makes it a
mere complex of sensations and ideas, supposed
to be capable of existing in some degree independ
ently of the synthesis in which knowledge con
sists. He expressly affirms this view of know
ledge, and it affects his idea of explanation. It
leads him to conceive things as finally reducible to
sense-impressions, and even to regard such impres
sions as the very type or equivalent of reality.
It engenders a suspicion of the constructive part
which thought plays in experience a suspicion
which betrays itself in Mill s whole account of
knowledge and action. He constantly tends to
think of things as naturally and really isolated
from one another, and to treat the relations in
which we know them as fictions, which do not
belong to them as they actually are. He is
apt to regard thought as merely the effect
of things, and to ignore the extent to which
the very being of things as we know them4 John Stuart Mill
consists of relations which reveal themselves in
thought.
It is in this spirit that he adopts Hume s con
ception of the relation of cause and effect the
conception which finds in it a mere succession of
subjective states
; and his tendency to see in
knowledge only a series of mental changes connects
itself not simply with this theory of causality,
but with the more general refusal to regard the
relations which thought constitutes and deter
mines as really belonging to the nature of things.
This fictitious isolation of the subject from the
object of knowledge, which Mill inherited from
his predecessors, plays, as we shall see, a most
real part in his logical theory ; and it is of hardly
less account in his conception of what conduct is
and ought to be. It commits him, so far as his
explicit theory goes, to thinking that desire is
necessarily for personal pleasure; and it makes
a hedonistic conception of moral good natural
and almost inevitable for him. j
This individualism, then, which appears as
sensationalism in the theory of knowledge, and
as egoism in that of conduct, forms the general
groundwork of Mill s philosophical work. ItIntroductory 5
represents the point of view at which lie found
himself when he began to think, and which he
never wholly abandoned. On the other hand, it
is matter of common knowledge that this is not
Mill s whole philosophy. His account of human
life contains elements that are almost explicitly
at variance with his inherited creed.
The theory of Induction, for example, which is
his most important contribution to the science
of logic, avowedly rests upon a doctrine of caus
ality which is not that of sensationalism. He
makes use of a conception of the causal relation
in which it is regarded not as mere succession of
ideas, but as unconditional dependence of fact
upon fact. In the same way, his recognition of
a self, other than transient states of conscious
ness, however unsatisfactory the manner of it may
be, betrays a consciousness that knowledge is not
merely a sequence of ideas. Still more signifi
cant of this conflict within his philosophy is the
profoundly ethical cast of his Hedonism his
tendency to subordinate the hedonistic concep
tion of moral good to a way of regarding it
which makes it consist, not in a mere effect upon
feeling, but in objective personal qualities.6 John Stuart Mill
These elements in Mill s philosophy have not
been by any means unremarked. But they have
very generally been regarded as mere eccen
tricities on his part as results which he ob
tained by a leap away from his serious thinking,
and to which he was in no sense entitled. Even
those whose sympathy with such ways of think
ing might be expected to be most active have
been disposed to see in them inconsistencies on
which an argumentum ad hominem against Mill s
empiricism might be founded, rather than to
treat them with any cordiality or esteem.
It would be idle to deny the justification
which exists for such an attitude as this. How
ever poor a virtue consistency may be, in science
at all events, the effort to attain it is the condi
tion of all real excellence
; and for philosophy,
methods must always possess a greater import
ance than results.
&quot; Wolves in sheep s clothing
&quot;
have been frequent, and the effects of good in
tentions have been calamitous, in philosophy ;
mistaken methods and prejudices must not pass
unchallenged et dona ferentes.
On the other hand, a straightforward examina
tion of Mill s work seems to me to show that,Introductory 7
both for Mill himself and for the real mean
ing of his philosophy, these so-called inconsist
encies are of no second-rate importance. They
have, at all events, not less to do with his
contribution to knowledge, in logic, ethics, and
politics, than what are generally supposed to
be his more deliberate and serious conclusions.
To leave them out of account in criticising his
work is to do him less than justice.
The suggestion of this aspect of his thought
must not, of course, be understood to mean that
Mill was an idealist. To affirm that he was so
consciously would be to contradict what he has
said about himself
; nor can we regard his philo
sophy as, even unconsciously, idealistic. His
very neglect of metaphysics is in itself incon
sistent with a genuine or thorough idealism
;
and even apart from this, we could only make
him out to be an idealist by ignoring elements
which permeate his whole philosophical work.
We find, indeed, many important utterances
which are idealistic in spirit and temper, and
which seem to constitute an abandonment of
empiricism ; but the general theory of thought
and things is never recast so as to give effect8 John Stuart Mill
to these suggestions. His philosophy is certainly
not idealism.
With all this, it remains true that the ideal
istic elements in Mill s thinking are really in
ternal to his point of view, and that they are
thus highly significant in the history of empiri
cism. They are not mere felonious appropriations
of desired results produced by the labour of other
men. They represent the effect in his own mind
of new ways of thinking, to which lie was singu
larly responsive, and by which he was profoundly
influenced. If his idealism is
&quot; not in word, but
in power
&quot;
if it appears not so much in definite
logical utterance as in the point of view from
which he regards the great human interests it
is not, on that account, less fruitful or less real.
Its main importance, indeed, consists just in its
having been developed within empiricism, and in
the growth of positive sciences.
This element in Mill s thought is essentially
ethical, both in its interest for him and in its
actual development. His view of human activity
and its worth is more idealistic than any other
part of his philosophy. In his attitude towards
his earlier masters, he is much more critical ofIntroductory 9
Bentham than of James Mill. Ho is, in fact, pro
foundly conscious of moral issues
; and lie finds
their complexity to he too rich for the meagre
explanation of them in which his predecessors
had been satisfied. It is with the force of
genuine conviction that he asserts the reality of
voluntary choice, and its significance both as a
means to human welfare and as the expression of
personal life
; while it is still more notable that
he recognises the social character of moral
criteria, that the internal sanctions of morality
bulk largely in his mind, and that he is aware of
the very limited extent to which the moral good
of individuals is indicated by their subjective
feelings.
It can hardly be denied that the latent idealism
of such convictions implies a conception of man,
in his relation to nature and to society, which
Mill never worked out. But it is also true that
his attempt to explain the legitimacy of his
moral faiths, and still more the extent to which
they affect his point of view in ethics and
economics, produces a real and very considerable
effect in his theory. If his view of man and
nature is not such as to warrant his ideas ofio John Stuart Mill
morality, it is yet profoundly influenced by them,
and all the more influenced because he thinks
himself bound to find a basis in facts for his
interpretation of the moral consciousness. Nor
is there anything that need surprise us in this
metaphysical effect of Mill s ethical idealism.
If he had been more deliberately metaphysical,
that idealism might have penetrated his doctrine
still more profoundly. As it is, he gives no
central or abiding effect to his idealistic ten
dencies in his explicit theory of thought and
reality.
The very inconclusiveness and tentative char
acter of Mill s philosophical work give it a
peculiar educational usefulness. There is, indeed,





But still greater than his importance in this
respect is the value of the discipline which his
intellectual attitude constantly affords. We find
him always free, fair, candid, without pretence
or fear
; his point of view is singularly objective
and impersonal ; and his severe, delicate reserve
and self-effacement make his work scientific in
its manner no less than in its substance. HisIntroductory
1 1
very lack of a coherent system belongs to the
sobriety of his thinking to the serious thorough
ness of his mental habit to his unwillingness to
fill up gaps in his knowledge by myths or guesses.
These qualities give his writings an enduring
usefulness and interest
; and they secure for his
convictions and his intellectual methods that
influence upon the development of thought which
more systematic speculations have sometimes
failed to obtain :
&quot; men will long feel the presence
of his character about them, making them ashamed
of what is indolent or selfish, and encouraging
them to all disinterested labour, both in trying to
do good, and in trying to find out what the good is,
which is harder.&quot;
1 In this respect, at least, the
study of Mill s philosophy brings its own reward.
He gives new depth to the conviction that the
disinterested pursuit of truth is possible and
altogether worthy, and that the desire of
&quot; wisdom
for life&quot; still plays its own high part in human
affairs.
In all this, too, and all the more readily because
of his simplicity and candour because of the
freedom with which, on due occasion, he
&quot;
gives
] Mr Morlev s Critical Miscellanies, 2nd Series (1877), p. 250.1 2 John Stuart Mill
himself away&quot; one may learn much from the
incompatibility of various elements in his think
ing. A fuller and more concrete idea of human
life, and specially of its moral and social aspect,
forces itself through the individualism of his
inheritance, and the empirical naturalism which
is his normal point of view for mental and
social facts. His examination of moral relations
issues in a way of regarding them which is
idealistic in principle, if not in actual result.
But he never makes clear the connection of this
aspect of his thought with his philosophy as a
whole.
Our task, in studying his philosophical attempt,
is that of disentangling, and relating to each
other, mental tendencies which appear at first
sight to be wholly inconsistent. We shall have
to see how these ways of thinking impede and
modify one another
; how Mill s preconceptions
are partly corrected by his half-conscious use of
a more adequate logic; and how, in spite of
this, these preconceptions, of which he is never
wholly rid, foil his endeavours and vitiate his
conclusions.
The lesson which his philosophy teaches, moreIntroductory
1 3
clearly perhaps than any other, is the dii licully
of erecting a theory of knowledge and action on
a basis of individualism
; and the large transi
tions which we find in his way of thinking help
us to estimate the interval that separates the
philosophy and science of our day from those of
the last generation.CHAPTEE II
ISOLATION
MILL S whole speculative work is vitally affected
by his theory of experience. Every philosophy
derives its character largely from its doctrine of
knowledge ; and in modern systems of thought
this element has become even more important
than it was before, not only because knowledge
itself is regarded with greater interest, but,
still more, because all the problems of philo
sophy are looked at from a logical point of
view. The relation of things to human person
ality and experience is, for modern philosophy,
their principal characteristic
; things are prim
arily objects of knowledge ; and the way in which
thought is regarded thus goes far to determine
the conception of reality. The fact that logicTheory of Knowledge 15
occupies this central position in philosophy is
specially exemplified in Mill s writings ; for there
is no important part of his philosophical doc
trine which is not rooted in the account that
he gives of human knowledge, and all the
elements in that account affect his theory
in various ways. It is therefore expedient
to begin the study of his philosophy by a
survey of some of the more outstanding fea
tures of the conception of knowledge which
underlies it.
The avowed basis of Mill s theory of know
ledge is an assertion of the separateness of per
sonal life from outward reality a limitation of
knowledge to the mental states of the individual
;
and this individualistic conception of thought, as
a subjective process, isolated from the real world
of objects, is of the greatest interest, both as a
clue to Mill s philosophical parentage, and in
respect of its significance for his whole idea of
man s place in the world. &quot;While the general
effect of his theory of personality is positive and
objective, this affirmation of the limited and ex
clusive character of human subjectivity forms, as
we shall see, a constant element in his philo-1 6 John Stuart Mill
sophy ; and wo must give an account of its main
outlines.
This aspect of Mill s theory of knowledge is
the result of a type of speculative system, and a
phase of philosophical development, peculiarly
English.
The philosophical activity of Locke and his
successors is one of the main developments and
the development that possesses most historic
interest of the work of Descartes. It consists,
both in intention and in execution, of a study
of human knowledge, taken by itself, as a fact of
observation; and it thus depends for the idea
of its subject
- matter on the distinction which
Descartes had drawn between mind and matter
thinking substance and extended substance.
While Locke s work is based, in this way, upon
the Cartesian result, it is no less determined, in
respect of its method, by that sober view of
human knowing-power which characterises all
the great English thinkers. Nothing in his men
tal habit is more impressive than the seriousness
and constancy of his endeavour to keep within the
bounds of experience, and to limit what he has
to say to the facts of mental life as they comefce 1 7
under observation. If lie finds, even in his
theory of knowledge, that the very nature of
thought itself forces him to take account of
realities as well as of ideas, and if he is thus
entangled unwillingly in metaphysical problems
he returns with all the greater eagerness to the
safe regions of the
&quot;
historical plain method.&quot;
The results of his study of knowledge show
that the dualistic conception of reality the
recognition of separate extended and thinking
substances remains a settled fact for Locke, no
less than it had been for Descartes. After ana
lysis of things into ideas has gone to the furthest
extent that Locke conceives possible, there remain
certain qualities of extended or material existence
that will not be resolved. Behind ideas lies the
source from which they come a substance of
which we have no further knowledge than that
which ideas yield us, and which is itself ulti
mately inaccessible to knowledge, because it can





or not mental, is the main object of Berkeley s
attack upon Locke s theory.
Berkeley s polemical attitude towards Locke is
B1 8 John Stuart Mill
apt to produce a wrong impression of the relation
between the two thinkers. One is liable to be
misled, if one estimates a philosopher s differences
from his predecessors at his own valuation; for
the changes of method or of presuppositions which
a thinker makes in so far as they are deliber
ately or consciously made can hardly fail to
bulk disproportionately in his mind, or to occupy
his attention more than the elements in his theory
that are common to him with others. This is
undeniably the case with Berkeley s relation to
Locke. Berkeley is so keenly aware of the re
form that he is making in philosophy, and of all
its uses and consequences, that he hardly pauses
to recognise the extent of his agreement with his
predecessor, both in standpoint and method. One
might thus easily be led to imagine a vastly
greater difference between them than actually
exists.
Berkeley s advance upon Locke s position was
no doubt highly significant. Locke s acceptance
of the Cartesian dualism left the metaphysical
issues undecided and obscure
; for however
strongly the manner of his philosophy might
tend to emphasise the mental aspect of allBerkeley \ 9
reality, it did not preclude the possibility of
an ultimate or metaphysical materialism, so long
as certain qualities of matter, or even an &quot;un
known somewhat,&quot; remained independent of con
scious life. So far, indeed, as matter was posi
tively conceived, it was reduced to dependence
upon knowledge; but the admission of a non-
spiritual residue, however indeterminately or
negatively it might be thought of, was still a
possible ground for the explanation of all reality
in terms of this unknown quantity ; and it was
this possibility of a materialistic solution of the
problem of dualism that was met by Berkeley s
immaterialism. This immaterialism, however, was
J only the result of a consistent and deliberate use
/ of Locke s method. Berkeley
&quot; had been accus
tomed by Locke, in the first place, to regard all
that exists on its phenomenal or ideal side
; and,
at least in the secondary qualities of matter,
to regard only this ideal or phenomenal exist
ence.&quot;
1 It was a direct application of this lesson,
to reduce, as Berkeley did, all the qualities of
matter, and material substance itself, to ideas
to make the existence of matter consist in the
1 Professor Eraser s Berkeley (Philosophical Classics), p. 29.2O John Stuart Mill
possibility of its being perceived, and to regard
it as derivative, or as relative to intelligence.
It is rather in his view of mind than of matter
that Berkeley s originality lies. His negative
criticism of the idea of
&quot; material substance,&quot;
while it was his starting-point, did not constitute
his whole philosophy
: its interest for him was
a derived one
; and his motive, from the first, was
his positive interest in the assertion of mind or
spirit. The reduction of matter, and so of all
existence, to dependence on mind, constitutes, in
J fact, a greater change in the idea of mind than
in that of matter. Tor the idea of matter, such
a reduction means only the impossibility of using
it as the principle of metaphysical interpretation;
but the idea of mind is more vitally and posi
tively affected.
[ So long as spirit is regarded as
one of two mutually independent substances, it
is necessarily linnted
; it explains, at most, only
itself and the ideas in which reflection observes
it. t But spirit as the sole substance is the ex
planation, not only of its own phenomena, but of
matter also, and of the relation of material to
mental facts. It becomes the very principle of
explanation ; and facts are only understood whenHume 21
they are seen in relation to it. Something of this





knowledge of matter, we have a &quot;notion&quot; of spirit.
But this positive view of spirit was not worked
out by Berkeley ; and Hume s interpretation of
mind, as nothing but the series of ideas, was the
natural sequel to Berkeley s criticism of Locke.
However far it might be, in intention, from
Berkeley s philosophy, this conception of mind
resulted from an application to the idea of mental
substance of the same method of criticism which
Berkeley had applied to Locke s idea of matter.
In his theory of mind Hume gave effect to
Berkeley s method, and to his limitation of know





The main significance of this formative period
of English philosophy consists, undoubtedly, in its
well-known historical relation to Kant in the




perience. / It led, in this way, to an assertion of
the relativity of experience to af&quot; subject
&quot;) of
the necessity for a spiritual interpretation of re
ality oJ__th^__gJ4ej3tive--syfitliesis of judgment22 John Stuart Mill




spirit as an actije^subject^ rather than a passive
&quot;
substance.&quot; All this might seem, indeed, to be
forecast by Berkeley s spiritualism.
1 But it was
essentially inaccessible to him, no less than to
Locke and Hume : it required a conception of
mental life alien to their individualistic abstrac
tion of knowledge from reality of the subject
from the object.
It is thus only natural that the work of Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume should also have had his
torical results entirely different from the critical
idealism of Kant. As a matter of fact, it is apt
to be forgotten that the most direct though not
the most important issue of their work was not
its effect upon Kant, but its development by Eng
lish thinkers, for whose speculations it continued
to be a positive starting-point. John Stuart Mill
is, in a sense, the last of these
; and some im
portant elements in his philosophy are inherited
from them.
What took place, in the philosophical develop
ment which we have been considering, was the
1 Cf. Professor Eraser s Preface to Siris, Berkeley s Works
(Clar. Press), vol. ii. pp. 347 ff.The Philosophy of Ideas
&quot;
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determination of the psychological point of view.
The progress of philosophy partly consists in the
creation of sciences : it leads to the definition of
points of view from which things are regarded,
and so to the development of special sciences,
which are theories of abstracted portions or
aspects of reality. This is clearly instanced in
the work of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. At
whatever rate we may estimate the differences
between these thinkers, it is impossible to ignore
the extent of their agreement ; and that agree-
, merit consists primarily in their emphasis on the
subjective aspect of things. However they may
vary in the extent to which they consider explana
tion to be possible, they agree in thinking that
the explanation of things consists in reducing
them to
&quot;
ideas,&quot; or states of consciousness. Their
whole work is dominated by this conception.
Theirs is the philosophy of ideas a philosophy
for which the abstract or unexplained subject is
everything, and in which all reality tends to
resolve itself into the passing states of the indi
vidual consciousness. Its final stage, indeed, is
not reached till personal life is so resolved, and
becomes, with Hume, only a name for the series24 John Stuart Mill
of ideas. But the tendency to this result, and
even the necessity for it, is present from the
beginning. It is bound up with the idea of ex
planation which directs the work of Locke no
less than that of his successors. Philosophy has,
for the time being, become psychology ; and in
this way the psychological standpoint is defined.
Psychology shares with all other special sciences
the necessity for abstraction for a limitation
of attention to one part or aspect of existence.
Such limitation is the condition of all specialisa
tion of theory ; and each science is defined by
the form which its abstraction takes. In the
case of psychology, the point of view adopted
is inevitably subjective ; the position of ideas in
the subjective process is considered by it, to the
exclusion of all other relations that they may
have, in the complex of reality. Psychology is
thus the science of Individual Mind. Its origin o
belongs to that deepened consciousness of per
sonal isolation which characterises modern thought O
and life: it is the science of the isolated or ab
stracted individual.
The determination, however, of this psychologi
cal point of view was the outcome of an attemptMetaphysical Individualism 25
to solve philosophical rather than merely scien
tific problems. The abstraction from outward
relations was not, in. general, deliberately or
consciously made for psychological purposes.
The facts of consciousness were regarded as the
sole clue to reality itself : the alxtmd subject
was taken to be the whole of knowable existence.
Such metaphysical use of abstract conceptions is
an inevitable accompaniment of the growth of
knowledge. Tt testifies, indeed, to the strength
of the demand for rnetaphysic, that every science
tends in this way to become metaphysical that
every aspect of experience, in turn, is taken for
the whole, or made to explain the whole. The
special metaphysical attempt, which we have
been considering, was essentially psychological
in its character
; and it separated personal life
from all other reality, because it made
&quot; ideas
&quot;
the sole object of knowledge. It thus left the
individual limited to himself, shorn of his rela
tions to outward objects of knowledge and to
other persons, bound hand and foot in the prison-
house of his own subjectivity.
This individualism was Mill s philosophical
starting-point. He inherited a theory of man s26 John Stuart Mill
relation to nature and society which came straight
from the eighteenth century. The doctrine of
man s natural separateness from the world of
things and from other persons has seldom been
accepted with less reserve than in the writings
of Bentham and James Mill
; and Mill learned it
from them so thoroughly that he may be said
never to have been able entirely to forget it.
Even when he was most critical of his early






the groundwork of this philosophy, as he under
stood it, was the limitation of human knowledge
to &quot;jstates _of_conscious_ness.&quot;
It need not surprise us, then, to find, in Mill s
theory of knowledge, elements that embody the
individualism of the
&quot;
theory of ideas.&quot; Mill is
himself aware of the relation of his theory of
knowledge to that of Berkeley, and to some extent
of Hume. He recognises Berkeley s results as &quot;the
starting-point of the true analytic method of study
ing the human mind, of which they alone have
rendered possible the subsequent developments j&quot;
1
and he insists on the truth of Berkeley s concep-
i Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iv. p. 157.A Text-book of Empiricism 27
tion of knowledge, although he finds it necessary
to do so at the expense of the theological idealism
to which Berkeley s philosophy was meant to lead.
Mill s individualism, however, is really an
integral part of his philosophy
: it is connected
with the motive of his thinking no less vitally
than with his inherited bias. The System of




empiricism of the doctrine
&quot; which derives all
knowledge from experience, and all moral and
intellectual qualities principally from the direc
tion given to the associations
;
&quot; l and Mill s
interest in this theory of knowledge was mainly
due to his conviction, that
&quot; the notion that
truths external to the mind may be known by
intuition or consciousness, independently of ob
servation and experiment,&quot; is
&quot; in these times the
great intellectual support of false doctrines and
bad institutions.&quot;
l But his intention of making
experience the sole source of knowledge is carried
out in his limitation of knowledge to the states of
individual consciousness
; and in this way his
individualistic theory of knowledge is connected
with his practical interests.
1
Autobiography, p. 225.28 John Stuart Mill
This aspect of Mill s thought centres in his
assertion that &quot;of the outward world we know
and can know absolutely nothing, except the
sensations which we experience from it.&quot;
1 We
can trace to this conception a whole system of
ideas about knowledge, which play a most im
portant part in Mill s philosophy. Once we take
the view that &quot;feeling and thought are much
more real than anything else,&quot; and that
&quot;they
are the only things which we directly know
to be real,&quot;
2 we are committed to a theory of
knowledge. It follows inevitably that &quot;the
whole variety of the facts of nature as we
know it is given in the mere existence of our
sensations, and in the laws or order of their
occurrence
;
&quot; 3 and that
&quot;
every objective fact is
grounded on a corresponding subjective one,&quot;
4
and is merely
&quot;a name for the unknown and
inscrutable process by which that subjective or
psychological fact is brought to
pass.&quot;
5
This conception of all reality, beyond subjective
states, as merely matter of inference, applies both
1
Logic, p. 39. 2
Essays on Religion, p. 202.
3 Examination of Hamilton, p. 257.
4
Logic, p. 49. 5 Ibid.Sensationalism 29
to material and to mental facts. A body is simply





&quot; the thinking principle, or mind,
in my own nature, makes itself known to me only
by the feelings of which it is conscious.&quot;
~ Of the
inferential character of our knowledge of outward
reality, Mill speaks confidently. He even goes so
far as to suggest that
&quot; we have in all probability
no notion of not-self, until after considerable ex
perience of the recurrence of sensations according
to fixed laws, and in groups.&quot;
3 Knowledge
begins, in fact, with simple unreferred sensa
tions
; and the consciousness of a real world,
the reference of sensations to outward objects,
is a later stage in its development. Things
are merely the causes of our ideas
; and we
gradually come to infer their existence from the
presence of their effects. This is no less true of
the relations between the elements of our ex
perience than of these elements themselves. The
relations are themselves simply feelings,
&quot;lie-
semblance is nothing but our feeling of resem
blance





:i Examination of Hamilton, p. 265.30 John Stuart Mill
succession.&quot;
1 Eelations are feelings that are pro
duced by the relation between feelings. No less
than simple sensations, they are effects upon us
of the order of things an order which we do not
directly know, but which produces knowledge in
us, and whose reality we are able to infer, al
though Mill does not explain how the inference
comes about, or how knowledge is produced by
that which has no objective character. On the
whole, as Mill says plainly,
&quot;the distinction
which we verbally make between the properties
of things and the sensations we receive from them,
must originate in the convenience of discourse
rather than in the nature of what is signified by
the terms.&quot;
2
It might be suggested that this particular
&quot; convenience of discourse
&quot;
is in itself a highly
significant fact: the objectification, which is
required for coherent speech, might reasonably
be regarded as more than an accidental excres
cence upon knowlege. It is at all events proper
that we should examine the validity of a way of
thinking which leads to such practical difficulties





&quot; and Knowledge 3
1
&amp;lt;_&amp;gt; *J
belong inseparably to the attempt to make states
of consciousness our ultimate term of explanation.
There are undeniable grounds for making the
personal life of the thinking subject our clue to
reality. All thought is in the life and develop
ment of individual minds : subjective states are
the only appropriations of the objective world
that can constitute knowledge. But it is none
the less misleading to regard objective reality as
explained by reducing it to ideas




abstracts from their rela
tion to the objective world, and
&quot;
ideas,&quot; in this
abstraction, are not knowledge. Knowledge con
sists, not in ideas per se, but in ideas synthesised
by and organised into a subject, in which alone
they have being and permanence. It is not, in
fact, the self 4aken in abstraction, but the self
as it exists in the knowing synthesis, that can




&quot; states of consciousness,&quot; however,
is to abstract the self from the synthesis of
\
knowledge; and, while this abstraction may be
proper to the psychological point of view, it
yields a conception of the &quot;self
1 which is
metaphysically useless.32 John Stuart Mill
Further criticism of Mill s individualism must
be postponed until we come to speak of his own
correction of it. It is to be observed, meanwhile,
that this view of knowledge really enters into
his conception of man s place in the world. He
thinks of knowledge and conduct as effects of
merely outward reality; and this deterministic
empiricism this idea of thought and action as
products of a world which is wholly external
is rooted in the individualism that makes reality
not the object but the cause of knowledge, and
so subordinates personal life to an order with
which it stands in no internal or vital relation.
Apart from this individualistic assumption, the
view of human life as a causally connected unity,
and even as rooted in the natural order, would
not lead to that empirical conception of it, as
the passive creature of circumstances, which Mill
sometimes adopts.
The effect of Mill s individualism on his general
view of human life shows his inability to escape
from it; and we find further evidence of this
in his logical theory. His conception of Logic
itself commits him to an abstract or subjective
treatment of it. To affirm that
&quot; so far as it isPsy
&amp;gt;chologicaI Logic 3 3
a science at all, it is a part or branch of Psy





Logic a science of &quot;mental
states&quot;; and this
view, which is an obvious sequel to the idea
that the objects of knowledge are
&quot; in other
words&quot; states of consciousness,
2 evidences itself
only too freely in Mill s treatment of logical
questions.
The theory of judgment which regards it as a
coupling of two mental states is a decisive and
important instance of the attempt to interpret
knowledge psychologically; and this, while it
is not Mill s general or leading view, is yet
explicitly stated by him, and is by no means
without effect in his logical theory. It follows
naturally from the treatment of &quot;ideas&quot; in the
earlier part of the Logic ;
3 and it has con
siderable influence on the subsequent discus
sion.
This theory of judgment connects itself with
the conception of causality which Mill inherited
from Hume the conception which regards it as
1 Examination of Hamilton, p. 461.
2
Logic, p. 64. (;f. Logic, bk. i. c. iii.34 John Stuart Mill
merely subjective. We need not pause here to
discuss the consistency of this doctrine with the
place which Mill assigns to causality in his treat
ment of Induction. The view of the causal relation
as simply a mental sequence obviously belongs
to that same mode of thought which regards
predication as mere coupling of mental states.
From the point of view of psychology, causality
is nothing more than this sequence of ideas,
which constitutes a habit of expecting what
we call the effect when we find the cause
; and







2 which seems to
him to vitiate other theories of causality, leaves
him with a view of the causal relation which
gives effect to his individualist leanings a view
which results in the completest possible dissocia
tion of the factors in the relation, and falls in
with his conception of knowledge as a coupling
&amp;lt;zff isolated ideas. It need not surprise us that
/this theory of judgment and of the causal rela
tion modifies his idea of definition and inference.
Whatever view is taken of judgment must
affect the idea of definition
; for the scope of def-
1
Logic, p. 548.
2 Examination of Hamilton, p. 003.Definition O u
inition is at all events limited by that of judg
ment, since we always define by judging. Mill
asserts that definition is purely verbal &quot;a mere
identical proposition which gives information only
about the use of
language.&quot;
1 He takes all defi
nitionapart from a postulate which might give
it objective significance to be merely a declara
tion of the meaning of a word. Xow, the rela
tion of this to the psychological theory of judg
ment and causality is evident. If judgment be a
coupling of ideas, then the ideas that a defining
judgment couples are those of a name and an
interpretation of it. If, on the other hand, we
regard judgment as a statement of the objective
reality of a relation, then definition also will be a
statement about reality: it will be a statement
of the determining qualities of a thing. While
definition is always a hypothetical judgment, it
may still, on this view, be a hypothetical judg
ment about reality; and it can only be regarded
as essentially verbal on the ground that judgment
itself has no objective reference.
Nominalism is, in fact, a normal element in a
sensationalist theory of knowledge ; and there is
1
Logic. ]&amp;gt;. 94.36 John Stuart Mill
nothing mysterious about the persistent connec
tion between these tendencies of thought. In so
far as we limit knowledge to sensations, we are
compelled to regard judgments as concerned
merely with ideas
; for if knowledge be not essen
tially a synthesis, then its real objects are bare
and unrelated particulars, and the connections
between them are nominal and unreal. Mill s
contention that definition is merely verbal, results
naturally from his tendency to regard judgment
as a coupling of mental states, and to make
isolated and unreferred sensations the object of
knowledge,
His theory of inference bears traces of the same
origin. He regards syllogism as a mere mode of
statement, and not a form of proof; and this
view of it depends on his conception of the
elements from which knowledge is built up. If
these elements are isolated states of conscious
ness, and therefore mere particulars, then it is
no doubt true that the major premise of a syllo-
&amp;lt;nsm, being simply a general statement about all
such particulars, can never prove anything. But
if the objects of our knowledge are regarded as
realities capable of analysis, then a general state-Syllogism 3 7
inent, which takes to do with their common ele
ment and abstracts from their differences, may
have a value, as a means of proof, greater than
that of all the imanalysed instances, on which it is
nevertheless analytically founded. Mill s denial
of the validity of syllogistic proof really suggests
that the truth of argument depends upon its
content, and that its general form can prove
nothing ; but he fails to give effect to this sug
gestion because he conceives the content of judg
ment in such a way that it cannot lie a ground
of proof. To affirm that
&quot; the syllogism is not a
correct analysis
&quot; x of the process of reasoning,
because that process is always
&quot; an inference from
particulars to particulars,&quot; is to assume that the
particulars in question contain no universal ele
ment
; and Mill does assume this, in so far as lie
identifies the object of knowledge with isolated
sensations.
That the psychological view of knowledge
serves in part to determine Mill s theory of
inference, is also shown, if further proof be
needed, by his identification of the logical theory
of reasoning with the psychological explanation
1
Lugic, p. 128.38 JoJin St^^,art Mill
by association of ideas,
1 and by his interpreta
tion of logical inference as a &quot;habit of expecting
that what has been found true once or several
times, and never yet found false, will be found
true again.&quot;
2 Whatever validity such explana
tions may possess as statements of the psy
chology of reasoning, to make them the basis of
logical theories is to regard logic as the science
of the subjective process ; and the propriety of
this depends on that theory of explanation which
makes it consist in reduction to
&quot;
ideas.&quot;
It appears, then, that that conception of the
knowing subject which isolates it from all other
reality plays no small part in Mill s Logic, affect
ing, as it does, his idea of definition and inference,








\YiULK Mill s logic contains elements that are
due to the individualistic, or psychological, point
of view from which he sometimes regards
thought, these elements do not constitute his
whole theory of knowledge. His individualism
has, indeed, a real effect on his logical doctrine :
his theories of definition and inference are influ
enced by his limitation of knowledge to states
of consciousness. But he also entertains an en
tirely different, and even opposite, conception of
knowledge; and this conception is the basis of his
most distinctive and valuable work as a logician.
The ground of this less abstract idea of experi
ence is to be found in Mill s consciousness of the
direct relation of thought to the rest of reality
a consciousness which is expressed primarily in40 John Stuart Mill
a denial of the unqualified or absolute isolation of
mental life. He affirms his conviction that
&quot; the
conceptions, which we employ for the colligation
and methodisation of facts, do not develop them
selves from within, but are impressed upon the
\\ mind from without
; they are never obtained
otherwise than by way of comparison and ab
straction, and, in the most important and the
most numerous cases, are evolved by abstraction
from the very phenomena which it is their office
to
colligate.&quot;
x He insists that
&quot; the conception
is not furnished lij the mind until it has been
furnished to the mind.&quot;
2 He regards the feeling
of certainty and the necessity that sometimes
belongs to our judgments as due to the impress
of reality upon our mental life, and to the degree
in which our mental habits are fashioned by the
course of things.
3 He makes experience so






4 and he studies the principles that should











Ibid., p. 545.Axioms 4
1
One of the most important instances of this
way of thinking is the account which Mill gives
of those axioms that lie at the root of knowledge.
He holds that
&quot; unless we knew something
immediately, we could not know anything medi
ately, and consequently could not know anything
at all
;
&quot; l and he investigates axioms with a dis
tinct consciousness that the account given of
them determines the mode in which experience
itself is to be conceived. Knowledge depends
upon recognition of these axioms, the truth of
which is self-evident and immediately known.
If they are known a priori, then experience con-
tains actual elements which are not empirical in
their origin. Mill declares against this view.
Axioms, he says,




&quot; - and this is not
only true of the axioms on which mathematical
science depends ; those postulates which lie at
the root of all knowledge of nature are no less
empirical in their origin.
&quot; The law of Causa
tion, the recognition of which is the main pillar
of inductive science, is but the familiar truth,
that invariability of succession is found by ob-
1 Examination of Hamilton, \&amp;gt;. 157.
-
Logic, p. lfl.42 John Stuart Mill
servation to obtain between every fact in nature




&quot; such a notion as can be gained from
experience.&quot;
*
In the same way, an experiential origin is
claimed for the idea of the Uniformity of Nature.
&quot;
It would ... be a great error to offer this
large generalisation as any explanation of the
inductive process. On the contrary, I hold it
to be itself an instance of induction, and induc
tion by no means of the most obvious kind.&quot;
-
The conception of experience which this view of
axioms yields is very obvious. From its simplest
beginnings to its largest and most general results,
experience is the product in man of the order
of things in which he lives. That order is re
produced in him
; his thought depends upon
and follows it.
Now, while this way of thinking is in the
highest degree significant, as a correction of that
individualistic limitation of thought to itself
which is an element in Mill s theory of know
ledge, it must, at the same time, be recognised
that such a statement of the relation of thought
1
Logic, p. 21 o.
-
Ibid., ].. -201.Thought and Tilings 45
to reality is equivocal and even misleading. It
may mean nothing better than the determin
istic empiricism that makes thought the mere
creature of a reality conceived as foreign to it
;
it mav subject intelligence to things, in such a v V O O
&quot;
way as to render a science of Logic fatuous and
impossible ; and Mill does actually tend to con
ceive knowledge in this way. In his zeal for
experience, and for the direct relation of thought
to things, he barely escapes, if indeed he does
escape, the reduction of knowledge to a merely
passive process.
On the other hand, it is happily not needful
to put such a construction on Mill s theory of
experience. That theory may be combined with
an idea of Nature which does full justice to the
distinctive character of knowledge. If we take
such a view of the activity of the thinking sub
ject as is sometimes explicitly stated,
1 and very
generally implied, by Mill himself, the assertion
of the dependence of every element in knowledge
upon experience is no more than every sane philo
sophy admits. Any kind of &quot;Idealism&quot; which
1 Examination of Hamilton, pp.
&quot;&amp;gt;S It .: Dissertations ami
Discussions, vol. iii. pp. 120 ti.44 John Stuart Mill
lives by clinging to those conceptions for which
no experiential basis can yet be found, must have
an increasingly precarious existence; and even
Mill s strongest assertions of the dependence
upon experienced fact of all conceptions and
axioms leave undisputed the dependence of
experience itself upon activity. Such asser
tions form, indeed, no small contribution to the
development of a theory of knowledge. They
make thought in the fullest sense objective ; so P f
that things_ may be said f-n *J&quot; *ik in np
_
knowledge is the coming to consciousness of
(
reality itself.
This interpretation of Mill s experientialism is
not one which requires to be discovered or in
vented in his defence. It is only a statement of
the significance which his theory of knowledge
actually has for him. Objectivity is charac
teristic of Mill s whole treatment of logic. He
regards it as
&quot; common ground on which the
partisans of Hartley and of Reid, of Locke and




does so because he thinks of it as a science of
Evidence, the object of which is to investigate
1
Logic, p. 8.77/6 Science of Evidence 45
the nature of proof, and which is therefore not
directly concerned in metaphysical or psycholo
gical differences. This view of logic as an objec
tive science of evidence distinguishes Mill sharply
from Comte. Cointe made logic a science of dis
covery, the object of which was to find how the
craving for clear and coherent conceptions could
be satisfied: lie did not investigate the methods
of verification and proof. Mill s logic, on the\
other hand, is, above all, a study of the concli- \
V-
tions of proof of the mode in which the real
causes of phenomena can lie found and verified.
1
He regards truth as an objective standard, by
~
which every one means the same tiling
&quot;
agree-
ment of a belief with the fact whichjit purports
to represent
&quot; 2 and he makes this the basis of
logic.
&quot; If the operation of forming a judgment
or a proposition includes anything at all, it in
cludes judging that the judgment or the proposi
tion is true. The recognition of it as true is not
only an essential part but the essential element
of it as a judgment ; leave that out, and there
1 Cf. Hoffding, Kinleitung in die Knglische Philosophic
unserer Zeit (German trans.), p. 32.
- Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iii. p. n.
r
&amp;gt;7.46 John Stuart Mill





f of the conditions on which right concepts, judg
ments, and reasonings depend.&quot;
2 It is not merely
the science of formal accuracy or consistency in
thinking ; for
&quot;
it is only as a means to material
truth that the formal, or, to speak more clearly,
the conditional, validity of an operation of





of thinking, of all thinking, and of nothing but
thinking.&quot;
4
This assertion of the objective and normative
character which belongs to logic as a science, and
of the idea of truth as the determining idea of
all logical investigation, gives the science a posi
tion entirely different from that of a mere branch
of psychology. Mill adopts a new conception of
logic, at the outset of his discussion of the
&quot;
Import of Propositions,&quot; when he says that it
/
&quot; has no concern with the nature of the act of
\/
judging or believing; the consideration of that
act, as a phenomenon of the mind, belongs to
another science.&quot;
;&amp;gt;








Logic, p. 55.Objective Thought 47
Such a conception of logic is hardly consistent
with the Humian phenomenalism of Mill s theory
of knowledge ; it depends rather upon the assump
tion that the object of knowledge is a real world
distinct from the subjective mental processes of
the individual. This is an assumption which Mill
may have learned from Ifeid, and of which he
seems to be so unconscious that he does not see
any necessity for vindicating it. He suggests,
indeed, that
&quot;
if the only real object of thought,
even when we are nominally speaking of Koti-
mena, are Phenomena, our thoughts are true when
they are made to correspond with Phenomena.
]
The world of Phenomena seems to form, in this
su&amp;lt;westion, a sort of tcrtium f/uid between thoughts OO *
and things. In any case &quot;Phenomena&quot; are





the object of knowledge is regarded as other than
states of consciousness. Mill does not escape the
antithesis of thought and its object any more
than Locke or Kant;&quot;
2
and, when he comes to
discuss the problems of logic in detail, he rinds48 John Stuart Mill
the objective reference of thought to be the aspect
of it which requires most emphasis and considera
tion. The serious and constructive part of his
logic is rooted in his demand for proof and veri
fication
; and it thus depends on the conscious
ness of a real world of knowable objects.
This conception of knowledge is not only im
plicitly conveyed in Mill s logical discussions : it
is also expressly stated and argued for. He
abandon^ and _ criticises the representation of
knowledge as an aggregate of unreferred ideas,
and recognises that it depends on a consciousness,
on the one hand, of the real world, and, on
the other hand, of the self. These, he says, in
speaking of developed knowledge,
&quot;
represent two
things with both of which the sensation of the
moment, be it what it may, stands in relation,
and I cannot be conscious of the sensation with
out being conscious of it as related to these two
things.&quot;
x
Mill seems, indeed, to forget much of his own




2 when he says of the theory of know
ledge, by which that discussion is really domin-
1 Examination of Hamilton, p. 266.
-
Logic, bk. i. c. iii.Objective Thought 49
ated,
&quot; the notion that what is of primary import-
ancc to the logician, in a proposition, is the rela
tion between the two ideas corresponding to the
subject and predicate (instead of the relation be
tween the two phenomena which they respectively
express), seems to me one of the most fatal errors
ever introduced into the philosophy of
logic.&quot;
1
But this sweeping statement does not stand alone.
It forms part of a discussion of the
&quot;
Import of
Propositions,&quot; in which the implication in all
judgment of an objective reference is asserted
again and again, unhesitatingly and deliberately.
Propositions
&quot; are not assertions respecting our
ideas of things, but assertions respecting the
things themselves.&quot;
2 An integral part, too, of
Mill s criticism of Hamilton s Logic is expressed
in his desire to hear &quot;less about Concepts and
more about Things, less about Forms of Thought
and more about grounds of Knowledge.&quot;
3 He
insists, against the subjective or formal concep
tion of logic, that
&quot; the judgment is not a recogni
tion of a relation between concepts, but of a suc
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facts,&quot;
1 and that &quot;judgment is concerning the
fact, not the concept
&quot;
;
2 and he adduces Hamil
ton s own contention that new truths are dis
covered by reasoning, to disprove his assertion
&quot; that reasoning is the comparison of two notions
through the medium of a third.
3
It cannot he doubted that this, which has now
been stated, is Mill s real view of knowledge. It
is the conception that underlies his interest in
Induction, and in the actual scientific procedure,
upon which his theory of Induction is based
; and
it is the conception to which his assertion of the
empirical character of all knowledge leads natur
ally and almost inevitably. Mill s acceptance of
this objective theory of logic is so frank and so
thorough that he says, of logical laws, that
&quot; since
they are laws of all phenomena, and since
Existence has to us no meaning but one which
has relation to Phenomena, we are quite safe in
looking upon them as laws of Existence.&quot;
4 Such
an utterance as this is conceived, indeed, in the
spirit of the same resolute empiricism which
prompts Mill s limitation of knowledge to the







Ibid., p. 492.Objective Thought 51
subjective process, and makes him regard logic
as a branch of psychology wl quantum mutatux
al&amp;gt; illo.
Witliin the limits of the &quot;experience philo
sophy,&quot; Mill s limitation of knowledge to mental
states has given place to a conception of it which
makes it an apprehension of the fulness of con
crete reality. His consciousness of the objectivity
of knowledge is grown so definite that it leads him
to regard logic as a science not of abstract or sub
jective thought but of existence. Logic becomes,
on such a view of it, the science of certain ultimate
relations of things. The existence of these rela
tions may indeed be dependent on the relativity
of all being to thought; but they belong none the
less but all the more on that account to the con
stitution of reality, and are not merely subjective
modifications of conscious life. At such a point
as this Mill is much more nearly idealistic than
he can be said to be in that subjectivist pheno
menalism which is sometimes, strangely enough, o / o
*
regarded as an idealistic element in his thinking.
1
It connects itself with this assertion of the
objective validity of logical laws, and still more
1 Of. Mr CourtneyV Met.apliysics of ,T. S. Mill. p.
:}.&quot;.5 2 John Stuart Mill
directly with the idea of logic as a science of
truth, that Mill makes judgment the unit of
logical theory.
1 As he says himself,
&quot; The answer
to every question, which it is possible to frame,
must be contained in a Proposition, or Assertion.
Whatever can be an object of belief, or even of
disbelief, must, when put into words, assume the
form of a proposition. All truth and all error
lie in propositions. What, by a convenient mis
application of an abstract term, we call a Truth,
is simply a True Proposition; and errors are
false propositions.&quot;
2 Judgment is, in fact, the
simplest possible form of objective thought
: apart
from it, there is no belief and no knowledge.
Pteference to reality exists only in judgment:
if it appears to belong to concepts, it belongs
to them simply in virtue of the judgments by
which they have been constructed.
3 But since
objective reference and the possibility of truth
are thus present for the first time in judg
ment, it is with judgment that we have to
do in logic.
&quot;
Logic does not undertake to
analyse mental facts into their ultimate ele-
1 Cf. Mr Bradley s Principles of Logic, book i. c. i.
-
Logic, p. 12.
3 Examination of Hamilton, pp. 419, 420./&quot;
tf jr s~ The Science of Judgment X .*
ments.&quot;
* It does not investigate the mode in lA
which knowledge originates historically. It is
the science of the objective reference or the
validity of knowledge ; and so it has to consider
judgments and not concepts. Its starting-point
is in the judgment, since it has to do, not with
the existence, but solely with the use of con
cepts.
2
Concepts have no meaning for it, as they
have none for knowledge, otherwise than in the
objective synthesis of judgment. In his discus^
sion of judgment, Mill is so free from the in- ^
fluence of epistemological individualism that he
denies the very existence of concepts. He re
gards the concept as a mere abstraction, made
for the purpose of judgment. It has
&quot;
merely a
fictitious or constructive existence,&quot;
3 and is dif
ferentiated from the rest of the mental complex,
to which it actually belongs, only by
&quot; a special
share of attention guaranteed to it by special
association with a name.&quot;
3 This fictitious or con
structive character of the concept makes it an




2 Cf. Mr Bradley s Principles of Logic, book i. c. i.
3 Examination of Hamilton, p. 402.54 John Stuart Mill
Mill s suggestion, that it would be better to
say that we think by means of general names
than by means of concepts,
1
is a remarkable
instance of his tendency to nominalism. It
affords, however, a less useful and less con
sistent correction of the formal conception of
logic than his own statement and assumption
that logic has to do only with judgment, and
that neither ideas nor things have any place in
knowledge otherwise than in the synthesis of
judgment. Mill is only carrying this view a
stage further when he suggests, in explanation
of the importance of hypothetical propositions,
&quot; that what they predicate of a proposition,
namely, its being an inference from something
else, is precisely that one of its attributes with
which most of all a logician is concerned.&quot;
2
Logic
is, in fact, primarily a science of inference or
proof ; and the inferential relations of judgments
are those with which it takes to do. What is
relevant for the logician is the way in which a
proposition
&quot;
may be made available for advancing
from it to other propositions.&quot;
3 On the other hand.
1 Examination of Hamilton, p. 403.
-
Logic, p. 54. 3
Ibid., p. 76.The Science of Judgment 5 5
judgments are in themselves real
; they constitute
knowledge ; and they are capable of truth and
falsehood. It is thus at once possible and neces
sary for logic to find its starting-point in them.
This conception of logic as the science of judg
ment and reasoning is so central to Mill s theory,
that his view of the meaning of general names is
partly determined by the necessities of judgment.
&quot;
Propositions and Reasonings,&quot; he says,
&quot;
may be
written in extension but they are always under
stood in Comprehension ;
&quot; l &quot;
all judgments, ex
pressed by means of general terms, are judgments
in comprehension.&quot;
- In the proposition, c.y.,
&quot; The summit of Chimborazo is white,&quot;
&quot; the
meaning of the proposition ... is that the indi
vidual thing denoted by the subject has the attri
butes connoted by the predicate.&quot;
3 This is the
view which is required in order to make reas
oning intelligible;
4 and the fact that judgment
and reasoning are only explicable on the under
standing that the meaning of general names is
fixed by their connotation, has probably much to
do with Mill s acceptance of that theory.
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This view of the meaning of general names
that it
&quot; resides in the connotation
&quot; 1 is one
which Mill consistently and unhesitatingly main
tains, in opposition to the theory that the exten
sion or denotation of names is their meaning.
&quot; In predicating the name,&quot; he says,
&quot; we predi
cate only the attributes
; and the fact of belong
ing to a class does not, in many cases, come into
view at all.&quot;
2




subject-matter of judgment and reasoning, raises
an important issue for Mill s theory of know
ledge, an issue which is significant in connection
with his refusal to regard the distinction be
tween sensations and properties of things as
anything more than a
&quot; convenience of dis
course.&quot;
3
Abstinence from a distinction between sensa
tions and qualities of things is, of course, apt to
be a one-sided bargain, since it is very gener
ally equivalent to a reduction of the objective
world to states of consciousness. But Mill s
assertion of the objective reference of knowledge
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qualities of things as other tliaii^ mere mental
states; and such an expectation does not remain
wholly unfulfilled. Mill s account of judgment,
as an ascription of attributes to reality, contains
a view of attributes which is not really consistent
with their identification with states of individual
consciousness. He does not, indeed, expressly
qualify his denial of the distinction in question.
But, on the one hand, he distinguishes sharply
between objects, or phenomena, and the ideas of
them
; while, on the other hand, he connects the
idea of phenomena, characterised by attributes,
with that of an order of nature. It remains pos
sible, of course, still to maintain that these
phenomena, and nature itself, cannot be distin
guished from feelings or subjective states. But
such a refusal to recognise an objective order of
things would render Mill s brave words about
the objective reference of judgment wholly idle
and unmeaning. Why should we take pains to
insist that judgment is about things, and not
about ideas, if, all the while, there is no real
ground for distinguishing things from ideas at o o o o
all?
That Mill recognised the attributes of things,5 8 John Stuart Mill
as belonging to the real world, is borne out by
his actual use of them : the idea that they are
mot mere mental states, but determinations of
ol objective reality, evidences itself in his theory
[ of classification. He recognises the legitimacy
of various subjective modes of classification,
which are
&quot;
all good, for the purposes of their
own particular departments of knowledge or
practice.&quot;





members are bound together by the common pos




&quot; are constituted in contemplation of, and
by reason of, characters.&quot;
- Their resemblance
their agreement in certain attributes or characters
^
forms the ground of the relation between the
individuals_which^constitute the group.
&quot; The
kind, to us, is the set of properties by which it
is identified.&quot;
y
Attributes or qualities of things thus form the
basis of objective classification of the classifica
tion of things according to their own nature. Such
classification is not, indeed, determined by
&quot; resem
blance to a
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characters which serve to differentiate things
which possess them from tilings which do not.
Still the idea of classification according to Nat
ural Kinds implies a system of objective natural
relations. It involves the existence of classes
which are
&quot;
distinguished from all other classes
by an indeterminate multitude of properties not
derivable from one another,&quot;
1 and between which,
consequently,
&quot; there is an impassable
barrier.&quot;
-
The problem of fixing the conception of a kind is
&quot;
to find a few definite characters, which point to
the multitude of indefinite ones.&quot;
- Kinds are
thus constituted by a standard, reference to
which determines whether objects belong to them
or not
;
y and Mill recognises that such kinds-
classes of phenomena bound together by relation
to an intellectual standard are objectively
present in nature.
The theory of kinds, we learn from Mill, was
added to the Logic
&quot;




4 and that it originates, in
this way, in the necessities of his treatment of
1
Logic, p. 81.
- Ibid., p. 471.
j
3 Cf. Mr Bosanquet s Logic, vol. i. pp. 125 if.
4
Autobiography, p. 181.60 John Stiiart Mill
induction, is a significant fact. In itself, how
ever, the theory is, in the highest degree, im
portant. Such a conception as it implies, of the
intelligibility of nature of the degree in which
reality expresses and embodies principles that
are not alien to our reason is a suggestive ele
ment in Mill s Logic. It conveys the idea of
nature as a rational system ; and this constitutes
the logical significance of Mill s contention that
natural or objective classifications, no less than
those which are devised in various subjective
interests, are based upon characters of things.
Since these characters are simply attributes or
qualities, and since they are, at the same time,
the ground of an objective or natural classifica
tion of things, attributes come to have in this
connection the objective significance which be
longs to them in Mill s theory of judgment, but





MILL S assertion of the existence of Natural
Kinds his belief in an objective method of
classification implies a conception of nature, as
an objective system, which goes far to correct
his phenomenalist theory of knowledge ; and this
conception is specially inconsistent with the
psychological doctrine of causality which he
sometimes affirms. Mill inherited from Hume
that idea of the causal relation which makes it
simply a subjective habit of expectation, induced
by frequent repetition of a sequence of mental
states
; and he does not openly abandon this way
of regarding causality. Jkit the conception of
nature, as a system of objective things, whose
attributes determine one another, has no vital
connection with this purely psychological account62 John Stuart Mill
of the relation of cause and effect; and it need
not surprise us if we find, in Mill s explicit doc
trine of causality, elements which are not con
sistent with that mode of conceiving the relation
which he derived from Hume.
Such elements are not far to seek. Even
when Mill makes consciousness of change the
motive of the search for causes,
1 he does so in a
spirit akin to that rather of Lotze than of Hume.
What seems to him to need explanation is the
&quot;




2 and the idea of the causal
relation, as one which belongs objectively to
things as we know them, is still more definitely
suggested in the statement that
&quot; the cause . . .
&quot;J is the sum-total of the conditions, positive and
negative, taken together.&quot;
3 Such an account of
causation presents the idea of known reality as a
single developing process, whose later stages
grow out of its earlier, and in which various
elements conspire to produce each new manifes
tation of its nature. But this is a way of think
ing for which the relations that characterise o
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reality in our knowledge are. virtually at all
events, even if not explicitly, objects of con
structive thought, rather than mere states of
subjective feeling. If we make nature a system
of things, then causality becomes merely the most
abstract way of conceiving their systematic or
rational connection.
The same tendency shows itself in Mill s asser
tion that, in the investigation of causes,
&quot; the
Plurality of Causes is the only reason why mere
number is of any importance.
] The causal
relation is not constituted by the mere frequency
of any particular sequence
: it is in the nature
and not the constancy of the sequence that it
really consists
; and the demonstrative use of a
number of instances depends merely on the fact
that they furnish a rough substitute for analysis
of the phenomena.
These elements in Mill s theory of causality
convey the idea that the causal relation is not a
mere habit of expectation, but an objective deter
mination of things. But this idea of causality is
most definitely expressed by Mill in his statement
that the causal relation is distinguished from64 John Stuart Mill
the relation of mere sequence by being uncondi
tional.
&quot; Invariable sequence, therefore, is not
synonymous with causation, unless the sequence,
besides being invariable, is unconditional.&quot;
1 It







are required ; and
Mill criticises Comte s refusal to use these words
mainly on the ground that this refusal indicates
the absence of an idea of unconditional relation.
2
The significance of such an interpretation of
causality can hardly be overstated. It means,
for Mill himself, that the causal relation is a
necessary one
;
3 and this conception of the rela
tion is a real departure from Mill s own asser
tion of the absence of
&quot;
necessity
&quot; from the action
of causes.
4 That assertion, however, is the inevit
able issue of the reduction of the causal relation
to a habit of expectation, or a mere sequence of
ideas
; for if the causal relation is unconditional,
it is not any kind of subjective sequence. Mill s
statement that causality is a necessary relation is
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This conception of causality as an uncondi
tional relation of things is Mill s most positive
idea on the subject ; although he does not
clear it of certain confusions, which are bound
up with the theory that serial order is the
essence of the causal relation that sequence is
its primary characteristic. His tendency, for
example, to separate
&quot; uniformities of coexist
ence&quot; from the principle of causality,
1 may be
traced to the presupposition that the causal
relation is essentially serial that it is a relation
involving temporal sequence in its terms, and
that an interval of time elapses, as it were, be
tween the cause and the effect, Now, such a view
is really a return to the psychological conception
of causality ; and it must, in the long-run, bring
about a reduction of causality to mere change
or sequence, and a failure to conceive it as the





which Mill finds the essence of causality, involves
the unity of cause and effect. If, as he says, the
cause
&quot;
is the sum-total of the conditions positive
and negative taken together,&quot;
- then the cause
1
Logic, pp. 381 if.
2
Uncl., p. 217.
E66 John Stuart Mill
cannot be present without the effect; for &quot;the
sum-total of the conditions
&quot;
constitutes the very
presence of the effect itself. Mill tries to make
the idea of causality, conceived as mere sequence,
do duty for that of the whole system of categories,
which all relation may be said to imply, but to
which even the fullest and most concrete inter
pretation of causality is not adequate. The
abandonment, however, of the view that the
causal relation is essentially serial is really im-
y plied in regarding it as unconditional. Now
the idea of the causal relation as unconditional
as a unity is that which Mill actually makes
use of; and it is his use of the idea as the
ground of induction that must decide his inter
pretation of it, since his interest in it is purely
logical, and he considers it simply as a prin
ciple of knowledge or explanation relative to
experience.
Causality is, for Mill, the ground of all in
duction. He suggests that &quot;M. Comte s deter
mined abstinence from the word and the idea of
Cause had much to do with his inability to con
ceive an Inductive Logic, by diverting his atten




: and his own discussion of the In
ductive Methods rests consistently upon the
view, which he announces, that
&quot; the validity
of all the Inductive Methods depends on the
assumption that every event, or the beginning
of every phenomenon, must have some cause,
some antecedent, on the existence of which it
is invariably and unconditionally consequent.&quot;
2
It is to be observed that, even in this state
ment, Mill continues to speak of causality as
if it were a principle regulating change and
change only. In so far as he does so, he
deprives the causal relation of that uncon
ditional character which makes it the basis of
induction. It is no doubt true that there are
many uniformities of coexistence which we are
unable to trace to causal conditions
; and our
knowledge of such uniformities is, as Mill su- O O
gests, merely empirical ;
3 for an inductive know
ledge of things only exists in so far as we
trace them to their conditions. ]&amp;gt;ufc the sug
gestion of uniformities of coexistence for which
no real conditions exist implies a co-ordinate68 John Stuart Mill
possibility of unconditioned events
; and the at
tempt to limit the law of causality, or uncon
ditional relation, to successions of events must
inevitably issue in its complete abrogation.
Causality, in the sense in which it is the
ground of inductive reasoning, and of guar
anteed knowledge, is simply the most abstract
unconditional relation. The cause is the ground
or explanation of the effect;
1 and it is in this
sense that the law of causation is the prius of
Inductive reasoning. Induction goes on the sup
position that everything is completely caused,
or is ideally capable of being presented as an
effect or product of conditions.
Stated in this way, the law of causation
^becomes equivalent to the principle of the
Uniformity, or, more correctly, the Unity, of
Nature, in the sense in which that principle
is
&quot; the fundamental principle, or general axiom,
of Induction,&quot;
2 and must &quot;be regarded as our
warrant for all the others.&quot; It is to be observed
tttat this principle, taken in the sense in which
it is the prius of Induction, is not really the
1 Cf. Mr Bosanquet s Logic, vol. i. pp. 264 ff.
2
Logic, p. 201.Uniformity of Nature 69
result of Induction at all. When Mill suggests
in one sentence that the Uniformity of Nature
is a result arrived at by complex and developed
Induction, and in the next that every Induc
tion really assumes this principle, he takes the
principle in different senses. Our developed
idea of Nature, as a uniform whole, is certainly
the result of reflection upon experience. But
experience itself, in the only sense in which it
is a source of knowledge, consists in a conscious
ness of objective relations, which implies the
real unity of known reality.
Now, it may be proper to call this consciousness,
of things as real, the potentiality of the complete
knowledge of nature as an orderly system with
uniform laws; and in the same way, the con
ception of the Uniformity of Nature is the ideal
of all the generalisations by which knowledge
progresses towards it. But to identify the mere
consciousness of an objective world with the
fully developed notion of the Uniformity of
Nature is to make the whole labour and pro
gress of knowledge unmeaning and useless; and
this is what Mill means by his denial of the
a priori character of the principle that the70 John Stuart Mill
course of nature is uniform.
1 It is not really
inconsistent with this denial to make the con
sciousness of nature as an objective unity the
implicit ground of knowledge. The appearance
of contradiction between the statements is due
to Mill s failure to distinguish between the
explicit conception in which our knowledge of
nature is supposed to be completely realised, and
the point of view which is implied in every
stage of that knowledge between the results
and the constitution of experience.
AVhat is involved in the possibility of know
ledge is the consciousness of an object
: of rela
tions whose reality does not depend upon our
recognition of them
; of the unity or self-con
sistency of the world of fact; and this is what
is meant by making unconditional relation, or
the uniformity of nature, the ground of induc
tion. There is, in fact, only one intuition
if we choose to call it so the intuition of the
whole
; and no truth is necessary, except the
whole truth. The ground of all knowledge is
necessity, objectivity of relations, the presence
in things themselves of those connecting bonds
1 Cf. chap. iii.Induction 7
1
which our knowledge seeks in them. This
is the one necessity of thought. Without it,
knowledge cannot he
; but experience itself,
determined by this point of view, is the source
of all those complex presentations which con
stitute our knowledge. That the experience
which furnishes knowledge is determined by
consciousness of the objective world does not
mean that knowledge contains elements not
produced by experience.
The idea of causality as an unconditional
relation, which belongs to Mill s assertion of the
objective reference of knowledge, determines his
conception of Inductive Reasoning. But not
only does induction rest, in this way as all
knowledge may be said to rest upon the law
of causation : it is also the special development
of knowledge which investigates causes.
&quot; To
determine the efi ect of every cause, and the




&quot; the problem of Inductive Logic
may be summed up in two questions
: how to
ascertain the laws of nature
; and how, after
having ascertained them, to follow them into72 John Stuart Mill
their results.&quot;
x Induction is thus primarily a
regress from complex things to their condi
tions : to the simpler elements which constitute
them
; to the factors of which they are pro
ducts. The kind of explanation that induction
gives of any phenomenon consists in pointing
out &quot;some more general phenomenon, of which
it is a partial exemplification ; or some laws of
causation which produce it by their joint or
successive action, and from which, therefore, its
conditions may be determined deductively.&quot;
2
The problem of induction is, in fact, that of
analysis
: it breaks up the complexity of indi
vidual concrete facts into simpler and ulti
mately into the simplest and most general facts.
This is the resolution of experience into its low
est terms into its most general truths. It is
the interpretation of every whole in terms of its
J parts of every complex fact or event in terms
of facts or events which are less complex.
3
Now, such a view of induction implies that the
i conception of Causality on which it rests is not
*
/ that of temporal sequence but that of uncondi-
\ tional relation
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of analysis into those conditions, the discovery of
which constitutes its problem.
While Mill s logic is vitiated by his failure to
recognise the reality of any relation more com
plex or more concrete than that of cause and
effect, it should still be observed that the idea
of relation implied in his theory of Induction
might be made to authenticate a doctrine of
Definition and Deduction widely different from
his.
The theory of Definition which is associated
with Mill s name is based upon his psychological
view of the causal relation. But by this revised
conception of causality Definition is made a pos
sible result of induction. The idea that things
are capable of expression in terms of their con
ditions makes real definition of them possible
instead of mere description, or statement of the
meaning of their names. Such true definition
would be an account of the determining condi
tions of the thing of the real elements to which
its character must be referred. Definition, in
this sense, is definition in terms of causes
; it ex
presses discovery, and is not simply a statement
of conventions; it may be a hypothetical judg-74 John Stuart Mill
ment, assuming the reality of the thing which
is denned
; but it is a statement about the thing,
and not simply about its name; and such defini
tion of things impossible so long as they are fixed
in abstract isolation from other things, and so from
real conditions becomes a possibility, and the
goal of inductive science, when once it is under
stood that the nature of things can be expressed
in terms of their causes. This statement of the
nature of phenomena is what Mill represents as
the aim of induction
; and his refusal to recognise
it as definition of things is part of his failure
to give effect to his own correction of the psycho
logical way of regarding knowledge.
Mill s theory of Deductive Reasoning, no less
than of definition, might be revised, in the light
of that conception of causality which determines
his view of induction. To make the nature of
things consist in the conditions of their existence
to regard an account of their causal relations
as the explanation of what they are is to recog
nise an universal element in the knowledge of
objective reality ; for such a conception of things
completely does away with that abstract view of
them which makes them merely particular andGeneral Truths 75
separate and regards their relations as external
to their nature
; and the recognition that rela
tions are objectively characters of things gives to
the universal element, that is present in all pre
dication, a legitimacy which it docs not other
wise possess. Some such view of the causal re





fact, the only ground upon which the assertion
and proof of general truths can be justified. The
truth of general statements implies the presence
of a necessary or universal element in things,
the objectivity of relations, the validity of causal
explanation.
It cannot be said that Mill makes clear the
l
significance, for the theory of reasoning, of his own
doctrine that causality is an unconditional rela-
\^
tion. But his assertion that inference is prim
arily
&quot; from particulars to particulars
&quot; accommo




than that which the statement
naturally implies, and which belongs to Mill s J
sensationalist account of knowledge.
He recognises that knowledge involves ele
ments which are general that all real judg-76 John Stuart Mill
ment asserts with some degree of generality.
For example,
&quot;it is only by means of general
names that we can convey any information,
predicate any attribute, even of an individual,
much more of a class.&quot;
1
Judgment is essenti
ally generalisation. It refers to the objective




as judgment ascribes it, can ever be regarded
as merely particular; and the ideal character
of judgment is betrayed by the impossibility
of eradicating generality from the relations
which it affirms. Mill goes still further in
the same direction when he asserts that every
inference to a particular implies a general truth.
&quot;Whenever the evidence, which we derive from
observation of known cases, justifies us in draw
ing an inference respecting even one unknown
case, we should on the same evidence be justi
fied in drawing a similar inference with respect
to a whole class of cases. The inference either
does not hold at all, or it holds in all cases of
a certain description; in all cases which, in
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All this connects itself with the view of re
lations, and primarily of causality, on which
Mill s theory of Induction is founded
; hut the
actual significance of that view is not given
effect to by Mill in his doctrine of Syllogism.
He does indeed admit the practical expediency
of generalising all conclusions so as to test their
legitimacy;
1 and he also defends the utility of
general propositions, on the ground that,
&quot;
though
in strictness we may reason from past experi
ence to a fresh individual case without the in
termediate stage of a general proposition, yet
without general propositions we should seldom
remember what past experience we have had,
and scarcely ever what conclusions that experi
ence will warrant.&quot;
- But such a statement
hardly suggests the practical necessity which
exists for the form of syllogism ; and it does
nothing to indicate the real worth which, on
Mill s own showing, syllogistic argument might
be held to possess, liooted in his doctrine that
the causal relation is unconditional, the idea that
knowledge depends upon universal elements is
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character of all predication. Even when infer
ence appears to be from particular to particular,
these particulars are not really so absolute, or
self-contained, or separate from one another, as
their name suggests. If they were wholly ex
clusive and disconnected, no inference from one
to the other would be possible
: if there were
no relation actually between them, none could
be constructed to connect them from without.
But the existence of such relation rids them of
their absolute particularity ; and inference from
one to the other is legitimate, simply because
they are not mere abstract particulars, but have
a common element : it is this common element
that renders the transition possible, and enables
us to infer. Inference from one particular to
another is thus secondary to, and dependent on,
inference from particular fact, to a general law
which expresses the ground of proof.
On such a view of inference and it is a view
which Mill does more than merely suggest the
worth of syllogism is much more internal to
knowledge than Mill conceives it to be
; for if
inference is made possible by the presence of
universal elements in knowledge by its im-Syllogism 79
plied generality then the selection of those
elements, by which inference is determined, is
at the root of the whole matter. Xow, the
function of syllogism is to make the determin
ing qualities of things the ground of inference.
The major premise is not, as Alill assumes, a
mere collective statement of a definite or in
definite number of cases taken in extension. It
is, as he himself might suggest, a judgment as to
relations of attributes : it is the statement of
c*
a law. The object of syllogism is to infer the -\/
character of a particular fact, from a law which
is recognised as applying to it; syllogistic argu
ment is the determination of a concrete case
by an abstract principle ; it is the proof of a
fact by its conditions. Mill s own conception of
causality as an unconditional relation might, if
he had given effect to it, have formed the basis
for some, such theory as this : it might have led
him to ascribe to syllogism as the expression of
inference from laws or causes a worth and an
importance which he nowhere vindicates for it^
Mill himself recognises the necessity, for in
ference, of that abstraction which it is the
function of syllogism to ef J ect.
&quot; The voluntary8o John Stuart Mill
power,&quot; he says,
&quot; which the mind has of attend
ing to one part of what is present to it at any
moment, and neglecting another part, enables us
to keep our reasonings and conclusions respecting
the class unaffected by anything in the idea or
mental image which is not really, or at least which
we do not really believe to be, common to the
whole class.&quot;
1
Eeasoning is always hypothetical.
&quot; An In





&quot; the only sense in which necessity
can be ascribed to the conclusions of any scien
tific investigation, is that of legitimately follow
ing from some assumption, which, by the condi
tions of the inquiry, is not to be questioned.&quot;
3
The hypothesis on which inference rests is the
limitation of attention to the common element in
the particular facts
; and syllogism is the definite
expression of this hypothesis. In this way, by
expressing and defining the abstract relation,
syllogism secures its relevancy for purposes of
proof ; and it seems reasonable to regard the syl
logistic procedure, which performs this function,
1
Logic, p. 425
; cf. p. 148.
2 Mr Bradley s Principles of Logic, p. 22],
:!
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as more than a merely formal or external ex
pression of thought: syllogism is, in fact, as
Aristotle held, the normal and complete expres
sion of reasoning.
Syllogism gives effect to the point of view
which is implied in all reasoning, licasoning
implies systematic connection of things ; for it
affirms their connection, in virtue of common
elements, and primarily in virtue of their causal
relations
; but the causal relation, and indeed all
relation, implies system, since it implies a unity
of things which is articulated in their various
concrete and defined connections
; and this unity
of things means that they are elements in a
system, or are related to one another according
to a principle. Now, syllogism expresses this
systematic character of reasoning, since it makes
inference depend upon the common relation of
particulars to a principle which determines their
connection. Its function is to represent the re
lation between things as necessary ; and this is a
function which is so far from being accidental
or external to inference, that it constitutes the
very essence of all reasoning.
Mill s Logic is thus very far from being a con-
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sistent whole. The constructive treatment of In
duction, which is his most signal achievement as
a logician, depends on a view of thought which
does not affect his theory of definition and syllo
gism as it might do. His doctrine that definition
is purely verbal, or refers only to names, and his
assertion that the syllogistic form of inference
has no demonstrative but only expository value,
depend upon his psychological conception of
causality. But he suggests ideas of judgment
and inference which go far to correct his theory
of definition and deduction, and which imply the
inadequacy of a purely sensationalist account of
relation. He does not, indeed, give effect to these
ideas
; and their place in his theory of reasoning
hardly entitles us to say more than that certain
elements in that theory are at variance with the
psychological conception of knowledge which is
its avowed basis. It is not to be denied, however,
that his Logic contains a view of judgment, and
of the causal relation, which cannot be reconciled
with his sensationalism
; and this view is at the
root of the most important part of his theory
his doctrine of Induction.CHAPTER V
SELF-CONCERN
MILL S limitation of knowledge to subjective
mental states evidences itself in his theory of
conduct no less than of knowledge. His indi
vidualism affects his idea of desire, just as it
moulds his conception of the character of defini
tion and inference. We have already seen that
his view of experience as simply a complex of
sensations is at the root of his logical nominalism.
The same view of experience lends itself to his
assertion that pleasure is the sole object of desire,
and that all action is determined by the idea of
pleasure.
Psychological Hedonism is not a new acquisi
tion with Mill : it forms part of his heritage of
&quot;
experience-philosophy.&quot; Apart from its influ
ence in ancient philosophy, it had been made an84 John Stuart Mill
integral part of the basis of ethics by Hobbes,
and, after him, in the Systeme cle la Nature,
J
and in the beginnings of English Utilitarianism.
It formed an essential, though disguised element,
in Paley s doctrine of obligation ;
2 and it was the
dominant conception of James Mill s ethics.
3
It received, however, its most definite expression
in Bentham s assertion that
&quot; Nature has placed
mankind under the governance of two sovereign
masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them
alone ... to determine what we shall do. On
the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on
the other the chain of causes and effects, are
fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we
do, in all we say, in all we think : every effort we
can make to throw off our subjection, will serve
but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a
man may pretend to abjure their empire: but in
reality he will remain subject to it all the while.&quot;
4
Such a statement as this left nothing to be
1
Systeme de la Nature (1781), vol. i. p. 268, quoted by
Professor Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism, p. 23.
2
Paley s Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, bk. ii.
chap.
ii.
3 James Mill s Analysis of the Human Mind, chap. xxii.
4 Bentham s Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. i.Psychological Hedonism 85
desired or achieved in the way of definiteness and
thoroughness
: Mill found psychological hedonism
ready to his hand. Yet it hardly needs to be
pointed out how inevitably this doctrine connects
itself with the individualism of Mill s theory of
knowledge. If nothing can be directly known
but subjective states, then nothing else can be
desired
; for desire is limited, in respect of its
objects, by knowledge; and we can desire only
what we can
think.jf Jljjurjoiowledge of things
in their relation to our activity is limited to the
pleasure and pain effects that they produce in
us, plainly we can desire only the production and
avoidance of these effects, and our actions must
be determined wholly by the idea of them,
(f
While, however, psychological hedonism is
thus rooted in a sensationalist account of know
ledge, it also exemplifies another aspect of in
dividualism. It depends on an abstraction or
separation of thu thinking subject not merely..,
from the world of objects, but also, from the
moral world of other persons. It expresses a
complete limitation of the interests of each indi
vidual to the closed circle of his own feelings.
In so far as other persons enter into the cal-86 John Stuart Mill
dilations of the agent, tjiey_are_regarded. accord-
ing to this theory, merely as circumstances. They
themselves their interests and rights are in no
sense ends. If they are considered, it is because
their advantage is a means to that of the agent
himself because he conceives that he will gain a
greater balance of pleasure by serving them than
he can obtain otherwise. They form part of the
environment, and so they must be taken into
account
:&amp;lt;J3ut as ends they are ignorgd_jyIiQlly. ]
This opinion is frankly accepted by Mill.
&quot;There is in reality nothing desired,&quot; he says,
&quot;except happiness. Whatever is desired other
wise than as a means to some end beyond itself,
and ultimately to happiness, is desired as itself
a part of happiness, and is not desired for itself
until it has become so.&quot;
1 The object of desire,
for Mill, is a state of feeling. It can be nothing
else, since no individual can know anything be
yond his feelings. It is to be observed that this
does not simply mean that action takes the direc
tion most pleasant for the agent,
2 or that pleasure
1
Utilitarianism, p. 57.
- Cf. Mr Stephen s Science of Ethics, p. 50
; Professor
Sorley s Ethics of Naturalism, pp. 23-25.Pleasure and J^esirc 87
actually results from the satisfaction of desire by
action.
1 Such interpretations are not, indeed, ex
cluded by the ambiguous statement
&quot; that desiring
a thing and finding it pleasant, aversion to it and
thinking of it as painful, are phenomena entirely
inseparable, or rather two parts of the same pheno
menon.&quot;
- But Mill s use of this and other state
ments consists in making them a ground for find
ing the springs of conduct in desire for feelings of
pleasure. It is his whole intention to make out
that desire is primarily for pleasant feeling, and
that other things, including morality and social
wellbeing, come to be desired by being associated
with the idea of pleasure.
3 This is the view
of which he makes actual use in his hedonistic
ethical construction
;
4 and it is the view which
naturally follows from his individualistic account
of thought.
Mill s treatment of Political Economy contains
*/
elements which give effect to this conception
of the individual. His ethical ideas in general
stand in the closest reciprocal relations with his
1 Cf. Green s 1 rolegomena to Ethics, pp. 163-177.
-
Utilitarianism, p. 58.
3 Cf. ibid., p. GO.
4
Ibid., p. 58, &c.88 John Stuart Mill
economics
; and his psychological hedonism, in
particular, connects itself with certain assump
tions which are common to him with other
economists. These assumptions find their most




the view of human
nature which forms the starting-point of eco
nomic theory. Mill defines this view so clearly
that his statement of it is worth quoting at
some length
:
&quot; Political Economy does not treat
of the whole of man s nature as modified by the
social state, nor of the whole conduct of man
in society. It is concerned with him solely as
a being who desires to possess wealth, and who
is capable of judging of the comparative efficacy
of means for obtaining that end. It predicts only
such of the phenomena of the social state as take
place in consequence of the pursuit of wealth.
It makes entire abstraction of every other human
passion or motive, except those which may be
regarded as perpetually antagonising principles to
the desire of wealth, namely, aversion to labour,
and desire of the present enjoyment of costly
indulgences.
. . . Political Economy considers
mankind as occupied solely in acquiring and con-The &quot;Economic Man&quot; 89
sinning wealth
; and aims at showing what is
the course of action into which mankind, liv
ing in a state of society, would be impelled, if
that motive, except in the degree in which it is
checked by the two perpetual countermotives
above adverted to, were absolute ruler of all their
actions.&quot; Mill regards Political Economy as
completely defined by the statement that it is
&quot; the science which traces the laws of such of the
phenomena of society as arise from the combined
operations of mankind for the production of
wealth, iii so far as these phenomena are not
modified by the pursuit of any other object.&quot;
He points out that Political Economy presup
poses
&quot;an arbitrary definition of man, as a being
who invariably does that by which he may
obtain the greatest amount of necessaries, con
veniences, and luxuries, with the smallest quan
tity of labour and physical self-denial with which
they can be obtained in the existing state of
knowledge.&quot;
l
It must of course be kept in mind that Mill
explicitly regards this assumption as an arbitrary
one
; and we shall have to consider presently
1 Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, pp. 137-14-Lgo John Stuart Mill
the extent and significance of his corrections of
it. But he asserts that it is essential to the
very existence of Political Economy as a science,
and that it is a legitimate and useful abstrac
tion
; and his economic work is also powerfully
affected by a view of wealth which is closely
related to this abstract hypothesis the
&quot; notion
sufficiently correct for common purposes,&quot; which
identifies wealth with value in exchange.
1 It
cannot be doubted, in view of his actual correc
tions of the economic abstraction, that his accept
ance of it as a working hypothesis is partly de
termined by its congruence with the doctrine of
psychological hedonism
; and it is also probable
that the influence, through his economic studies,
of the abstract theory of Eicardo may have
helped to strengthen the hold which psycho
logical hedonism had upon his mind. While the
economic abstraction may be thought legitimate,
apart from any special theory of desire, it un
doubtedly gains considerable prestige from a
hedonistic psychology ; and the habit of using
the individualistic hypothesis, on which Political
Economy has been made to depend, constitutes
1 Political Economy, pp. 1-4.Individualism 9
L
u real predisposition to adopt an individualistic
view of conduct
; for such a view of conduct
goes far to clear away the difficulties which are
apt to arise from the abstract character of the
economic hypothesis.
It thus appears that three elements at least, in
Mill s philosophical heritage, conspired to bias
him in the direction of individualism. He had
inherited, from his predecessors in psycholog
ical and metaphysical speculation, a theory of
knowledge which limited it to the subjective
states of the individual consciousness, from
which an external or objective world could only
be doubtfully and indirectly inferred. He was
thus committed, by his philosophical education
and antecedents, to a conception of man as
isolated from the real world and incapable of
knowing anything beyond the limits of his own
mind. He had also learned, from I&amp;gt;entham, to
regard subjective states of mind pleasant feel
ings as the only possible objects of desire
; and
the individualistic sensationalism of his philoso
phical upbringing made it impossible for him at
first to criticise this theory. The
&quot;
Principles
of Morals and Legislation
&quot; came to him, as it92 John Stiiart
were, as
&quot; a friend with whom his education had
made him long familiar&quot;; and he was thus led to
conceive man as bound over to the moral isola
tion of self-concern, as well as to separation from
the world of objective knowledge. With these
two elements we must also include the influence
of the Pdcardian economics, which formed part
of his philosophical creed, and gave him a sphere
for applying, as well as grounds for supporting,
his individualistic conception of human desire
and of personality in general.
But however powerfully Mill may have been
influenced by the individualism of these theories,
it did not retain any final or absolute hold upon
his mind. He did not, in fact, continue to be
merely the disciple or exponent of those from
whom he received the tradition of empiricism.
Empiricism underwent, in his hands, a real
development; and the significance of his philo
sophy consists less in the limitations which he
inherited than in the presence of other tenden
cies, which may be inconsistent with his avowed
principles, but which are genuinely characteristic
of his thinking. He never, certainly, realised
how far his positive investigation had led himScience and Individualism 93
from the theory of knowledge on which lie con
tinued explicitly to base it. But however little he
might he aware of the inadequacy of his philoso
phical creed, or able to make clear to himself
the logic of another theory of knowledge and
conduct, Mill did, in vitally important respects,
shake off the individualism of the empiricist
tradition. His thought remains coloured by it :
it forms, as we have seen, an element in his
speculative result
; but there are also in his
philosophy other elements which constitute a
departure from it.
The essence of that individualistic bias, which
Mill inherited from his predecessors, is the asser
tion of an abstract subjectivity as absolute and
complete reality. It is the conception of in
dividuality as an exclusive or repellent rather
than a synthetic or uniting principle. The idea
of human personality on which it depends is
that of an isolated, inaccessible, and impene
trable subject.
Xow it is at all events a partial correction of
this mistake to regard man, with all his functions,
as an element in the real world
; and this is how
Mill actually thinks of human life. The very94 John St^lart Mill
essence of his work as a philosopher is that he
makes man an object of inductive study, and
accepts human life and conduct as a part or
aspect of reality. He considers man as an
element in nature, and makes not only organic
life, but mental change too, in all its aspects, an
object of experience among other objects, and
related to them as fact to fact. He regards
human personality as part of that succession of
changes which we call nature, and the conception
of man s relation to nature is vital to his point
of view.
1
This objectification of human personality re
moves the abstraction of individualism. For
scientific investigation of anything the attempt
to discover what it is, or to define its nature
is a study of relations. It is an inquiry into
resemblances and differences, causes and effects
;
and to attempt such an inquiry into any object
is to assume its real relatedness to other objects.
As Mill himself says,
&quot; we cannot describe a fact
without implying more than the fact. The per
ception is only of one individual thing ; but to
describe it is to affirm a connection between it
1 Vide chaps, vi. and vii.Science and Individualism. 95
and every other tiling which is either denoted or
connoted by any of the terms used.&quot;
l In mak
ing man an object of experience, then, and of
science, which is simply developed and special
ised experience, we regard him as related to
other facts, and part of the order of nature.
Mill s most characteristic philosophical quality
is a real consciousness of man as an object of
knowledge ; and this is radically inconsistent
with the individualistic view of man as simply
&quot;subject.&quot; This &quot;naturalistic&quot; character of
Mill s philosophy is his unconscious correction
of the abstract logic of individualism.
This objective view of human life connects
itself, as we shall see, with the
&quot;positive&quot; or
scientific character of Mill s philosophical in
terests. He does not aim at the construction of
a philosophy, in the sense of a system of prin
ciples. His philosophy is all contained in his
scientific treatment of certain classes of facts.
He philosophises, simply as occasion serves or
compels him, in the course of his exposition of
logic, psychology, ethics, or politics. Just on
this account, his nominal adherence to the in-
1
Lorric, i). 4-22.96 John Stuart Mill
dividualism of his predecessors finds compara
tively little to evidence it in his real thinking.
The objectivity of science is, in fact, inconsistent
with such abstraction. In serious thinking about
things as they are, the individualistic standpoint
cannot be maintained: the logic of mere identity
breaks down. Every act of predication is a
practical denial of the separateness of individual
things, and an affirmation of their ultimate unity
of relation; for if things were &quot;cut off with a
hatchet,&quot; predication would be falsification, and
science would be impossible. We cannot think
facts in terms of abstract identity or of mere
difference
; for the very essence of thinking is
synthesising ; and the legitimacy of this depends
on the real relation of things to each other. It
was in the prosecution of his scientific task in
his attempt to know the human interests that
Mill s individualism fell away from him, and left
him face to face with the order of nature and the
issues of life.
But if Mill, in this way, outgrew the limita
tions of his early sectarianism, in the course of
his effort to investigate knowledge and conduct,
he was influenced in the same direction by con-A Spirit
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tact with other minds, of a different order from
those by which his early education had been
moulded. His gradual emancipation from the
influences under which he grew up culminated
in entire dissatisfaction with the hunger -bitten
philosophy of his teachers, and left him open to
impressions of another kind. He found himself
dissatisfied not simply with the speculative basis,
but, still more fatally, with the practical ideals
of his juvenile Radicalism; and his intellectual
life lost, for a time, that philanthropic impulse
which was required to make it fruitful.
1 This
internal failure of his philosophy taught Mill
the importance (even from a purely hedonistic
point of view) of some kind of disinterestedness
;
1
Autobiography, p. 133. &quot;It occurred to me to put the
question directly to myself
: Suppose that all your objects in
life were realised
; that all the changes in institutions and
opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely
effected at this very instant : would this be a great joy and
happiness to you
? And an irrepressible self-consciousness
distinctly answered, Xo ! At this my heart sank within me :
the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell
down. All my happiness was to have been found in the con
tinual pursuit of this end. The end had ceased to charm, and
how ci &amp;gt;uld there ever again be any interest in the means ! I
seemed to have nothing left to live for.&quot;
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and it impressed him with the necessity for a
cultivation of emotional as well as of active and
intellectual life.
1
It was in this state of mind, and at this
&quot; crisis
in his mental history,&quot; that Mill read Words
worth,
2 and discovered his &quot;healing power&quot;;
and the satisfaction which he got from Words
worth s expression of
&quot; states of feeling, and
of thought coloured by feeling, under the excite
ment of beauty,&quot;
3 was a decisive factor in his
development. It not only restored him to a
more tranquil state of mind, so that he felt
himself




also quickened his intellectual sympathies, and
transformed his dissatisfaction with his former
aims and beliefs into a serious effort to ap
preciate those of another school of philosophy,
towards which he had hitherto adopted an
attitude merely of antagonism. His intimacy
with Maurice and Sterling, which this change
of attitude made possible, introduced him to
the philosophical writings of Coleridge; and by
the influence of Coleridge and Carlyle, and,
1
Autobiography, pp. 142, 143.
2
Ibid., pp. 146 if.
u
Ibid., p. 148.Benthani gg
through them, of German thought, his philo
sophical standpoint was profoundly modified, so
that Carlyle said,
&quot; Here is a new
Mystic,&quot;
* and
Mill s former associates observed the change O
in his opinions with the gravest apprehension.
His political ideas were at the same time con
siderably affected by those of St Simon and his
school.
Mill s subsequent attitude towards Bontha.ni
shows the extent of this change in his intellectual
sympathies. While he retains the highest respect
for the strength, directness, and systematic quality
of Bout-ham s intellectual methods,- as well as for
his work as a reformer,
3 he misses in him much
that he has learned to demand and appreciate.
He finds in him too much of a &quot;resolute denial
of all that he does not see,&quot;
4 and a fatal &quot;defici
ency of Imagination.&quot;
5 To this lack of imagina
tion, indeed, Mill attributes Bentliam s want of
sympathy witli ages and characters other than
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3 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 333.
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ignorance of the deeper springs of human
character
&quot; 2 in Bentham s failure to recognise, as
he should do, not only desire of perfection, sense
of honour, and love of order, of beauty, of power,
and of action, but also the influence of art in
fashioning and transforming human life.
3 But far
more definite than any of these criticisms, as a
proof of Mill s real abandonment of Benthamism,
is his attack on Bentham s neglect of the moral
consciousness itself as a fact in human nature.
&quot; Man is never recognised
&quot;
by Bentham, he says,
as a being capable of pursuing spiritual perfec
tion as an end ; of desiring, for its own sake, the
conformity of his own character to his standard
of excellence, without hope of good or fear of evil
from other source than his own inward conscious
ness. Even in the more limited form of Con
science, this great fact in human nature escapes
him. Nothing is more curious than the absence
of recognition in any of his writings of the exist
ence of conscience, as a thing distinct from phil
anthropy, from affection for God or man, and




from self-interest in this world or in the next.
There is a studied abstinence from any of the
phrases which, in the mouths of others, import
the acknowledgment of such a fact.&quot;
1
It is a highly significant element in Mill s atti
tude towards ethical and political questions that
he attaches, in this way, much greater importance
than his predecessors to the possibility of unself
ish motives. He points out that &quot;mankind are
capable of a far greater amount of public spirit
than the present age is accustomed to hold pos
sible
;
&quot; - and his disbelief in universal selfishness
is so complete that he has &quot;no difficulty in admit
ting that Communism would even now be prac
ticable among the elite of mankind, and may
become so among the rest.&quot;
a He asserts, in the
most unequivocal way, the immediacy, natural
ness, and force of social feeling. &quot;The social
state is at once so natural, so necessary, and so
habitual to man, that, except in some unusual
circumstances or by an effort of voluntary abstrac
tion, he never conceives himself otherwise thanIO2 John St^lart Mill
as a member of a body ;
&quot; x and the feelings that
arise from this organic relation to society are so






unity&quot; with others may become so strong as to
prevent the individual from desiring any benefit
for himself in which they are not included.
2 &quot; To
those who have it, it possesses all the characters
of a natural feeling. It does not present itself to
their minds as a superstition of education, or a
law despotically imposed by the power of society,
but as an attribute which it would not be well
for them to be without.&quot;
3 Mill joins with
Comte, therefore,
&quot;in contemning, as equally
irrational and mean, the conception of human
nature as incapable of giving its love and de
voting its existence to any object which cannot
afford in exchange an eternity of personal enjoy
ment.&quot;
4 He affirms that the Religion of Hu
manity fulfils the essential condition of a genuine
religion
&quot;
strong and earnest direction of the
emotions and desires towards an ideal object,
recognised as of the highest excellence and as





4 Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 135.Economic filethod 103
rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of
desire
;
&quot; l and lie considers that the danger of
such a religion, as a motive power, is
&quot; not that
it should be insufficient, but that it should be so
excessive as to interfere unduly with human
freedom and individuality.&quot;
-
We need not pause to inquire into the truth
of this high doctrine. However far it may seem
from us,
&quot; in the time of the present distress,&quot; we
cannot doubt the serious intention with which
Mill asserted his faith in such a possibility. To
entertain such hopes for mankind could not seem
a light thing to him
; and that he did entertain
them there is no room for doubt. His ethical
convictions are rooted in them, and even his con
ception of economic method accommodates itself
to their presence.
His estimate of the significance of social feel
ing affects Mill s theory of economics in a two
fold way.
In the first place, he insists, as his predecessors
had not done, on the hypothetical character of
Political Economy.
3 He points out that its
1
Essays on Religion, p. 109. 2 Utilitarianism, p. 49.
y Cf. Professor Ingrain s History of Political Economy, p. 155.IO4 John Stuart Mill
deductions are based on an abstract or hypo
thetical conception of human nature. He is
aware, as Kicardo was not, of the distinc
tion between the &quot;economic man&quot; and actual
human persons. He knows the reality and im
portance of altruistic motives.
But, in the second place, Mill even takes a
further step, under the influence of his belief
in unselfish desires. His recognition of the real





sceptical of the utility and even the legitimacy of
the economic abstraction.
The complexity of all causation prejudices
Mill against belief in the utility of formulae and
deductions in general
:
x he understands that
omissions in the premises lead to errors in the
results of an investigation.
2 His partial antago
nism to Benthamism, too, deepens his sense of
the multiplicity of causes in social life. His
assertion of the real extent of disinterested feel
ing and action makes him realise how much is
left out of account in rigid adherence to economic
method.
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 208.
-
Ibid., p. 349.Economic Method 105
He does, indeed, as we have seen, defend the
proeedure of economics on the ground of the
hypothetical character of the science, and the
possibility of correcting empirically the hypo
thetical result. But the case against this
method of investigation has never been stated
more pointedly and definitely, in its practical
aspect, than by Mill himself.
&quot; There is little
chance,&quot; he says,
&quot;
of making due amends in the
superstructure of a theory for the want of suffi
cient breadth in its foundations. It is unphilo-
sophical to construct a science out of a few of
the agencies by which the phenomena are deter
mined, and leave the rest to the routine of
practice, or the sagacity of conjecture. AVe
either ought not to pretend to scientific forms,
or we ought to study all the determining agencies
ecpually, and endeavour, so far as it can be done,
to include all of them within the pale of the
science ; else we shall infallibly bestow a dispro
portionate attention upon those which our theory
takes into account, while we misestimate the
rest, and probably underrate their importance.&quot;
1
Mill s views on this point are, in fact, not such
1
Logic, p. 583.io6 John Stuart Mill
as to form a consistent doctrine. He is pre
vented from accepting the method of economics,
as he finds it and defends it, because those
factors, from which the economic point of view
abstracts, bulk so largely in his conception of the
causation of conduct that their omission goes far
to render economic calculation worthless.
It is part of this sceptical treatment of the
economic abstraction that Mill endeavours to
substitute, in his actual discussion of the prob
lems, the idea of a




&quot; economic man.&quot; His emphasis on
this idea, which was itself derived from Ricardo,
1
is an important change in the method of eco
nomics. The idea plays a much more consider
able part with Mill than with his predecessors,
and its employment is a real advance in con-
creteness. It constitutes a substitution of real
factors states of actual desire and will for
the abstract or hypothetical
&quot; economic man,&quot;
whose desire and indolence are purely indefinite,
determined in their effects simply by the con-
1 Cf. Kicardo s Principles of Political Economy, ch. v.,
quoted by Professor Marshall
; vide Professor Marshall s Prin
ciples of Economies (2nd ed.), vol. i. pp. 551-553.Disinterestcdness io /
ditions in which he happens to be placed. This
clearer recognition of actual human character,
with all its varied desires and tendencies, as
one of the factors in economic processes, con
stitutes an abandonment of the point of view
which had limited economics to the abstract
consideration of purely commercial motives and
their effects.
1
This altered conception of economic method is





; and nothing could more strikingly
illustrate the hold which that belief has upon
his mind. In view of such an estimate of the
possibility of disinterested social feeling as is
indicated both in his explicit utterances and in
the adaptation of his economic method to in
clude it as a factor, it is not easy to attach much
importance to his adhesion to the doctrine of
psychological hedonism. The doctrine has come
to mean so little that what is left is hardly worth
criticising ; and even this residue seems to be
O
given up in the admission that
&quot; when the will
1 Cf. Appendix to Professor Bain s John Stuart Mill : a
Criticism, by J. E. Cairues.io8 John Stuart Mill
is said to be determined by motives, a motive
does not mean always, or solely, the anticipation
of a pleasure or of a
pain.&quot;
* The impossibility
of desiring anything except pleasant feeling does
not seem to count for much in the assertion of
cases in which
&quot; action itself becomes an object
of desire, and is performed without reference to
any motive beyond itself,&quot;
2 or in the demand




Such utterances really constitute an abandon
ment of the doctrine of inevitable self-concern.
It may remain true that a man can only act
as he pleases ; and indeed it is not easy to see
who can have any interest in disputing a pro
position which is at once so innocent, so self-
evident, and so uninforming: but this harmless
necessary remnant of psychological hedonism
does not isolate human desire either from the
actual things in which the joy of life is found,
or from those social feelings which men have
sometimes tried to regard as a mere artificial
perversion of self-love.
It cannot be said that Mill explicitly abandons
1
Logic, p. 551. 2 11^1 a
Utilitarianism, p. 54.Disinterestedness \ 09
psychological hedonism. His belief that pleasure
alone is desired is his express ground for assert
ing that it alone is desirable. He retains the
form of the doctrine, and uses it as the basis
of his ethical theory. But his corrections and
limitations of it are so considerable and so vital,
that he thinks of man, not as an isolated sub
ject buried in his own self-concern, but as, in
his own nature, heir to the riches of the world,
and a member of society.I 10
CHAPTEE VI
LIFE IN NATURE
THE vexed question of Mill s relation to Posi
tivism lias a real and not merely an antiquarian
interest in the study of his philosophy ; for, in
some important respects, his work has the char





applied. He is justified, indeed, in his protest
against being considered a Positivist, in the nar
row or technical sense of the term
; hut it is
none the less true that the intention and the
subject
- matter of his investigations are such
as to connect his work with the positive
philosophies.
Positivism is essentially a theory of practice.
Comte s saying,
&quot; Voir pour prevoir, prevoir pour
pourwir,&quot; expresses the Positivist conception ofPositivism \ i i
science
; and this way of regarding knowledge is
strikingly exemplified by Mill : the motive of his
philosophy is mainly ethical
; his aim is that of
a reformer
; he prosecutes the work of science
for the sake of practice, as part of an effort to
secure the means of human wellbeing. Every
science interests him primarily as a study of the
conditions of some practical benefit.
Logic, for example, is the science of evidence;
it is the theory of correct thinking; its object
is to investigate the methods of discovery and
proof ; it is the science on which the art of right
thinking is based
; and every other part of Mill s
philosophical activity bears an equally direct
relation to some practical ideal. Speculative
results hardly possess for him an independent
value. Their interest is mainly secondary
: they
are chiefly important as reasons for conduct, or
statements of the effect of actions or circum
stances on the interests of human life. Even
when Mill is not arguing definitely for a reform,
or a practical improvement, the consequences of
his theories are never wholly absent from his
thoughts. The utility of a way of thinking is
always, with him, an important argument in itsi r 2 John Stuart Mill
favour. His mind inclines steadily to those
beliefs whether scientific, moral, or religious
whose usefulness is evident.
The practical or humanistic bent of Positivism
determines its scientific character. Because its
interest centres in practice, it makes human life
its object and investigates the conditions of
human development and satisfaction. In this
respect also Mill exhibits positivist tendencies.
His humanism limits his interest to the sciences
of human life. Man, in his varied relations and
endeavours, is practically his sole topic. What
ever problems he finds in nature or in the abstract
conditions of existence, he interprets in terms of
human interest and effort.
No less akin to Positivism is the connection
between Mill s practical standpoint and his view
of the limits of science the view that regards
ultimate causes as radically inaccessible to human
knowledge, and confines investigation to phenom
ena. This limitation of knowledge to phenomena
is a theoretical expression of the fact that Mill
investigates primarily the conditions of human
satisfaction ; and this relation to his positive
interests is its chief significance in his philo-Naturalism 1 1 -\ \j
sophy. It belongs to the complete restriction of
his interest to human wcllbeing and the modes
of its production. It is not rooted in any meta
physical agnosticism ; such assertive agnosticism
was profoundly repugnant to Mill






is only an incident in the defence of what he
conceives to lie a more excellent way of studying
human advantage. The motive of his aversion
to metaphysic is his belief that the scientific
or analytic investigation of human life and its
conditions is best calculated to lead to real
improvement.
In his philosophy, then, Mill s deepest and




tive work is largely determined by this point of
view
; and his interest in defending it is also the
ground of his negative attitude towards meta
physics. Our review of his philosophy must
include a statement of some of the leading
conceptions in which its naturalistic side is
developed.
The essence of Mill s naturalism consists in his
making man an object of inductive study. He
IIi T 4 John Stuart Mill
is dominated by a consciousness of man s place
among the objects of experience. He considers
every human activity as a cause of effects and




that wide sense of the word in which it means
simply the object of knowledge the &quot;fades totius
universi.&quot;




entire system of things (which Mill regards as
&quot; the true scientific sense
&quot;),* the inclusion of man
in it is presupposed by every serious attempt
to understand him. So much of &quot;naturalism&quot;
there is in every theory of human life. In some
form, and at some degree of removal, the facts
of man s life his
&quot; nature
&quot; - must form the
basis of every such theory. The difference of
philosophical opinion, and the real difference of
method corresponding to it, lie in the answers
given to the question how man is related to the
world of non-human nature.
Mill s answer to this question evinces his nat
uralism in a more definite way than the mere
fact of his scientific study of human life can be
held to do. We shall have to see, in our survey
1
Essays on Religion, j&amp;gt;. 7.Naturalism 1 1 5
of what we may call Mill s
&quot;Anthropology&quot;
his theory of man s actual constitution and func
tionshow close and binding he conceives the
relation to be between man and the world in
which he lives. Meantime we may note that




no means unconnected with that objective and
inductive way of studying man which is so
characteristic of Mill.
Analysis is, for Mill, the essence of know
ledge. The aim of all science, as of observa
tion itself,
1
is to resolve complex realities into
their component parts. Scientific progress
growth in the knowledge of things consists
in the progressive &quot;mental decomposition of
facts.&quot;- Science, that is to say, is a search for
the constituent elements, or factors, of the pro
ducts which it investigates
: its problem is the
resolution of complex realities into their simplest
elements. Now, in connection with this scientific
ideal it is significant for Mill s view of the rela
tion of human life to nature that he insists that
explanation must be in terms of real factors : it




IbiJ., p. 240.u6 John Stuart Mill
claim on our acceptance is their power of ex
plaining the known phenomena.
1 On the other
hand, it is no less significant that lie always
regards
&quot;the swathes and bands of ordinary
classification
&quot;
as a tentative and temporary shift,
by which our &quot;discriminating faculty&quot; must
not be imprisoned. He demands a perpetual
readiness to carry analysis beyond any point
at which its progress may seem to have been
arrested;
2 and even when two phenomena are
found to be irreducibly distinct, he still thinks
it possible to regard them as causally connected.
3
On such a view as this of the nature of ex
planation, and the directions which it may and
must take, the discovery of a real connection
of human life and society with the natural order
becomes at once possible, and, in a sense, neces
sary
: possible, because all conventional limits
to analysis have been set aside, and the single
ness of reality has become an expected result;
necessary, because intellectual clearness demands
at once a complete analysis and an analysis into
real factors. It is only natural after this that
Mill should think it a merit in De Tocqueville s
1
Logic, pp. 328, 329.
&quot;
Ibid., p. 249. 3
Ibid., p. 516.Naturalism \ 1 7
work that lie
&quot;
applied to the greatest question in
the art and science of government those principles
and methods of philosophising to which mankind
are indebted for all the advances made by
modern times in the other branches of the
study of nature.&quot;
1 It is not even surprising
to find that he regards the methods of physical
and moral science as essentially one, and that
he sees no impossibility in purely naturalistic
interpretations of moral and social life, or in
the recognition of a causal relation between
mind and matter. Mill s naturalistic account
of man his tendency to explain man in terms
of nature is thus no less rooted in a logical
demand than we have already seen it to be in
a practical ideal. It depends upon his conception
of scientific explanation as an analysis of phe
nomena.
This attempt to explain human in terms of
natural relations is not, of course, new with Mill :
we have only to do with an interesting and
highly suggestive development of one of the
permanent directions of human thought. Mill
would have recognised the application to his
1 Dissertations and Disuussiun.s, vol. ii. p. 4.1 1 8 John Stuart Mill





&quot; the philosophy called Positive
is not a recent invention of M. Comte, but a
simple adherence to the traditions of all the
o-reat scientific minds whose discoveries have O
made the human race what it is.&quot;
1 But it is
none the less true that Mill s account of man s
relation to nature has special characteristics,
which are due to the influences under which it
was developed. Mill is, in fact, chiefly to be
understood, in this connection, as the successor
and spiritual descendant of the English psychol
ogists, and especially of Hartley and James Mill.
Naturalistic psychology was systematised by
Hartley much more fully than by any previous
writer. It became in his hands an attempt to
give an analytic account of the mental process,
as an orderly and sequent unity, dependent for
the very conditions of its existence upon its
relation to organic states, and so to the external
world; and Mill s idea of mental life and its
relation to nature is largely formed upon Hart
ley s. Specially in his resolution of all mental
development into Association of Ideas, Hartley
1 Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 9.Psychology
\ 19
has a quite decisive influence upon Mill s view
of knowledge. This conception of Association,
as practically the sole principle of mental growth,
systematically stated by Hartley, and developed
by James Mill, forms the main term of psycho
logical explanation for Mill.
1
Apart, however, from any definite psycholog
ical theory which Mill may have learned from
his predecessors, it is significant of the English
derivation and character of his positivism that
he asserts the possibility and usefulness of psy
chology itself. In this important assertion he
is in direct opposition to the positive philosophy
of Cointe. Comtism is, as it were, a Catholic
positivism, making little of the individual. Mill s
positivism, on the other hand, is English and
Protestant, full of the consciousness of the in
dividual, and resolute in the attempt to know
human nature on its subjective side. Mill re
gards Comte s denial, and consequent omission,
of Psychology as
&quot; not a mere hiatus in M.
Comte s system, but the parent of serious errors
in his attempt to create a Social Science.&quot;
21 2O John Stuart Mill
The difference is in fact of greater importance
than might appear at first sight. It means
that Mill s view of man includes an element
of which Comte, while he does not deny its
reality, takes no scientific cognisance ; and it
constitutes a difference in the estimation of per
sonal life which goes far to account for the
divergence of the ethical theories of Mill and
Comte.
But, even in his assertion, against Comte, of
the possibility and usefulness of knowing con
scious states by direct observation, Mill holds no
truce with dogmatic spiritualism. He asserts,
indeed, strenuously and consistently, the impossi-
/ bility of substituting physiology for psychology.
1
Psychology is limited by the possibility of intro
spection. From whatever sources, or in what
ever ways, the knowledge may be obtained, of
facts that are used in psychological explanation,
these are psychologically relevant only in so far
as they can be related to facts that are known
introspectively. Direct consciousness of mental
^ states gives the only clue to the psychological
1
interpretation of whatever facts may be other-
1
Logic, p. 556.Mental Continuity
\ 2 \
wise observed. Mere description, however, of
mental states cannot be regarded as in any de
gree a solution of the problem of psychology ;
and Mill s belief, that direct self-observation is
essential to psychology, does not prevent him from
recognising the distinction between descriptive
classification of mental states and genuine analy
sis of them. Nothing short of such analysis,
however, can give a real account of mental lite.
The problem with which Mill has thus to deal
is that of the possibility of psychology whether,
namely, within the limits of psychology, a
thorough analysis of mental states can be
achieved. This analysis can only be regarded




mental processes is carried so far that their com
plexity is resolved into a series of changes which
are self-evident and, for our knowledge, necessary.
Now, conscious states, taken by themselves, do
not furnish the spectacle of such a series as this :
psychology, in so far as its results are furnished
by simple introspection, is merely empirical.
Psychological analysis reveals, in fact, only an
actual sequence of presentations. It may be sup
posed to yield more than this, by a confusion ofi 2 2 John Stuart Mill
the relation between cognitive states with that
which obtains between the objects that are known
;
but mental life itself is, for our observation, dis
continuous. The stages of the mental series do
not follow one another
&quot;
unconditionally.&quot; \Ylien
we take them by themselves, we do not discover
a self-evident connection between them. The an
alysis of mental facts into simpler mental facts
can never be carried so far as to yield the know
ledge of a causal relation between the elements
of mental life itself. It is therefore necessary to
ask whether that relation, and the continuity
which it gives, can be seen to belong to mental
facts, when we remove the abstraction in which
psychology regards them.
From one obvious way out of this difficulty





alist view of mental life. The explanation of
mental changes as results of the activity of a non-
phenomenal Self of a subject which is not a set
of psychical events or factors is impossible for
him. The implication of such a Self in all know
ledge he does indeed admit;
1 and we shall
afterwards have to consider the importance of
1 Examination of Hamilton, pp. 247 ff.Unconscious Slates 1 2 3
the admission for his whole theory of ex
perience. But he recognises no phenomenal
reality of mental life, other than the series of
mental states
; and psychology is a science of
phenomena an explanation of known realities
by known realities. It is an instance of Mill s
refusal to adopt this mode of completing the
psychological explanation, that he will not
account for the more obvious gaps or breaches
in the continuity of the mental process by the
hypothesis of
&quot; unconscious mental modifications.&quot;
This hypothesis, primarily designed to meet the
more considerable failures of strictly psycho
logical analysis in the attempt to discover a
continuous mental process, might, if its validity
were admitted, be regarded as an explanation of
the phenomenal mental life itself. It is therefore
an important element, in Mill s criticism of
Hamilton, that he declines this way out of the
difficulty of psychological analysis:
1 in doing so,
he simply affirms, in a definite instance, thatA
limitation of the knowledge of mind to conscious
states which he elsewhere generally asserts. To
1 Examination of Hamilton, pp. 355 if.
; cf. James Mill s
Analysis, note on chap. v.124 John Shi-art Mill
affirm
&quot; unconscious mental modifications
&quot;
as an
explanation of the course of the conscious pro
cess, is really to make the non-phenomenal
subject a term of psychological explanation.
The very words in which the hypothesis is,
perforce, expressed, indicate its futility for the








is, in its very
essence, not mental. The hypothesis constitutes
a departure from the psychological point of view,
and it furnishes no other. In point of fact, the
non-phenomenal Self the self regarded as es
sentially other than conscious states is unavail
able as a term of scientific explanation. Just be
cause all mental states are inevitably character
ised by their relation to the
&quot;
subject,&quot; that rela
tion cannot be treated as a mere factor in their
development. It makes no difference between
mental phenomena, because it belongs to all alike.
The essential incompleteness of psychological
analysis is by no means clearly realised by Mill.
He remains in great measure unaware of it,
because his thought is largely governed by the
assumptions of his psychological predecessors.Sensations 1 2 5
Ho is content to assume, with them,
&quot; sensations
&quot;
out of which the complex unity of conscious





merely physical facts; nor does he appear to
realise how powerfully the answer to this ques
tion affects the nature and limits of psycho
logical analysis ; but it is probable that he
regards sensations in general, just as James
Mill did, as mental units out of which per
ceptions are built up. In so far as he does so,
he simply adopts from his predecessors that
hypothesis to which the illusory appearance of
completeness in their psychological analysis is




mental fact, is purely hypothetical. As AVundt
says,
&quot; The . . . conception of sensation arises
only from the necessities of psychological analy
sis. Simple sensation is never given to us in
isolation, but is the result of an abstraction to
which we are driven directly through the com
plex nature of all inner experiences.&quot;
1 Sensa-
1 Wundt, Fhysiologische Psychologic, third cd., vol. i. p.
2S9. Cf. Professor Scth s Scottish Philosophy, Lecture iii.126 John Stuart Mill
tion does not exist in consciousness, otherwise
than in the synthesis of the perceptive act
;
and the analogy of chemical elements, by which
Wundt and others seek to defend the use of
the hypothetical unit in psychology, is really
not a correct one
; for the very essence of the
matter is that the psychological unit cannot
exist in isolation, as the chemical element can
and does. In so far as Mill is content to accept
the hypothetical sensation unit, and to regard
psychological analysis as effected when an ex
planation is obtained in terms of such sensation,
he abandons his own demand for an analysis
into &quot;real&quot; factors, and resorts to such a use
of hypothesis as we have already found him
condemn. But when he is aware of the absence
of a purely psychical continuity and at all
events in those cases in which more metaphysi
cal psychologists resorted to the hypothesis of
&quot; unconscious mental modifications
&quot; he proposes
a way out of the difficulty. He finds
&quot; uncon
scious modifications of the nerves
&quot;
to be the only





This method of explaining the psychical result
1 Examination of Hamilton, pp. 355-357.Physiological Continuity 127
involves conceptions of psychological explanation
that might have meant more than they do for
Mill s theory. If he had been less satisfied with
the traditional assumptions of psychology, he
might have made much more than he actually
does of the relation of mental to organic states.
In so far as he recognises the internal incom
pleteness of psychological analysis, he resorts, for
its completion, to physiology ; and in so doing, he
makes use of factors that are no longer hypo
thetical but definitely real
; for even when sen
sations, or rather impressions, are psychologically
nothing, they are everything for physiology.
Nothing can be more real than the transmission
of nervous impressions from the periphery to
the cerebral cortex. But in these real stages
of the physiological process there is a positive
continuity
: in them we have to do with a
discoverable causal series, delation to the or
ganic process is thus a quality of mental life
in virtue of which it can be studied as a con
tinuous whole. Xor, it may be suggested, is
there anything arbitrary or strange about the
fact that mental processes can be explained in
this way. Our consciousness is in relation to128 John Stuart Mill
the physical process in question; and, since its
existence and character belong to it in this
relation, there is nothing singular in the neces
sity for interpreting it in the light of the physical
process.
1 Relation to organic change is a real
quality of mental life as we know it; and, if
this be recognised, it cannot appear unreasonable
that this quality should give to mental life what
ever continuity it may have for our knowledge,
or that the analysis of mental facts should be
capable, through their real relation to organic
states, of a completion that is not possible when
they are regarded in an isolation which is, after
all, fictitious and abstract.
Mill is too well satisfied with psychology, as he
finds it, to recognise fully the dependence of its





every psychical result. But this certainly arises
from no jealousy of the recognition of material
conditions. On the contrary, once the reality
and distinctiveness of mental facts have been
admitted, he argues for the thorough concomi-
1 Of. Mr Bradley s Appearance and Reality, chap, xxiii., esp.
pp. 337-342,Mind and Body 129




if it be materialism to endeavour to
ascertain the material conditions of our mental
operations, all theories of the mind which have
any pretension to comprehensiveness must be
materialistic
;
&quot; 2 and while he recognises that
&quot; the relation of thought to a material brain is no
metaphysical necessity, but simply a constant co
existence within the limits of observation,&quot;
3 lie
yet insists that the influence of physiological fac
tors is &quot;one of the most important departments
of psychological study.&quot;
1 The development of
Mill s psychological position issues in a thorough
going incorporation of man in nature, a concep
tion of the laws of mind as possibly
&quot; derivative
laws resulting from laws of animal life,&quot;
5 and a
definite assertion that mental life is related to
material conditions within the organism.
1
Essays on Religion, pp. 198 ff.
L Dissertations and Discussions, vol. in. p. 109.
3
Essays on Religion, p. 199.CHAPTEK VII
DETERMINISM
MILL S naturalistic conception of human life
appears more decisively in his deterministic
view of activity than in any other part of his
philosophy: determinism is, in fact, the main
outcome of his inclusion of man in nature,
and the central doctrine of his scientific theory
of human thought and conduct.
Mill s interest in determinism is mainly
logical. The doctrine is forced upon him by his
objective treatment of man, and required as the
presupposition of his attempt to construct a
science of social relations. That his belief in it
is brought about rather by logical than by ethical
requirements
is shown indirectly by the extent
to which he qualifies his statement of it, by his
emphatic assertion of the reality of choice andHuman Nature 1 3
1
volition
; and no stronger evidence could be
desired of the degree in which he was aware of
the moral difficulties of the theory than his
own account of his desire to evade it.
1
The deterministic idea of human conduct be
longs, in fact, to the manner of Mill s attempt to
investigate human life : it simply expresses, for
him, the view that man is a possible object of
inductive study. Induction depends for its pos
sibility upon the existence of causal relations,
since it is essentially an inquiry into causes.
2
1
Autobiography, pp. 168 ft .
&quot; For example, during the later
returns of my dejection, the doctrine of what is called Philo
sophical Necessity weighed on my existence like an incubus.
I felt as if I was scientifically proved to be the helpless slave
of antecedent circumstances
; as if my character and that of
all others had been formed for us by agencies beyond our con
trol, and was wholly out of our own power. I often said to
myself, what a relief it would be if I could disbelieve the
doctrine of the formation of character by circumstances
; and
remembering the wish of Fox respecting the doctrine of resist
ance to governments, that it might never be forgotten by
kings, nor remembered by subjects, I said that it would be a
blessing if the doctrine of necessity could be believed by all
quoad the characters of others, and disbelieved in regard to
their own. I pondered painfully on the subject till gradually
I saw light through
it.&quot;
-
Logic, pp. 247 and 369
; Augustc Comte and Positivism,
pp. 59 IT.132 John Stuart Mill
The existence of causal relations, therefore, in
human personality, conditions the possibility of
making an inductive study of man s conduct, and
of knowing his life objectively. Determinism
means for Mill, primarily, the existence of causal
connection within personal human life, in the
same sense in which it obtains in the world of
external nature.
1 In the case of action it means
that
&quot; a volition is a moral effect, which follows
the corresponding moral causes as certainly and
invariably as physical effects follow their phys
ical causes.&quot;
2 In the case of knowledge (though
Mill does not explicitly connect this with his de
terminism) it means that the associative sequence
of ideas is invariable and unconditional. In either
case, determinism may be taken to affirm simply
an
&quot; abstract possibility of being foreseen,&quot;
3 for
every voluntary act, and every sequence of pres
entations. &quot;Correctly conceived, the doctrine
called Philosophical Necessity is simply this:
that, given the motives which are present to an
1
Logic, pp. 547 ff.
; Examination of Hamilton, pp. 576 ff.,
and 603.
2 Examination of Hamilton, p. 578.
3
Ibid., p. 603.Desire and Will 133
individual s mind, and given likewise the charac
ter and disposition of the individual, the manner
in which he will act may lie unerringly inferred
;
that if we knew the person thoroughly, and knew
all the inducements which are acting upon him,
we could foretell his conduct with as much cer
tainty as we can predict any physical event,&quot;
1
This general conception of human personality
as an orderly or causally connected complex
simply expresses, as we have seen, the possibility
of making it a subject of investigation. But
besides this, and even apart from the question of
man s relation to the external world, Mill s deter
minism contains a definite view of the nature of
moral causation. /
&quot; Those who say that the will
follows the strongest motive, do not mean the
motive which is strongest in relation to the will,
or in other words, that the will follows what it
does follow. They mean the motive which is
strongest in relation to pain and pleasure ; since
a motive, being a desire or aversion, is propor
tional to the pleasantness, as conceived by us, of
the thing desired, or the painfulness of the tiling




Examination of Hamilton, p. 605.1 34 John Stuart Mill
nected with Mill s psychological hedonism : it in
volves his doctrine of the relation of desire and
pleasure. But this doctrine is not really essential
to his determinism: his deterministic theory of
volition turns less upon his view of the object of
desire than upon his idea of the relation of desire
to volition. That
&quot; will is the child of desire
&quot; *
is really all that the theory needs to assert
psychologically; and it is by this view of the
causation of actions that Mill distinguishes his
determinism from fatalism; since he maintains
that, while a man s character is formed by his
circumstances,
&quot;his own desire to mould it in
a particular way is one of those circumstances,
and by no means one of the least influential.&quot;
2
Apart from certain individualistic assumptions,
which do not necessarily belong to it, this aspect
of Mill s determinism is simply a resolute assertion
of the inner unity of the mental process
: what he
contends for is the real relation of acts of will to
the whole mental life of the individual. This is
the significance, for example, of his assertion that
&quot; the difference between a bad and a good man is
not that the latter acts in opposition to his strong-
1 Utilitarianism, p. 60.
2
Logic, p. 550.Desire and /77/// 1 3 5
est desires
; it is that his desire to do right, and his
aversion to doing wrong, are strong enough to over- O O O O
come, and in the case of perfect virtue, to silence,
any other desire or aversion which may conflict
with them
;
&quot; l and it is the ground of his statement
that consciousness does not witness
&quot; that I could
have chosen one course while I preferred the
other&quot;
2 of two alternatives. Mill does not conceive
of the will as an isolated
&quot;
faculty.&quot; He means by
it nothing more than the facts of consciousness
which are called volitions
; and these are so de
pendent upon the whole conscious life of the agent
that, while
&quot; I can indeed influence my own voli
tions . . . by the employment of appropriate
means,&quot;
&quot; direct power over my volitions I am
conscious of none.&quot;
3 Its dependence on other
elements in consciousness is so integral to the
volition itself, that it cannot be affected otherwise
than through them.
Such a conception of the integrity of mental
life is at the root of the idea of
&quot;
character,&quot;
which plays so large and useful a part in Mill s
theory of conduct. Character he defines, with
1 Examination of Hamilton, p. 585.
-
Ibid., p. 58-2. Ibid., p. 377.136 John Stuart Mill
Novalis, as




it is in the light of this conception of character
that Mill s determinism has its chief importance.
Will
&quot;
passes out of the dominion of its parent (de




habit of willing is commonly called a purpose.&quot;
x
Purposes, or volitional habits, must be regarded,
in this way, as the effect of volition
; and it
is in the formation of purposes not -directly
dependent on immediate inclinations that, the
development and confirmation of character con
sist. Character is thus the effect of past voli
tions; but it is, for Mill, no less the source
than the product of voluntary conduct
; and it
is this interdependence of volition and character
that gives his deterministic theory of will its
main interest for him.
The connection in which Mill s most deliberate
statement of his determinism occurs is in itself
suggestive of the place of the theory in his philo
sophy. It forms the prelude to his discussion of
the
&quot;
Logic of the Moral Sciences,&quot;
3 and is the
basis of the contention






Logic, book vi. chap. ii.Ethology
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a science of human nature.&quot;
x The significance of
determinism consists in the fact that it is in
volved in every attempt to study human person
ality inductively, and is thus the only hypothesis
on which Ethology the science of character can
even be attempted. This makes it an essential
presupposition of social science, the possibility of
which Mill regards as bound up with that of
Ethology. The use of the determinist theory,
for Mill, thus consists in its being required to
make Social Science legitimate.
In Mill s opinion, social science rests on Eth
ology.
&quot; Human beings in society have no pro
perties but those which are derived from, and
may be resolved into, the laws of the nature of
individual man.&quot;
2 This is his reason for in
sisting, against Comte, on the necessity for
Psychology. There can be no science of char
acter that is not based upon observation of
mental life
; and without a science of character
there can be no science of society. This emphasis
on individual human nature as the explanation
of social life is the key to Mill s conception of
social science, and to his criticism of Comte s
1
Logic, book vi. chap. iii.
2
Ibid., p. 573.138 John Stuart Mill
sociological attempt. The Politique Positive is
an account of the life and growth of society which
abstracts, all but completely, from the fact that
society consists of persons ; and Mill asserts the
importance of this omitted element. He demands,
therefore,
&quot;a science of Ethology, founded on
the laws of Psychology.&quot;
1 He contends that
there are &quot;universal laws of the Formation of
Character,&quot;
2 and that these are primarily psycho
logical laws. He regards them also as the ulti
mate laws of social development.
3
This assertion of the relation of Psychology to
Social Science is really useful and important.
Psychology forms an element in every science
whose subject-matter is mental. Ethics, Politics,
^Esthetics, and the Science of Religion, for ex
ample, are sciences of special relations of mind
;
and none of them can be dissociated from psy
chology, which is simply analysis of the mental
function implied in them all. The complete de
velopment of any of these sciences involves an
analysis, a cleared conception, of mental action
itself : that is a psychology. Just as all natural
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of material relations as such so do all spiritual
sciences imply analysis of mental relations.
No natural science can give a result, or assume
a process, that contradicts the physical possibil
ities, or is irreducible to those processes in which
physical change is found to consist. Similarly,
no spiritual science can violate, by its results,
the known modes of mental action can repre
sent mental processes as occurring in a manner
inconsistent with what we know of mental func
tion. Psychology is thus regulative of spiritual
sciences as physics are of natural sciences
; and
this is the real meaning of Mill s contention
that a psychological ethology is the necessary
basis of social science. The absence of such a
basis must mean, according to him, a social
science which takes no heed of the individuals
who make up society, and which is therefore
unauthorised and insecure.
The possibility of a science of individual char
acter is thus of no small importance to Mill s
philosophy ; and his belief in it is quite definite.
He admits, indeed, that &quot;there are reasons
enough why the moral sciences must remain
inferior to at least the more perfect of the phys-1 40 John Stuart Mill
ical: why the laws of their more complicated
phenomena cannot be so completely deciphered,
nor the phenomena predicted with the same
degree of assurance.&quot;
* But these reasons consist
simply in the greater complexity of the phenom
ena with which the moral sciences have to do,
and not in any abstract impossibility of knowing




cannot attain to so many truths, there is no rea
son that those we can attain should deserve less
reliance, or have less of a scientific character.&quot;
2
Mill s estimate of the accuracy which is pos
sible for a science of human nature results, in
fact, from his demand for a resolution of its
empirical laws into the laws of the causes on
which they depend. Because its explanations
are of this derived kind, such a science cannot
give a complete analysis of all the partial and
limited influences by which character is af
fected : it will give an account of
&quot; the main
phenomena, but not the perturbations.&quot;
3
The degree of precision which Mill thinks
attainable in a science of human nature connects







acter of the ultimate laws of such a science
; and
this degree of precision corresponds no less fully
to the end for which the science is required.
&quot; Whenever it is sufficient to know how the
great majority of the human race, or of some
nation or class of persons, will think, feel, and
act,&quot; the general propositions of ethology
&quot; are
equivalent to universal ones. For the purposes
of political and social science, this is sufficient,&quot;
&quot; that which is only probable when asserted of in
dividual human beings indiscriminately selected,
being certain when affirmed of the character
and collective conduct of masses.&quot;
1 Mill is
satisfied, in fact, with that degree of accuracy,
in the science of character, which enables it to
serve as a basis for Social Science.
It can hardly be denied that the project of a
science of character, as Mill conceives it, is one
which is beset with difficulties, and which it is
not easy either to connect with psychology or
to make use of in the study of social pheno
mena.
2
Apart, however, from the question how
1
Logic, p. 554.
2 Cf. an article by Mr Ward on
&quot;
J. 8. Mill s Science of
Ethology,&quot; International Journal of Ethics, vol. i. p. 446.142 John Stuart Mill
far such a science is possible, or likely to be use
ful, Mill s demand for it lias a twofold significance
in his philosophy: it explains his interest in
determinism; and it indicates his sense of the
need for an interpretation of personal life.
His belief in ethology also suggests a way of
regarding personality which he actually adopts,
when he comes to investigate the conditions of
human development.
One of the most general and important prob
lems of a science of character a problem, too,
the manner of whose solution affects the inter
pretation of determinism in the most vital way-
is that of the relation of human character to the
external world. Mill is emphatic in his asser
tion of man s dependence upon nature of the
ethical and economic significance of the external
world of circumstance. He does not hesitate to
affirm
&quot; that Nature is to the greater number a
severer taskmaster even than man is to man.&quot;
1
Circumstances impose on man necessities that
guide and form his life
; and the conditions that
affect him most are of natural and not human
orknn. This is a view of man s relation to O
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 27.Nature and Production 143
nature which Mill develops in more than one
instance.
His appreciation of Malthus s doctrine of pop
ulation, for example, must he understood in this
way. He regards the necessity for limiting pop
ulation as due to natural rather than to social
causes.
&quot; The niggardliness of nature, not the
injustice of society, is the cause of the penalty




l it is because
nature limits the productiveness of labour that
population cannot increase indefinitely without
harm. Man is, in fact, an organism, and subject,
as all organisms must be, to the world from which
he draws his life and supplies his needs. Produc
tion, Mill points out, is limited and determined
by natural conditions. It is not arbitrary
: its
conditions are not fixed, and cannot be altered,
by human will. Its possibility depends on the
presence of natural resources : it is limited in its
amount, and determined in its character, by
these. Man must seek his livelihood from
nature on terms that are of nature s fixing. An
improvement of his powers, or a husbanding of
his acquired resources, may increase his gains ;
1 I ol. Eeon., 1&amp;gt;._11S.144 John Stuart Mill
but even to this nature sets limits. Man lives,
as it were (a lesson that Mill learned from the
Physiocrats), partly by the bounty of nature,
which multiplies for him the results of his la
bour. The productiveness of labour depends upon
nature, and is governed by laws that man can
not change.
1
This is less true of the distribution than it is:
of the production of wealth
; for the distribution
of what nature yields is a matter in which man
can to some extent choose and arrange, and its
laws are
&quot;
partly of human institution.&quot;
2 Here \
also, no doubt, there are necessities to be dis
cerned
; for the effects of
&quot; human institution
&quot;
&quot; are as much a subject of scientific inquiry as
any of the physical laws of nature.&quot;
3 But the
laws that determine the effects of distributive
arrangements are laws of character itself; and
Mill makes much of the distinction, between
distributive arrangements, which man can regu
late, and conditions of production, which are
fixed, and with which he cannot interfere.
4
This dependence of production upon natural
1 Cf. Pol. Econ., pp. 13 ff., 63 ff., 264.
2 Pol. Econ., p. 13.
3
Ibid., p. 14. *
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conditions is of quite crucial importance; for
nothing is more certain than the vast significance,
in all human development, of the economic factor.
Xo other condition exerts so much influence on
the formation of character as the mode in which
nature can be made to yield a livelihood. The
economic significance of nature, as a factor in
production, makes nature the greatest of ethical
factors also. This is the main explanation of
the influence on character of climatic and other
natural conditions. In proportion as they com
pel and reward labour, by producing in response
to it an improvement in comfort, they develop
character, not simply in its economic utility, but
in many other respects as well.
1
Of more direct influences of the external world
on character Mill is no less aware than of
that which it exerts in virtue of its economic
significance. He never tires of affirming
&quot; the
extraordinary susceptibility of human nature to
external influences,&quot;
- whether such influences
are of human or of directly natural origin. The
effects of pain, privation, occupation, and all the
1 Cf. Pol. Econ., lik. i. c. vii.
-
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relation of thought to the world. He states his
father s
&quot; fundamental doctrine,&quot; in psychology, as
&quot; the formation of all human character by circum
stances, through the Universal Principle of Asso
ciation
;
&quot; * and the place given to Association, by
Mill, in conformity with the traditions of English
Psychology, does, in fact, imply more than merely
a causal connection within mental life, and a con
sequent possibility of investigating it. It implies,
besides, the complete and direct subjection of thei
mental process to the course of external events.
It means that consciousness is essentially passive,
and merely receives and reproduces impressions
from the outer world that the order and con
nection of our ideas, no less than the elements
which make up their complexity, come entirely
from without. Such a view is not merely im
plied, but is even explicitly advanced by Mill.
He says that
&quot; the conceptions
. . . which we
employ for the colligation and methodisation of
facts, do not develop themselves from within,
but are impressed upon the mind from with
out
;
&quot; 2 and that
&quot; the conception is not furnished
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mind
; and the facts which supply it are some
times extraneous facts, but more often the very
facts which we are attempting to arrange by
it.&quot;
1
How far this view of thought is consistent
with other elements in Mill s philosophy is a
question which we shall have to discuss at a later
stage, when these elements come to be considered.
But it constitutes an important part of his posi-
tivist or naturalistic theory of human life, and
it leads directly to his idea of the formation of
character.
&quot; Our character,&quot; he says,
&quot;
is formed
by us as well as for us
; but the wish which in
duces us to attempt to form it is formed for us
;
and how ? Xot, in general, by our organisa
tion, nor wholly by our education, but by
our experience experience of the painful con
sequences of the character we previously
had.&quot;
L&amp;gt;
It is to be observed that this way of conceiv
ing the relation of character to the outer world,
while it is perhaps a natural sequel to the deter
minism which Mill required as a scientific postu
late, is yet not necessarily implied in that theory.
It is possible to believe that human character
and experience are capable of analysis into con-
1
Logic, p. 428.
- Ibid., p. 550.1 50 John Stuart Mill
nccted processes, and even that they are objec
tively related to the natural order of things,
without thinking of them as directly and
passively subject to the external world.
1 We
shall see that the freedom of personal experience
is suggested by Mill s own questions as to the
finality of phenomenalist psychology; but his
failure to develop this idea constructively, in his
account of character and its conditions, leaves
him, in his investigation of human experience,
committed to the view that it is nothing more
than an incident in the course of nature.
1 Cf. James s Principles of Psychology,
c. xxviii.CHATTER VIII
FREEDOM
WK have seen that Mill s theory of knowledge,
in some of its most important developments, con
tains a recognition of objective existence, such as
his inherited sensationalism can hardly be said
to justify
: a reality which is not merely mental
states is implied, in his theory of judgment, to
be the object of knowledge ; and this reality is
definitely conceived, in his constructive logical
theory, as a system of unconditional relations.
This idea of an objective world has for its cor
relative Mill s conception of a subject, or self,
other than mere states of mind. The conscious
ness of objective reality involves the consciousness
of a knowing subject ; and the idea of objects as
other than mere subjective states of individuals1 5 2 John Stuart Mill
makes it impossible to regard such states as the
subject that knows. Mill does indeed affirm that
&quot;the Mind is only known to itself phenomen
ally, as the series of its feelings or conscious
nesses,&quot;
1 and that &quot;the feelings or conscious
nesses which belong or have belonged to it, and
its possibilities of having more, are the only facts
there are to be asserted of Self the only positive
attributes, except permanence, which we can
ascribe to it.&quot;
2 But this does not prevent him
from admitting the necessity for another concep
tion of the Self.
The way is left open for such a conception by
Mill s recognition of the phenomenal limits and
incomplete character of all inductive explanation.
&quot; What is called explaining one law of nature by
another,&quot; he tells us,
&quot;is but substituting one
mystery for another, and does nothing to render
the general course of nature other than mys
terious: we can no more assign a wliy for the
most extensive laws than for the partial ones
;
&quot; 3
and the limitations of scientific theory are hardly
less definitely expressed in his statement that no
1 Examination of Hamilton, p. 263.
&quot; ibid.
3
Logic, p. 310.elf 153
mere summation of the actions of its elements
&quot;will ever amount to the action of the living
body itself.&quot;
x Such suggestions make it possible
to maintain that the self is not completely ex
pressed in mental states, while at the same time
these states are regarded as all that can be
known of it.
The recognition of a subject which is not
simply states of consciousness is forced upon
Mill by his assertion of the objectivity of know
ledge ; for experience only yields a knowledge of
actual things in virtue of its inner continuity.
A mere series or succession of unconnected
mental states could never amoiiriL-tQ~irTaTow -
leolge^of objective reality ; and Mill sees that the
conception of mental life as such a series, which
is the only one that the experienced facts yield, is
inadequate to explain the essential objectivity of
thought. He finds the empiricism, which is
normal to the scientific problem, to be meta
physically incompetent. Experience explains
everything but itself.
Mill does not, indeed, admit
&quot; that the mere
impression on our senses involves or carries with
1
Logic, p. 243.154 John Stuart Mill
it any consciousness of a Self.&quot;
1 But memory
and expectation belong to all knowledge ; they
are essential to the objectivity which charac
terises it
; without them, the phenomena of mind
would be discontinuous, and there would be no
knowledge of a world. Memory and expecta
tion, therefore, must be explained by any theory
which is really to give an account of knowledge ;
and it is thus a fact of real significance, that they
&quot; are attended with the peculiarity, that each of
them involves a belief in more than its own
present
existence.&quot;
2 This characteristic of mem
ory and expectation compels Mill to admit
&quot; that
the mind, or Ego, is something different from any
series of feelings, or possibilities of them,&quot;
3 in
order to escape
&quot;the paradox, that something
which, ex hypothcsi, is but a series of feelings,
can be aware of itself as a series.&quot;
3 This is the
ground of Mill s belief in a self. &quot;In so far,&quot;
he says,
&quot;as reference to an
E&amp;lt;jo is implied in
Expectation I do postulate an Ego&quot;* Memory
and expectation involve a self which is not
merely a series of phenomena
: the dependence
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of knowledge on them is thus really equivalent
to the relativity of things to a thinker.
For Mill, this necessity of a non-phenomenal
self is merely &quot;inexplicable&quot;; and his inability
to explain its relation to other elements in his
theory of knowledge instances the inadequacy of
his avowed logic to his real thinking. The ad
mission is really
&quot; a trap
- door opened by Mi-
Mill himself in the floor of his own philosophy.&quot;
1
But that Mill should have stumbled over the
idea of a
&quot;
subject/ and should have been un
able to reduce it to a series of
&quot; states of con
sciousness/ is no mere personal accident or
momentary weakness. For metaphysical empiri




is a mere anomaly;
but no consistent empirical philosophy would
have admitted the necessity for it. From an
empirical standpoint, this way of regarding
knowledge seems a most needless lapse on Mill s
part: Mr Bain, for example,
&quot;never could see
where his difliculty lay.&quot;
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. . . which connects the present
consciousness with the past one
&quot; 2
is not an iso
lated apergu, nor a mere exception in an other
wise consistent theory. Mill s guarded but undis
guised admission of the necessity, for knowledge,
of a subject, &quot;different from any series of feel
ings, or possibilities of them,&quot;
3 does not stand
alone
; it is simply the central and crucial in
stance of an element in his thinking which is
exemplified in many other cases, whose practical
importance, though not their logical significance,
is perhaps greater than that of this conception.
When Mill finds a &quot;subject&quot; to be involved in
knowledge, and asserts
&quot; that there is something
real in this tie, real as the sensations themselves,
and not a mere product of the laws of thought
without any fact corresponding to
it,&quot;
4 he is
only developing, in relation to the subjective
aspect of knowledge, a conception to which his
theory of induction gives effect in relation to the
1 A phrase which Mill accepted from Professor Masson s
criticism of him ; vide Recent British Philosophy, third ed.,
p. 213.
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world of known reality. His assertion of the
unity and reality of the knowing subject con
nects itself with his view of knowledge as con
structed out of judgments about things.
That Mill s idea of the self is vague and
incoherent need hardly be insisted on, in view
of his most modest pretensions in the matter.
His suggestion that
&quot; mind may be described as
the sentient subject (in the German sense of the
term) of all feelings,&quot;
1 indicates only too truly
the slight and second - hand character of his
acquaintance with German thought ; and it is
not difficult to suppose that, if he had made
himself at home in German philosophy, as
Sterling urged him to do,
2 he might have come
to a clearer understanding with himself on this
and other matters. He had little craving for
system ; and when the facts of life forced upon
him ideas that did not tally witli his theories, lie
accepted the results frankly enough, but he left
them often unexplained. In the present in
stance, it may be suggested that his assertion
1 In the earlier editions of tlic Logic, p. G8.
2 Of. Mr W. L. Courtney s Life of John Stuart Mill (Great
Writers), p. 70.158 John Stuart Mill
of &quot;something I call Myself&quot;
1 is wiser than
many pretentious theories
; but it can hardly
be maintained that this or any other of Mill s
statements about the self can be made to con
vey a clear account of it. In point of fact,





However much it may be involved in his recog
nition of objective reality, he does not discover
it as so involved. He may rather be said to
stumble upon it unexpectedly ; and his idea of
it is proportionately negative and obscure. He
thinks of it as a mere residue from psychologi
cal analysis an element in the mental complex
that cannot be resolved
; his conception of it is
psychological; and however far such a result
may be from his intention, the idea of the self
which he actually conveys is much more that of
a &quot;substance&quot; than of a &quot;subject.&quot; He is thus
compelled to find in it not an explanation of
things but a baffling and incomprehensible prob
leman inexplicability added to the mystery
of knowledge.
Now, the form of knowledge is certainly not
&quot;explicable&quot; in the sense in which objects of
1
Logic, p. 40.Explanation and tlie Self 159
knowledge are so ; but neither is it at all relevant o
&amp;gt;
to speak of it, in Mill s way, as &quot;inexplicable.&quot;
There are excellent reasons for our inability to
explain it as a separate or abstract fact
; for even
to demand such explanation of it is to miscon
strue it altogether. Self - consciousness is the
very term of all explanation ; and all knowledge
is in a certain sense of it as well as by it. lUit
the attempt to know it in isolation is essentially
unreasonable, since it is only real in experience ;
and to abstract it from the synthesis of know
ledge, or to make it the unexplained residue of a
merely subjective process, is to reduce it, and
with it all reality, to a dead level of unreason.
Mill s conception of the self as &quot;inexplicable&quot; is
thus part of a confusion, which arises from his
failure to conceive it as the subject of knowledge.
But if Mill s assertion of the dependence of
knowledge upon a subject is not made in such a
way as to do justice to all the issues that are
involved in it, we may still regard it as part of a
theory of experience which forms a highly sug
gestive correction of his deterministic account of
man s relation to the world.
The connection is not far to seek between the160 John Stuart Mill
discovery that self-hood, or personality, is the
basis of all knowledge, and Mill s recognition of
the part which emotional interest plays in the
construction of experience. As Volkmann says,
1
&quot;
Everything interests me of which I can say I
am in it.&quot; Interest expresses the relation of its
object to the needs of personal life; and it is
therefore significant of Mill s emphasis upon the
personal element in experience that he makes
much of subjective interest in his account of the
development of knowledge. Interest, for ex
ample, promotes that synthesis which is the
main element in knowledge
: we know things as
wholes, and riot in their mere details, because
&quot; in our perceptions of objects, it is generally the
wholes, and the wholes alone, that interest us.&quot;
2
In the same way pleasure and pain are referred
to the subject rather than to the object, because
their interest is mainly subjective ; because they
are of comparatively little importance to us as
qualities of the objective world of things, and
1 Lehrbuch der Psychologic, third ed., vol. ii. p. 203 ; quoted
by Professor Baldwin in his Handbook of Psychology
: Feeling
and Will, p. 148.
8 Examination of Hamilton, p. 325.Interest 1 6 1
interest us primarily as elements in conscious
life.
1 In its more developed stages, too, ex
perience depends for its coherence upon the
existence of emotional interest : a capacity of
feeling is required in order that there may be a
motive for the pursuit of truth.
2 The effort to
know things depends upon a sense of their im
portance upon the interest which their relations
possess for us.
The same sense of the inner unity of personal
life, and of the dependence of experience upon
this unity, is expressed in Mill s assertion of the
relation of activity to the growth of knowledge.
The fundamental position, for example, which he
assigns to experiences of resistance in his deriva
tion of our conception of matter,
3 makes activity
an essential element in the consciousness of an
outer world
; for
&quot; resistance is only another name
for a sensation of our muscular frame, combined
with one of touch;&quot;
3 but this recognition of a
mere contribution, however important, which ex
periences of activity make to our knowledge of
Examination of Hamilton, p. 268.
- Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 92.
&quot; Examination of Hamilton, p. 2/0.1 62 John Stuart Mill
reality, is of subordinate interest, compared with
Mill s admission of the active character of ex
perience itself. This is an idea which does not
affect, in any vital way, Mill s own systematic
treatment of psychological problems ; and he re
gards it as a new development of empirical psy
chology, when Mr Bain affirms the essentially
active character of conscious life. Still, it is a
development of doctrine which he welcomes with
real cordiality, and which he regards as not only
true but also of the highest importance.
&quot; The
mind,&quot; he says,
&quot;is active as well as passive;
and the apparent insufficiency of the theory to
account for the mind s activity, is probably the
circumstance which has oftenest operated to
alienate from the Association Psychology any
of those who had really studied it.&quot;
1 This is
an account of mental life which can hardly
be combined in any organic way with that
complete subjection of thought to things which
Mill elsewhere asserts.
2 To make experience
an activity an expression of personality is to
abolish the direct causal relation between out-
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iii. p. 120.
2 Cf. chapter vii.The Activity of Experience 163
ward tilings and the knowledge which experi
ence gives ; for if experience is an activity, and
is formed and characterised by the personal life
which makes it real, then it is no longer possible
to regard its results as due to mere unknown
things. Things only affect the growth of experi
ence as they become objects of knowledge; but
objects of knowledge are characterised by their
relation to the activity of the knowing self
; and
this essential element in their very being is left
out of account when knowledge is regarded as
simply an effect of things. The relation of per
sonal activity to the world of fact need not be
denied : man s hereditary continuity with nature
is a matter which does not really concern us in
this connection. Every material element in
personality has, no doubt, its conditions in the
world of impersonal existence
; but to call per
sonality an effect of these conditions is still
irrelevant and impossible. For, after all has
been said, an essential characteristic of personal
activity is self-consciousness; and to call self-
consciousness an effect of anything is to use
words without meaning. Thought is thus no
mere effect of things. The activity of experience1 64 J hn Stuart Mill
its dependence upon the constructive action of
personal
life is, in fact, only another name for
the dependence of knowledge upon a subject
: it
means that self-consciousness cannot be ignored
in giving an account of the ideas of things which
experience yields us.
Mill s failure to embody his belief in the ac
tivity of experience in a systematic theory, does
not mean that this belief is without effect in his
way of conceiving human knowledge and conduct.
That sense of the reality and significance of per
sonal life, which appears in his defence of in
trospective psychology, betrays itself in various
other ways.
His vindication of the worth of hypothesis in
scientific investigation suggests the extent to
which his conception of scientific method is
affected by his belief in the importance of intel
lectual motives and interests : he regards volun
tary thought as essential to the development of
knowledge by investigation.
1
But a more crucial instance of his recognition
of personality
is his estimate of the nature and
importance
of voluntary choice. He asserts the
1
Logic, p. 326.Choice 165
reality of choice in the most definite way. Belief
in it is, in fact, a necessity of that moral interest
which determines his philosophical work.
1 He
seems to miss the idea of it in deterministic
theories
; and he suggests that
&quot; the freewill doc
trine, by keeping in view precisely that portion
of the truth which the word Necessity puts out
of sight, namely, the power of the mind to co
operate in the formation of its own character,
has given to its adherents a practical feeling
much nearer to the truth than has generally (I
believe) existed in the minds of Necessitarians.&quot;
2
Choice is, to begin with, a genuine fact of psychic
life
; and it is a mental function which is of cen
tral, and not merely accidental, importance.
&quot; The
human faculties of perception, judgment, discrim
inative feeling, mental activity, and even moral
preference, are exercised only in making a
choice.&quot;
3 Conscious life is, in fact, summed up
in the act of choice : it expresses not simply a
part, but the whole, of the mental activity of the
individual. In it, and in it alone, his mental life
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of that life, and the denial of it would amount to
a dissolution of personality.
But choice is not only itself real. It is also a
factor in the formation of character
; and
&quot; what
is really inspiriting and ennobling in the doctrine
of freewill, is the conviction that we have real
power over the formation of our own character
;
that our will, by influencing some of our cir
cumstances, can modify our future habits or
capabilities of willing.&quot;
1 This is really the
important issue for Mill. His interest in the
question is a practical one. He is beset with
the difficulty
&quot;of thinking one doctrine true,




and he requires a solution which will satisfy the
demands of both theory and practice. His state
ment of the reality and effectiveness of choice
must be made in such a way as not to contradict
his naturalistic conception of human action as
part of the causally connected order of events
;
and his assertion of the absolute correlation of
conduct and character makes this difficult, since
it is not open to him to suggest either that the
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of the agent, or that that character is itself in
dependent of the causal order.
In face of such perplexities, Mill affirms that
the fact of a man s character
&quot;
being, in the
ultimate resort, formed for him, is not inconsis
tent with its being, in part, formed by him as
one of the intermediate agents
&quot;
;
^ and he points
out that, although character is formed by circum
stances,
&quot; desire to mould it in a particular way
is one of these circumstances, and by no means
one of the least influential.&quot;
l This is all that
seems to him to be required as a vindication of
moral freedom :
&quot;
this feeling, of our being able to
modify our own character if v:c wish, is itself the
feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious
of. A person feels morally free who feels that
his habits or his temptations are not his masters,
but he theirs.&quot;
l What Mill argues for, in fact,
is the freedom of character itself, against par
ticular impulses and passions. The unity of
character, and the possibility of its being in its
entirety the source of action, is what he means
by moral freedom.
It is not to be expected that such a conception
1
Logic, p. 550.1 68 John Stuart Mill
of freedom will satisfy those who insist that the
possibility of moral life depends upon a freedom
of the self and of action from or against the
actual character, in which Mill finds the explana
tion of conduct. On the other hand,
it&quot; must be
remembered that those who separate the self
from character, in this way, are apt to
&quot;go out
for wool and come home shorn
&quot;
; for, after all,
much more depends morally upon the unity of
conduct and character than upon the freedom
of a psychological abstraction. There is little
gain in such freedom, and much loss
; for to
make self - conscious action in any degree in
dependent of character is to make self -con
sciousness and character separate things ; and
this abstract separation of self - consciousness
from character leaves character impersonal and
mechanical. But to sacrifice the idea of the
freedom of character itself is to pay too dearly
for the conviction that action is rendered incal
culable by the presence of a
&quot;
surd.&quot; Mill s
assertion of the determination of conduct by
character is an element of strength in his
theory ; and he is saved from many of the
difficulties of determinism by his recognition ofSelf and Character 169
the part which volition plays in the formation
of character itself.
On the other hand, it must be admitted that
Mill is not in a position to express, in any ade
quate way, that freedom which moral experi
ence demands. He is left amid the antinomies
of determinism and indeterminism, because his
conception of the self is inadequate and irrele
vant. His idea of the self, or subject, is arrived
at, as we have seen, simply by his failure to
analyse the subjective process of knowing, and
not in relation to the objective synthesis, which
constitutes knowledge. The idea is thus a psy
chological one
; and, in so far as it is positive, it
is little better than that notion of the self which
Hume had failed to find any impression to justify.
Self-consciousness is, indeed, more than this for
Mill
; but his idea of it is never free from traces
of its psychological origin. It remains for him
an object, rather than the very condition, of expe
rience
; and it is therefore conceived as separate
from character, and so capable of being brought
into antagonism with it and subjection to it. In
so far as his idea of self-consciousness is vitiated
in this way, Mill s theory of volition is a mere1 70 John Stuart Mill
determinism: it must inevitably make self-con
sciousness, and voluntary action, an effect of
alien things. This separation of the self from
character, which is common to Mill with some of
his opponents and critics, makes freedom, in any
worthy sense, impossible. It is at the root of
Mill s curious denial of the possibility of altering
character by direct volition.
&quot; We are exactly as
capable,&quot; he says,
&quot; of making our own character,
if we will, as others are of making it for us.&quot;
* A
man can only change his character, in fact, by
changing his circumstances : this is all his power
over his own development. He can only alter
his character in the same sense, and in the same
degree, in which other people can alter it.
Such a view of the way in which character
is changed betrays an abstract and mechanical
conception of it
; and it ignores the fact that the
will to be different is itself a change of char
acterthat character is modified from within, by
the volitions which express it. The very idea of
character is apt, in truth, to be a misleading ab
straction. In speaking of character, we abstract





the fact that those actions which we ascribe to
character are self-conscious. But to do this is
to omit the most significant element in the case.
The real acrent is not character, taken in abstrac- o
tion from the self -consciousness which is its
most distinctive quality: such character is, in
truth, a mere hypothesis, which neither exists
nor acts. The real agent in human conduct is
personal character which is self-conscious, or
self-consciousness which is realised and individ
ualised in the detail of character. Neither an
abstract self apart from character, nor an equally
abstract character apart from self-consciousness,
is an actual or complete personality ; and to
make either of these abstractions the source of
conduct is to separate action from its real con
ditions. Mill s idea of character undoubtedly
tends to leave out of account the self-conscious
ness which makes it human and personal ; and
his derivation of conduct from this impersonally
conceived character makes freedom an impossible
idea for him. He does not conceive action in
such a way that it cannot be made the effect
of impersonal causes
; and he does not conceive
human personality in such a way that its self-1 7 2 John Stuart Mill
development is possible. But these are the very
essentials of freedom. Negatively and positively,
it must be so conceived. It must mean absence
of external or alien causation
; and it must mean
the possibility of self-development.
Mill s assertion of choice, and its effect upon
character, is thus not made in such a way as
to constitute a theory of freedom. It indicates
only a dissatisfaction with determinism, which
arises from his consciousness of personal life and
its issues. The intensity of that consciousness
is attested by Mill s effort to conceive action as
free, and to regard character as self-determined.
His failure in these respects suggests the real
incompatibility of moral freedom with his philo
sophical presuppositions, and especially with his
idea of self-consciousness.
But however unable Mill may be to express
his conviction of moral freedom in a consistent
theory, his assertion of it is no mere compromise
or weakness on his part. It is not an isolated
concession to custom or prejudice ; it belongs to
his mental habit, and connects itself with im
portant elements in his theory of human life.
In economics, for example, Mill insists on theChoice and Distribution 172 / \J
actual effectiveness of human character and choice.
He distinguishes sharply between production and
distribution, on the ground that, while production
is determined by natural agencies and circum
stances, distribution is &quot;a matter of human
institution
solely.&quot;
&quot; The rules by which it is
determined, are what the opinions and feelings
of the ruling portion of the community make
them, and are very different in different ages
and countries
; and might be still more differ
ent, if mankind so chose.&quot;
: This determination
of distribution by human will makes choice a
vitally important factor in economic conditions
;
and the central position which Mill gives in
this way to choice and character, is further
asserted in his qualification of his naturalistic
account of production. While he adheres to
that account in its main outlines, he modifies
it by affirming the dependence of production
upon character and thought.
&quot; Xo limit,&quot; he
says, &quot;can be set to the importance, even in
a purely productive and material point of view,
of mere thought.&quot;
2 Intellectual work, mere
speculation itself, is productive labour.
3 Mental
1 Political Economy, p. 123.
- Ibid., p. 27.
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and moral qualities are required for production,
and both its nature and its amount depend on
them.
1 The growth of knowledge is a devel
opment of man s power over nature
; and the
limitless possibilities of discovery afford the pros
pect of an equally unbounded development of
productive industry.
2 Productiveness depends,
too, upon the &quot;energy of labour&quot;; and this is
conditioned by the presence of wants and am
bitions fitted to call it forth.
3 The education
and development of human character is thus,
in the fullest sense, a productive industry
: it is
an indirect, but most real, contribution to the
increase of material wealth.
4
Still more definitely does character condition
the right use of wealth when it is produced
: the
main hope of economic wellbeing lies in the edu
cation of feeling and opinion and the growth of
self-restraint. The Standard of Comfort, which
determines the distribution and consumption of
wealth, depends for its maintenance and develop
ment upon self-restraint, and upon the education
of impulses and wants. It represents, really, the
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economic effect of character. While external
causes may raise it for a time, the level at which
it is maintained must always depend upon men
tal and moral qualities.
This conviction of the economic significance
of character is the ground of Mill s strenuous
assertion of the necessity for education as the
only means to social wellheing. His helief in
democracy gives way, in some degree, to grave
apprehensions of
&quot; the ignorance and especially
the selfishness and brutality of the mass.&quot;
l He
sees clearly that all social transformation requires
&quot;an equivalent change of character,&quot;
2 and that
&quot; the primary and perennial sources of all social
evil are ignorance and want of culture.&quot;
:i Self-
dependence and self-protection form the only
security of human beings ;
4 and
&quot; the wellbeing
of a people must exist by means of the justice
and self-government, the SiKaioavvr) and aw(f)po-
avvri, of the individual citizens.&quot;
5
&quot;The laws of
national (or collective) character are by far the176 John Stuart Mill
most important class of sociological laws,&quot;
1 not
only on account of their direct interest, but also
because it is character that mainly determines
other conditions and guides the development of
society.
In a like spirit, Mill finds the cause of social
development in the growth of thought.
&quot;As
between any given state of speculation,&quot; lie
says,
&quot;and the correlative state of everything
else, it was almost always the former which
first showed itself
; though the effects, no doubt,
reacted potently upon the cause.&quot;
2 In spite of
its relative weakness, intellectual activity is
the mainspring of progress. In it alone man
frees himself from the incubus of the past
and the present. It determines moral and
physical conditions
;
2 and its development
&quot;
is
at the root of all the great changes in human
affairs.&quot;
3
Thought is, in fact, man s chief quali
fication for progress, because in it he
&quot; knows the
end from the beginning,&quot; and sees the goal of
effort. It emancipates him from his past
: it
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active life is liberated by it from habit and
routine, and set free to adapt its effort to new
needs. This simple and straightforward faith in
the worth and weight of ideas is no small part of
Mill s heritage from the intellectnalism of the
eighteenth century. The men of that clear
headed and cold-hearted time had a faith in
knowledge and enlightenment for which no
esteem can ever be too high; and, even when
he forsakes their results, Mill holds by this faith
which he received from them. It is the perma
nent faith of all philosophy belief in ideas.
It is part of this belief in the worth of
thought that Mill makes much of individual
initiative and incentive in all reform.
1 Be
cause all improvement depends upon ideas, it
must come from individuals
; and the most real
and secure improvement that of men them
selves consists in their adoption of new and
better ways of thinking.
Personality is thus, for Mill, the very centre of
human affairs. Human progress depends, not
only upon natural conditions, but still more upon
1 Cf. Liberty, p. 39, &c. ; Dissertations and Discussions, vol.
ii. pp. 72 ff.
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choice, and thought, and character, and qualities
of personal
life. If Mill is committed by his
presuppositions to another way of conceiving
man s relation to the world, yet this assertion of
the fundamental importance of personality forces
itself through his empiricism, and modifies the
strictness of his theory.179
CHAPTER IX
ETHICAL IIEDOXISM
BOTH the strength and the weakness of Mill s
idea of conduct appear in his theory of its moral
aspect.
It is because conduct consists of acts of per
sonal choice that it is possible to subject it to
a moral criterion, and so to form judgments of
moral value; and Mill s assertion of the voli
tional aspect of conduct its relation to self- con
sciousness makes ethics possible for him. He
estimates conduct and character, not simply in
respect of their effect on human happiness, as
any other facts or events can be estimated, but
also in relation to the self-consciousness of the
agent; and he is able to take this moral view of
conduct, because his assertion of choice, and itsi8o John Stuart Mill
relation to character, affirms a real connection
between conduct and personality. Moral judg
ment, with the feelings that are appropriate to
it, depends upon this personal aspect of conduct,
for it constitutes an application to actions of a
standard which the agent himself is assumed to
be capable of recognising and applying ; and this
means that moral judgment must assume that a
personal or self-conscious being is the cause or
source of the actions judged, since only a self-
conscious being could recognise the application
of an ideal standard. Mill s moral criticism of
conduct is thus relevant in virtue of that actual
relation of conduct to self-consciousness which is
asserted in his emphasis upon voluntary choice.
On the other hand, Mill s deterministic abstrac
tion of character from self-consciousness makes
the end or standard by which conduct is judged
external to conduct itself. His misleading con
ception of self - consciousness separates it from
character ; and, because he regards character as
the source of conduct, he is unable to give any
coherent expression to that relation of self-con
sciousness to conduct which he asserts or requires
in his doctrine of volition. Conduct is thus notAn External Criterion 181
determined by self - conscious personality
: its
whole explanation is in character, which is con
ceived impersonally. But the worth of conduct,
as Mill conceives it, is relative to personal thought
and desire
; and the end which conduct ought to
realise thus stands in no real or vital relation to
conduct itself.
Conduct and character, taken in this fictitious
isolation from self-consciousness, are in no sense
ends : they are only means to an end, which does
not belong to them in any vital way, and to which




tions about ends are,&quot; as Mill says,
1
&quot;in other
words, questions what things are desirable; /ends
are thus essentially determined by self-conscious
ness
; and the separation of the source of conduct
from self-consciousness is, consequently, an exclu
sion of acts from the end in relation to which
they are judged. The relation of the moral end
to action is thus external or contingent
: the end
becomes simply an effect upon feeling, and can
not be realised in the acts themselves. Such is
the connection between hedonism and a psycho
logical idea of self -consciousness, through the
1
Utilitarianism, p. 52.182 John Stuart Mill
impersonal conception of character to which that
idea leads.
. The explicit ground of Mill s hedonistic ethics
is
&quot; that happiness is desirable, and the only thing
desirable, as an end
; all other things being only
desirable as means to that end.&quot;
* His proof of
this depends on his doctrine that only pleasure is
desired
; and that doctrine combines with his
abstract conception of character to determine
his acceptance of a hedonistic criterion. Mill
points out, indeed, that
&quot;
questions of ultimate
ends are not amenable to direct proof ;
&quot; 2 and he
does not affect to give a demonstration of hedonism.
But he also recognises that
&quot; there is a larger
meaning of the word proof, in which this ques
tion is as amenable to it as any other of the dis
puted questions of philosophy.&quot;
2 &quot; Considerations
may be presented capable of determining the
intellect either to give or withhold its assent to
the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.&quot;
3
The ground of Mill s hedonistic conception of the
moral end is not an intuition,
2 but consists in his
theory of desire the doctrine of psychological
hedonism.
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given that an object is visible, is that people
actually see it. The only proof that a sound is
audible, is that people hear it : and so of the
other sources of our experience. In like manner,
I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to
produce that anything is desirable, is that people
do actually desire it. If the end which the utili
tarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in
theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an
end, nothing could ever convince any person
that it was so. Xo reason can be given why the
general happiness is desirable, except that each
person, so far as he believes it to be attainable,
desires his own happiness. This, however, being
a fact, we have not only all the proof which the
case admits of, but all which it is possible to
require, that happiness is a good
: that each per
son s happiness is a good to that person, and the
general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggre
gate of all persons.&quot;
* This claim that happiness
is one of the ends of conduct is transformed by
psychological analysis into the statement,
&quot; that
there is in reality nothing desired except happi
ness. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a
1
Utilitarianism, pp. 52, 53.1 84 John Stuart Mill
means to some end beyond itself, and ultimately
to happiness, is desired as itself a part of happi
ness, and is not desired for itself until it has be
come so.&quot;
1
We need not pause, meantime, to examine the
validity of Mill s transition, in the above pas
sages, from private to general happiness. What
we have to note is, that the only real proof of his
Utilitarianism is the doctrine that pleasure is
the sole object of desire; and that his ethical
theory is thus governed by his psychological
presuppositions.
It is not to be denied that Hedonism empha
sises a real aspect of moral good. In making the
end of conduct consist essentially in satisfaction,
it affirms a genuine characteristic of it
; for a good
which is not a satisfaction of desire is quite unin
telligible ; and such a good, if we suppose it to be
possible, could not, at all events, be a moral ideal
or end. The objectivity of moral judgments in
volves the authority of the end or law which they
apply to conduct
; and this means that the moral
end must be realisable in and by acts of will
; for if
it is not realisable, it cannot be binding or obliga-
1
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tory ; and to be realisable means here to be real
isable in acts of will, since these are the subject
of moral judgment. The moral end, then, must
be capable of being willed : it must be a possible
object of desire
; for it can only be realised by
being willed and desired. The moral end must be
adapted to the nature of man
; for it is a
&quot; human
good,&quot; and must be so conceived as to be capable
of realisation in the facts of human character. If
the moral consciousness is not to be an impos
sible, and therefore unauthoritative, demand, its
dicta must be relative to the human possibilities.
Moral lightness is that particular end or good
which human actions are intrinsically capable
of realising. Satisfaction is thus a necessary
element in moral good ; and, in asserting this,
Hedonism calls attention to a characteristic of
the moral end which is of real significance.
On the other hand, while the interpretation of
the moral end as personal happiness emphasises
an aspect of moral experience which ethical
theory cannot afford to ignore, it is also true
that the assertion of this aspect is apt to be made
in a one-sided way. In so far as the hedonistic
theory of morality is based upon the doctrine1 86 John Stuart Mill
that pleasure or happiness is the sole object of
desire, it expresses an abstract or individualistic
conception of personality. That desire is for
things which are expected to produce pleasure
may perhaps be accepted as a summary state
ment of certain characteristics of desire regarded
as a mental fact. But, apart altogether from the
question of the completeness or validity of such
a statement, taken in a purely psychological sense,
to derive from it a theory of the moral end is to
make a constructive use of the abstract point of
view required for psychology, in a domain to
which it is quite inapplicable. The laws of
mental life cannot, indeed, be ignored in form
ing a theory of the moral end, for that end must
be realised by mental life
; and it must not, there
fore, be conceived in such a way as to make its
realisation inconsistent with what is known of
mental processes. The psychological results
cannot be left out of account : morality must
be conceived in accordance with them. But the
function of the psychology of conduct, in relation
to a theory of the moral end, is purely regulative
:
it cannot be made to determine the end positively,
as it does when a direct passage is made from thePsychology and Et/iics \ 87
psychological formula that desire is for pleasure
to a hedonistic theory of the moral end. To make
the formula of psychological hedonism determine
the moral point of view is to introduce into
ethics an individualistic way of thinking, which
is essential and proper to psychology, but which
is irrelevant to the theory of morality, because it
deliberately leaves out of account those relations
to things and persons in which alone morality
can exist.
Mill s idea of conduct is based on his psycho
logical conception of knowledge and desire : it is
derived from his limitation of consciousness to its
own states. His theory of desire depends upon
an isolation of personal life from the real world
;
and the abstraction of the subjective process from
reality, in which his doctrine of conduct is thus
rooted, betrays itself in the ethical consequences
of the doctrine. The formal statement that de
sire is always for pleasure or happiness ignores
all the particular interests and objects by which
desire is actually determined and characterised.
It thus makes possible no distinction between
actions on their inner or conscious side : in respect
of their motive they all become alike and morally1 88 John Stuart Mill
indifferent. Mill does actually recognise a variety
of motives; but this recognition avowedly counts
for nothing in his criticism of conduct. Motives
only acquire ethical importance for him, by a
separation of character from conduct, which is
contrary to his own better judgment in the
matter : they affect the moral worth of the agent,
but not the morality of his actions.
1 Now this
purely external conception of the worth of con
duct this refusal to judge it otherwise than by
its outward results is an obvious and direct
consequence of the attempt to base ethics upon
the formula that pleasure is the sole object of
desire. The conception of desire which makes a
state of personal feeling its only possible object
can have no ethical meaning but this. It separ
ates conduct from its end, and makes the end a
merely external effect.
Even within the limits of his hedonism, Mill
finds that this external conception of the relation
of conduct to its end issues in a dissolution of
practical life. One of his most searching dis
coveries, in the time of his doubt and distress,
was the fatuity of the quest of personal happi-
1
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ness.
&quot; Those only are happy ([ thought) who
have their minds fixed on some object other than
their own happiness ; on the happiness of others,
on the improvement of mankind, even on some
art or pursuit, followed not as a means, hut as
itself an ideal end.&quot;
l If only for its own sake,
happiness must be allowed to come unsought.
Those who aim at something else &quot;find happiness
by the way;&quot;
1 but when it is sought it is not
found. &quot;The conscious ability to do without
happiness gives the best prospect of realising
such happiness as is attainable.&quot;
- That such
admissions as these are a surrender of the doc
trine that only happiness can be desired, is a
point on which it is hardly needful to insist. It
is more interesting to observe that they are
a powerful commentary upon Mill s ethical
theory. Moral life ceases to be a unity for him,
because he separates means and end in it, and
makes the standard of conduct a mere out
ward consequence.
&quot;\Ve have just seen that
Mill s failure to make the inner aspect of con
duct morally significant leads him to ignore that
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been his strength and excellence to assert. This
abstraction from each other of related elements
in the unity of moral life finds a fitting sequel in
the conclusion to which Mill is driven, when he
asserts that the ideal end which action must
realise can never be made its motive. The ex
ternal character of the relation between action
and its end or criterion makes practical life un
reasonable.
Such difficulties as these belong to the incon
sistency of the elements in Mill s theory of ac
tion. If he had adopted a consistent deterministic
account of conduct, and had been satisfied with
such external criticism of it as determinism
makes possible, his perplexities need never have
occurred. They are the outcome of his attempt
to fuse the ethical consequences of his mechanical
theory of conduct with a criticism of action which
implies its relation to self-consciousness. We have
seen that Mill s attempt to reconcile his assertion
of voluntary choice with his determinism is beset
with difficulties
; but these difficulties are greatly
complicated and intensified when he tries to com
bine not simply his divergent ideas of conduct, but
the ethical conceptions that grow out of them.Ethical Hedonism 1 9
1
This constitutes the dramatic and speculative in
terest of Mill s ethical theory. It is an attempt to
find, within the limits of empiricism, a place for
naive and undistorted moral experience ; and Mill
is distinguished from his empiricist predecessors
by the serious and resolute nature of this attempt
:
lie recognises the moral facts as they had failed to
do. Mill s Utilitarianism might, in fact, almost be
signalised as a return of modern hedonism to the
ethical point of view. It is something of a con
cession to regard Benthamism as a theory of
&quot;Morals&quot;; it is a theory of nearly everything in
morals except the distinctively moral element
;
and Beiitham s empiricist predecessors, though
some of them were more theologically minded
than lie, were really no nearer to the ethical con
ception of conduct. With Mill this is changed,
and we have a real attempt to express the results
of moral experience. He is not satisfied with a
discovery of the means by which each individual s
attempt to secure his own happiness, in the pres
ent or in a future life, may be turned to account
for the general good. He attaches much more
*~- o
importance than previous hedonism had done to
the internal sanctions of conduct to the estab-TQ2 John Stnart Mill
lishment of a relation between the hedonistic end
and the desires of the individual. We shall have
to see, at a later stage, in what directions Mill s
Utilitarianism is modified by his attempt to make
out a real identity of private with general inter
est. But, in so far as his theory of the moral
end consists in making it simply the satisfaction
of actual desire, or the production of pleasant feel
ing, his main difficulties in working out that
theory arise from his attempt to combine with it
the idea of a less external relation between con
duct and its criterion.
Mill makes utility a really moral principle.
He affirms that &quot;the principle of utility either
has, or there is no reason why it might not have,
all the sanctions which belong to any other
system of morals.&quot;
1 His main effort, indeed, is
to clear it from the charge of selfishness, and to
idealise it by connecting it with man s whole
spiritual meaning. He insists on the prominent
place which may be assigned, on purely utili
tarian grounds, to virtuous conduct. The utili
tarian doctrine, he says, &quot;maintains not only
that virtue is to be desired, but that it is to be




&quot; 1 and the utili
tarian standard
&quot;enjoins and requires the cul
tivation of the love of virtue up to the greatest
strength possible, as being above all things im
portant to the general happiness.&quot;
2 The hedon
ism of Mill s ethical theory does not, in fact,
express moral laxity or selfishness: the theory
is conceived in no spirit of concession to self-
regard or human weakness.
Mill s education had been the work of a stern
schoolmaster. What we know of James Mill
makes it very credible
&quot; that his moral teachino- O
was not likely to err on the side of laxity or in
dulgence
:
&quot; j we learn that
&quot; his moral feelings O
were energetic and rigid on all points which he
deemed important to human wellbeing;&quot;
4 and
that his &quot;moral inculcations were at all times
mainly those of the Socrat-ici viri ; justice,
temperance (to which he gave a very extended
application), veracity, perseverance, readiness to
encounter pain and especially labour
; regard for
the public good ; estimation of persons according
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intrinsic usefulness; a life of exertion in contra
distinction to one of self-indulgent ease and
sloth.&quot;
*
It would have been surprising
if Mill, brought
up on such ethical doctrine as this, had relapsed
into a theory of morals conceived in a less ardu
ous spirit; for all the newer influences of his
youth, and his growing sympathy with the ideal
ism of some of his contemporaries, could only
serve to intensify his appreciation of the serious
side of life. There is nothing which should lead
us to expect in his hedonism any failure to do
justice to the claims of morality or of social rela
tions
; and, in point of fact, the most obvious
moral quality of the theory is its emphasis upon
benevolence. In its assertion of the obligation
of justice, and in its demand for reasonable self-
sacrifice, Mill s Utilitarianism shows no lack of
moral sinew betrays no weakness or frigidity of
moral motive.
Nor, again, is the hedonistic cast of the theory
to be explained by any kind of sensuousness in
Mill, or in those from whom he learned his ethics.
In such men as Bentham and James Mill there
1 Autobiography, p. 47.Hedonism and Philanthropy 195
is little enough of the &quot;artistic temperament&quot;;
and the art of enjoyment is one in which Mill
finds himself fatally lacking.
1 From such men
the real temper of hedonism is conspicuously
absent. Theirs is not the mood of the epicure.
Love of pleasure is, at all events, not their beset
ting sin. They are reflective rather than sensi
tive
; and there is in them more of the sage than
of the voluptuary. Hedonism, in any ordinary
sense of the term, sits strangely enough upon such
men as these
; and Mill s hedonism is not such
as can reasonably be ascribed to any constitu
tional overestimate of even the most refined
indulgences.
The philanthropic or humanitarian bent of his
mind had probably much more to do with Mill s
hedonism than any enthusiastic personal appreci
ation of pleasure. This is a real element in his
outlook upon life. He is, above all things, inter
ested in human wellbeing ; and his emphasis on
happiness connects itself, undoubtedly, with this
side of his character. The most obvious evils of
human life are its dulness and its misery ; and no
normally constituted and sympathetic observer
1
Autobiography, p. 14-3.1 96 John Stuart Mill
can fail to see in these, and especially in the ac
tual pains that men undergo, the most clamant
wrongs that await redress. The saint and the
prophet may perceive, with truer insight, that a
more real tragedy is the failure of life from within
the weakness that consents to evil, the cowar
dice that courts defeat, the selfishness that separ
ates every man from his neighbour. But the
needless pain and sorrow of mankind are more
visible evils
; and there has been no real philan
thropy that has not been alive to their presence,
and urgent for their removal. Mill s conscious
ness of them colours all his thought about human
conduct. When he insists that
&quot; the greatest hap
piness of the greatest number
&quot;
is the criterion of
morality, he is the spokesman of those to whom
life brings too much pain. In their behalf he
affirms the equal rights of all human beings ; and
it is the spectacle of their misery that makes his
claim seem valid and needful. If Mill s utilitari
anism has been of more real and direct service, in
its effect upon social ideals and practice, than
other, and perhaps more accurate, ethical theories,
it has only fulfilled, in this, his main intention.
It derives its character from his sympathy withLogical Value of Hedonism 197
the pains of humanity
: his hedonism is rooted in
moral and humane interests.
Mill himself, in his review of Whewell s ethi
cal writings, asserts, in the most unqualified way,
his belief in the moral validity of his own theory.
&quot; We arc as much for conscience, duty, recti
tude,&quot; he says,
&quot; as Dr Whewell. The terms, and
all the feelings connected with them, are as much
a part of the ethics of utility as of that of intui
tion. The point in dispute is, what acts are the
proper object of those feelings ; whether we ought
to take the feelings as we find them, as accident
or design has made them, or whether the tendency
of actions to promote happiness affords a test to
which the feelings of morality should conform.&quot;
*
In this passage, however, it is to be observed
that Mill makes more of the logical than of the
ethical aspect of the principle of utility; and it
is beyond doubt that his acceptance of this prin
ciple was mainly determined, at all events in the
first instance, by his sense of its logical useful
ness.
&quot;My zeal,&quot; lie says, speaking of his early
ttentlumiisii),
&quot; was as yet little else, at that period
of my life, than zeal for speculative opinions. It198 John Stnart Mill
had not its root in genuine benevolence, or sym
pathy with mankind
; though these qualities held
their due place in my ethical standard.&quot;
] The
logical unity, or coherence, of the utilitarian
theory was what first commended it to Mill.
He saw men s moral judgments determined by
traditions, caprices, and prejudices; and he de
sired to substitute for these a logic of practice.
He criticises Whewell s Elements of Morality
as
&quot;
nothing better than a classification and sys
tematizing of the opinions which lie found pre
vailing, among those who had been educated
according to the approved methods of his own
country ; or, let us rather say, an apparatus for
converting those prevailing opinions, on matters
of morality, into reasons for themselves.&quot;
5 Mill
regards utilitarianism as the only escape from
confused and arbitrary moral conceptions ; and
he accepts it primarily as the only ethical system
which gives a real deduction of moral rules from
a single principle. This is the secret of his enthu
siasm for Bentham s ethical work. He had been
too thoroughly
&quot;rooted and grounded&quot; in incli-
1
Autobiography, p. 109.
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vidualism to detect the abstraction which under
lay Bentham s whole conception of conduct
; and
when he read the Principles of Morals and
Legislation all his previous ideas became an
orderly and complete system of ethics. &quot;The
feeling rushed upon me,&quot; he says,
&quot; that all pre
vious moralists were superseded, and that hero
indeed was the commencement of a new era in
thought.&quot;





&quot; as the key-stone which
held together the detached and fragmentary com
ponent parts of my knowledge and beliefs. It
gave unity to my conceptions of
things.&quot;&quot;
R&amp;gt;r Lentham himself the interest of utilita
rianism had been primarily logical
: it gave him
a principle for the theory of legislation, just





of morality summed up, in a
convenient formula, the means by which human
conduct can be influenced
; and Mill defends
Bentham s ethical theory on the ground of its
scientific or logical value.
&quot; It is by his method
chiefly,&quot; he says,
&quot; that Bcntlmm, as we think,
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gous to that of Bacon in physical. It is because
he was the first to enter into the right mode of
working ethical problems, though he worked many
of them, as Bacon did physical, on insufficient
data.&quot;
x
Except in the case of a conflict of moral
rules, which must be settled by reference to first
principles, the utilitarian controversy is
&quot; a ques
tion of arrangement and logical subordination
rather than of practice ; important principally
in a purely scientific point of view, for the sake
of the systematic unity and coherency of ethical
philosophy.&quot; That morality should be
&quot; referred
to an end of some sort, and not left in the
dominion of vague feeling or inexplicable internal
conviction, that it be made a matter of reason
and calculation, and not merely of sentiment, is
essential to the very idea of moral philosophy ;
is, in fact, what renders argument or discussion
on moral questions possible.&quot;
x
This logical character of the importance of the
utilitarian principle does not make it less signifi
cant, in Mill s eyes, for the practice of morality.
&quot; The contest,&quot; he says,
&quot; between the morality
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. ii. p. 462.
2
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\vhich appeals to an external standard, and that
which grounds itself on internal conviction, is the
contest of progressive morality against stationary
of reason and argument against the mere deifica
tion of opinion and habit.&quot;
^ He makes this, in
fact, his chief apology for utilitarian ethics, that
the utilitarian principle is one by which concrete
acts and general moral rules can be judged and
determined. He points out that certain of the
consequences of an action can generally be fore
seen,
- and that it is the function of a science of
ethics to criticise these consequences in terms of
the end which it assumes.-
1 He urges, in favour
of utilitarianism, that the principle which it
makes use of can be made a criterion of the con
sequences of action, and therefore a ground for
rules of conduct : utilitarianism is, in this way,
a real theory of right and wrong in conduct
4
a theory fitted to guide action. It is thus mainly
as an assertion of the moral significance of con
sequences that Mill defends hedonism. He shares2O2 John Shiart Mill
Bentham s contempt for the authority of those
unjustified sentiments of sympathy and antipathy
which are apt to be regarded as the ultimate
court of appeal in moral questions.
1 He points
out that
&quot; to all those a priori moralists, who




&quot; from the hedonistic
end, and defends them on hedonistic grounds;
3
and Kant finds in experience and preference the
real ground of his criterion.
4 The utilitarian
principle is thus an essential element in the
method of ethics.
Mill finds the peculiar excellence of Bentham s
utilitarianism in two characteristics of his method.
In the first place, Bentham s method is in
ductive and analytic. More than any previous
moralist, he seems to Mill to have the scientific
quality the power of going behind abstractions
and generalities, and dealing with things in the
concrete reality of their details.
5
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. ii. p. 499.
2
Utilitarianism, p. 5.
3 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. ii. p. 496.
4
Utilitarianism, p. 6.
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Tn the second place, Mill praises the construc-
tiveness of Bentham s work.
&quot; With him,&quot; he
says,
&quot; the first use to he made of his ultimate
principle, was to erect on it, as a foundation,
secondary or middle principles, capable of serving
as premises for a body of ethical doctrine not
derived from existing opinions, but fitted to be
their test.&quot;
1 His work is positive, and not
merely destructive or critical
; and its value is
therefore permanent. This constructive utility
of Bentham s ethical theory, which had been part
of its original attraction for Mill, continued to
appeal to him, even when he was most aware of
Bentham s shortcomings ; and his sense of it
helped the individualistic presuppositions of the
theory to retain that hold upon Mill s mind
which they never entirely lost.
But, with all his belief in the logical value of
the principle of utility, and with all his apprecia
tion of the force and skill with which Bentham
had developed and applied that principle, Mill is
keenly aware of the limitations of Bentham s
system of morality. He criticises it with all the
energy of a former disciple. He points out that204 John Shiart Mill
Bentham makes no contribution to the science of
personal morality, since his theory
&quot;does not
pretend to aid individuals in the formation of
their own character
;
&quot; l and he insists that with
out an ideal of personal life,
&quot; the regulation of
. . . outward actions must be altogether halt
ing and imperfect.&quot;
-
In such criticism of Bentham s ethical think
ing Mill shows a sense of its outwardness and of
its failure to meet the facts of moral experience,
which belongs to his own deepened conscious
ness of the spiritual significance of conduct.
When he says that Benthamism
&quot; will do nothing
... for the spiritual interests of society,&quot;
3 he
betrays a consciousness of an ideal which is not
expressed in his hedonism. The mere summation
of pleasures has become in a high degree irrele
vant. Mill is thinking of moral life in terms
of an idea of character, to which no justice is
done when it is criticised merely as a means to
the production of pleasant feeling. He expresses,
in this renunciation of Bentham s theory of life,
the demand for a direct relation between the
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 363.
-Ibid., p. 364.
:;
II,id., p. 365.Modification of Hedonism 205
moral end and the conduct wliich realises it.
Such a demand inconsistent with a purely
hedonistic theory of the moral criterion, and
with the determinism which is natural to such
a theory connects itself with Mill s belief in
the reality and importance of voluntary choice,
and is fulfilled by a conception of moral good
ness as a real quality of self-conscious action.
Mill s idea of conduct as a spiritual function,
however he may fail to give it coherent expres
sion, issues in a view of morality which stands
in no very positive relation to his hedonism.
It betrays itself in the social character of his
conception of the moral end, in the extent to
which he qualifies his assertion of the worth of
pleasure, and in the importance which he attaches
to the inward aspect of the moral life. We shall
have to sec, in the next chapter, how largely
these ways of thinking modify the complexion of
his utilitarian ethics.2O6
CHAPTEE X
THE WOHTII OF CONDUCT
IT has already been suggested that Hedonism is
a theory which makes morality relative to the
interests of personal life; and it is especially
characteristic of Mill that he emphasises this
personal aspect of moral good. His sense of the
value of conduct is not diminished by his belief
in the possibility of giving a naturalistic account
of its development;
1 and, with all his experi-
entialism, he retains the strongest and sanest
conviction of the worth of practical ideals.
2 His
conception of such ideals, and of the value which
they express, makes them relative to the needs
of individual persons.
1 Cf. Autobiography, p. 151.
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Against all abstract conceptions of value, and
against the materialistic interpretation of it which
is more often implied in habits of thought and
conduct than theoretically expressed, he main
tains the relativity of every kind of good to
personal consciousness and experience. Human
desire is the source of the value of things O
*
their worth consists in the satisfaction of desire
which they afford. The people of a country, for
example,
&quot; are that for the sake of which its wealth
exists;&quot;
1 and social institutions, and economic
conditions, are criticised in relation to the good
of individuals. Popular, and even scientific,
critics of utilitarianism are apt to do but scant
justice to the unqualified assertion which the
theory makes of the worth of the human inter
ests. Mill yields to no idealist in his magnificent
contempt for material things, when these are
made to seem more important than the needs of
personal life which it is their proper function to
satisfy. His economic theory expresses, at every
turn, the loftiest humanism, and the most com
plete disregard of all apparent advantages which
do not really benefit individuals.
1
1 olitical Economy, p. (j.208 John Stuart ilfill
This is the meaning of his suggestion of the
need for a criticism of consumption, and for a
proper appreciation of the relative value of things.
He does not look with unqualified approval on
the mere desire of wealth. This
&quot; haste to be
rich,&quot; and the stimulus to production which it
gives, are not in themselves good ; and they do
not even afford any real security for the realis
ation of ethical or economic ideals. Mill s point
of view is that of a moralist, whose humanism
teaches him to look below the surface of things,
and not to accept blindly the thoughtless esti
mates either of the populace or of a scientific
cult. He sees in the commercial life of England,
and in the very mood of its industrial prosperity,
an ambition that defeats itself, and a materialism
whose doom is already sealed, r In England,&quot; he
says,
&quot;
it is not the desire of wealth that needs
to be taught, but the use of wealth, and appreci
ation of the objects of desire which wealth can
not purchase, or for attaining which it is not
required/] Every real improvement in the char
acter of the English, whether it consists in
giving them higher aspirations, or only a juster
estimate of the value of their present objectsPersonality and Value 2O9
of desire, must
necessarily moderate the ardour
their devotion to the pursuit of wealth.&quot;
For his own part, he is &quot;not charmed with the
of life held out by those who think that the
lormal state of human beings is that of struggling
o get on
; &quot;Mie finds, in the scramble for riches
d all its results, only &quot;the disagreeable symp toms of one of the phases of industrial progress ;
&quot;
and he suggests that //the best state for&quot;human
nature is that in which, while no one is poor no
one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear
emg thrust back, by the efforts of others to push
themselves forward.&quot;
*fl He admits, indeed, that
competition stimulates and increases production;
but the mere increase of material wealth does
not appear to him to be absolutely or
necessarily
&quot;
It is only in the backward countries of
the world that increased production is still an
important object: in those most advanced, what
is economically needed is a better distribution
;&quot;
and economy in production will only secure real
advantages when &quot;civilization and improvement
shall have so far advanced,, that what is a benefit
1
Political Economy, p. 65. -Ibid i&amp;gt; 43.3
&quot;
Ibid., p. 454.2io John Stuart Mill
to the whole shall be a benefit to each individual
composing
it.&quot;
1 Unproductive and not produc
tive use of wealth is the ultimate end of the
whole economic process ; and it is not the amount
but the misapplication of unproductively con
sumed wealth that calls for criticism.
2 Material
wealth is, in fact, of secondary importance for
Mill.
&quot; A stationary condition of capital and
population implies no stationary state of human
improvement.&quot;
3 On the contrary, the true ends
of conduct can all be realised even when purely
material progress is not going on. *Moral and
social advance, and the improvement of the art
of living, do not depend on unlimited increase of
material wealth; and they are hindered, rather
than furthered, by the engrossment of men in
&quot; the art of getting
on.&quot; If men s minds were
free from this purely selfish occupation, then,
&quot; instead of serving no purpose but the increase
of wealth, industrial improvements would pro
duce their legitimate effect, that of abridging
human labour.&quot;
4
Every economic condition, in
fact, depends, for its worth, upon its effect on
1 Political Economy, p. 461.
2
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personal life. It is only in virtue of its use by
conscious persons that wealth is good ; and it is
good simply in so far as it lends itself to their
purposes.
This conception of value is profoundly ethical.
Against the attempt to crush or overshadow the
human spirit, or to silence its claims by the
worship of outward prosperity and the deifica
tion of material wealth, Mill affirms the supreme
worth of personal life, and its moral superiority
to all impersonal things; and, in this assertion of
the personal source of all value, he joins himself
to those whose estimate is most worthy of heed.
This is the ethical way of conceiving value
; and it
is this which makes hedonism an ethical theory.
This idea, however, that all worth is relative
to personal ends, gives fundamental ethical im
portance to the mode in which personality is
conceived. We have already seen that the
degree in which Mill s ethical theory is affected \
by his individualistic idea of personality com- .
mits him to a view of the moral end, which
separates it from the acts in which it is realised,
and makes it only an external effect of them.
This dislocation of the moral end from action212 John Stuart Mill
leads, as we have seen, to real difficulties within
hedonism itself; and a further difficulty arises
in the attempt to pass from the egoism, which
is involved in the theory that all desire is for
personal pleasure, to the universalism of the
utilitarian conception of the moral end. Mill
partly evades this difficulty by a recognition of
the social character of personality, which serves
to justify his ethical universalism, but which is
not consistent with his attempt to derive mor
ality from an individualistic theory of desire.
While he does not
&quot; conceive life to be so rich
in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the
cultivation of all those which address themselves
to what M. Comte terms the egoistic propensi
ties,&quot;
x and while he makes pleasure itself a good,
Mill yet affirms that enjoyments need to be moral
ised




&quot; in cultivating the habitual wish to share them
with others, and with all others, and scorning to
desire anything for oneself which is incapable of
being so shared.&quot;
*
The social conception of morality could not
but come naturally to a disciple of Bentham
1
Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 145.




were of a political kind,
meant to serve as a basis for legislation ; and
an ethical system intended primarily to guide
the work of a legislator could hardly fail to be




But Bentham s conception of conduct was not
of a kind that made it possible for him to regard
the general happiness as an end or object of
desire for the individuals who make up society.
It is an end, on his theory, for the community
or for the legislator; but it is not desired by
individuals; and the function of government is
to use penal sanctions of various kinds in such
a way as to establish an external connection
between the private pleasure of individuals
and the general good. The social character of
^morality
is thus conceived by Bentham in a
very imperfect way. The common good, or the
greatest happiness of the greatest number, is
not really made a moral end, because it cannot
be desired by the individual aent.
While Mill s recognition of the social char
acter of morality is really a development of
Bentham s political or legislative conception of
it, he does more than Bentham to justify such2 1 4 John Stuart Mill
a conception, because he regards personal life
as itself social, and makes social relationships
natural to man. His assertion that the moral
end is a common good connects itself with his
idea of the individual as a member of society ; and
this revised idea of the individual, which con
siders his actual nature to be in some degree the
embodiment of social relations, makes the com
mon good a possible object of desire for him.
The moralisation of desire its identification
with a common interest is rendered possible by
the pressure of society upon its members, and by
the degree in which their nature is formed by
their social relations.
&quot; To do as one would be done by, and to love
one s neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal
perfection of utilitarian morality ;
&quot; : and the
realisation of this ideal morality can be best
approached by such a development of social in
stitutions, and of public opinion, as will tend to
identify private with general interests.
1 Social
interests do not, on Mill s theory, require to be
implanted in man artificially.
^
&quot; The deeply
rooted conception which every individual even
1
Utilitarianism, p. 25.Morals and Society 2 1 5
now has of himself as a social being, tends to
make him feel it one of his natural wants that
there should he harmony between his feelings




feeling of unity with our fellow-creatures
&quot;
does indeed require education and cultivation
;
but it is capable of becoming
&quot; as deeply rooted
in our character, and to our own consciousness as
completely a part of our nature, as the horror of
crime is in an ordinarily well-brought-up young
person ;
&quot; 2 and this is possible because it is not
an external law but a natural feeling.
This naturalness of the social interests con
stitutes the possibility of that action for the
general good in which morality consists
; but, in
itself, it is a mere potentiality of moral life
; and
morality only grows up under the influence of
forces which tend to identify public and private
good. Society is the great educator of moral life.
Its wellbeing depends on the power of unselfish
interests :
3 its very existence is only possible by
a discipline of selfish propensities
&quot; which consists
in subordinating them to a common system of2 1 6 John Stuart Mill
opinions ;
&quot; 1 and this dependence of society upon
the power of combined action, which its members
have, makes its development a growth in in
dividuals of those qualities which unite their
interests, so that
&quot; there is not a more accurate
test of the progress of civilization than the pro
gress of the power of co-operation.&quot;
2 The quali
ties which social life requires are thus wrought
into the characters of men
; and the exigencies
of society produce such a development of their
personal aptitudes that
&quot; what is lost in the
separate efficiency of each, is far more than made
up by the greater capacity of united action. In
proportion as they put off the qualities of the
savage, they become amenable to discipline ; cap
able of adhering to plans concerted beforehand,
and about which they may not have been con
sulted : of subordinating their individual caprice
to a preconceived determination, and performing
severally the parts allotted to them in a com
bined undertaking.&quot;
3 Civilisation is, in fact,
&quot; a
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This effect of social life upon the moral ten
dencies is largely due to the power of public
opinion. The
&quot;
feeling of unity with our fellow-
creatures&quot; shows itself in sensitiveness and re
sponsiveness to their esteem. &quot;All experience
shows that the mass of mankind never judge of
moral questions for themselves, never see any
thing to be right or wrong until they have been
frequently told it.&quot;
1 The modern civilised man
finds much of the work of moral judgment
&quot; done
to his hand,&quot;
2 and inherits an experience on which
&quot;
all the prudence, as well as all the morality of
life, is dependent.&quot;- Bentham s underestimate
of tin s accumulated experience is an aspect of
his individualism which Mill singles out for
criticism
;
3 and Mill himself is keenly aware of
its importance. Xot only
&quot; when it succeeds in
enforcing a servile conformity to
itself,&quot;
4 but
still more when it forms a steadying pressure
against reforming zeal, the public opinion which
embodies the traditions and experiences of hu-2 1 8 John Stuart Mill
inanity is a powerful and wholesome influence
upon character.
1
Society corrects, by this and
other means, the one-sidedness of individuals ;
2
and all interaction with others, whether within
or beyond the limits of a single nationality, de
velops a breadth of character and interests, by
which individuals are redeemed from their isola
tion, and the idea of a common good is made
possible.
3 Both by the activities which its re
lations produce, and by the opinions and feelings
which arise out of its needs, social life tends to
identify the felt interests of each individual with
those of others.
This moral power of society is so essential an
element in its very nature, that Mill makes the
moral effect of social institutions a test of their
worth.
&quot; Human beings owe to each other help
to distinguish the better from the worse, and
encouragement to choose the former and avoid
the latter. They should be for ever stimulating
each other to increased exercise of their higher
faculties, and increased direction of their feelings
and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevat-
1
Representative Government, p. 207 ; cf. p. 116.
Ibid., p. 300.
3 Cf. Political Economy, pp. 351,
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ing instead of degrading, objects and pursuits.&quot;
l
Even when Mill is most sceptical of the possi
bility of giving moral help, and most critical of
undue interference, he never suggests that the
claim of human beings on the moral support of
their fellows is loss valid than any of their other
rights. It is thus not surprising that he makes
the moral effect of social relations the main
criterion of their value.
This, for example, is one of his chief arguments
for a reform of marriage laws and of the relations
which they regulate. Xo doubt much of Mill s
contention in this matter is a demand for
&quot; better
bread than can be made of wheat
;&quot; and many of
his suggestions indicate, not so much a serious
appreciation of the facts of the case, as the im
patience of that untold and tragic yearning for a
perfected human life, which lends so much of
pathos and dignity to his intellectual work. But
however little he may be thought to contribute
to the actual question of what is or is not
involved in the distinction of sex, there is no
mistaking the ground on which he argues for
legal equality of married persons, as
&quot; the only
1
Liberty, p. 44.22O John Stuart Mill
means of rendering the daily life of mankind, in
any high sense, a school of moral cultivation.&quot;
1
He demands a reform of the relation of men and
women, because he sees how much that relation
means for the moral health of society
: because
family life determines the moral directions of
men, the position of woman, which gives family
life its character and its power for good or evil,
has an importance which Mill finds it impossible
to overrate. The main significance of the whole
question, for him, is in the effect of the marriage
relation upon character, and in the special power,
which that relation has, of forming and develop
ing moral ideas.
2
In the same way, the value of all other social
arrangements consists in their moral usefulness :
their justification is their tendency to make the
common good the interest of individuals. Penal
laws exist in order to enforce that conduct which
is for the general advantage ;
3 and their legiti
macy depends, for Mill, upon their serving this
1
Subjection of Women, p. 78.
2 Cf. Subjection of Women, esp. pp. 79-82, 148-152, 159,
177-180.
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purpose. The proper end of government
&quot;
is to
reduce the waste of energy occasioned by in
jurious conduct, so that the whole efforts of
mankind may be
&quot; turned to the legitimate em
ployment of the human faculties, that of compel
ling the powers of nature to lie more and more
subservient to physical and moral
good.&quot;
1 The
protection which society affords to its members
and their interests is valuable chielly as the con
dition on which alone the development of industry
and frugality is possible.
2 &quot;
Insecurity of person
and property, is as much as to say, uncertainty
of the connection between all human exertion
or sacrifice, and the attainment of the ends for
which they are undergone ;
&quot;
:; and the obliga
tion of society to enforce security arises from
the fatal effect which this uncertainty has upon
the development of character. The State is thus
a moral institution. Its function is to maintain
those conditions in which character can develop.
Mill s faith in democracy is rooted in the same
moral idea of the value of institutions. It
belongs to his conviction that society ought to
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serve the moral interests of its members; and
it expresses his belief in the educative effect
of popular government, rather than any blind
confidence in the wisdom or goodness of the
masses. The worth of popular institutions con
sists largely in their tendency to make each
member of society
&quot;
feel himself one of the
public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for
his benefit.&quot;
1
They are a &quot;school of public
spirit ;
&quot; * and without them the development
of character cannot be complete.
Moral life cannot be perfected in isolation : no
matter how well able the individual may be to
conduct his life in solitude, the highest moral
excellence is only possible for him as a mem
ber of society ; and
&quot; the aim of improvement
should be not solely to place human beings in a
condition in which they will be able to do with
out one another, but to enable them to work
with or for one another in relations not involving
dependence.
&quot; 2 The effect of a state of society
upon character is &quot;in itself the most interest
ing phenomenon which that state of society
1
Representative Government, p. 68.
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can possibly present;&quot;
1 for there are certain
personal qualities which can only be developed
in society ; and these, on the utilitarian theory,
are of the very essence of morality. The value
of social life is thus ethical it consists in an
effect on character : society has its
&quot;
perfect
work &quot;in producing those moral qualities which
cannot exist apart from it and on which its
own stability depends. The end of society is
realised in the production of that type of char
acter which is fitted for social life in the
identification of the interests of individuals
with the general good.
P Mill s theory of the relation of morality to
social life thus forms a highly important element
mi his ethics. It constitutes a real advance upon
Bentham s external way of conceiving the rela
tion
; and it suggests, although not in a way
altogether consistent with Mill s explicit theory
of desire, how a common good or general hap
piness may come to be desired by individuals.
It is of more importance, however, for under
standing Mill s ethical theory, to observe that
the way in which he connects the moral life
1
Logic, p.
f&amp;gt;&amp;lt;iO.224 / John Stuart Mill
nth society modifies his hedonism in two re
spects.
In the first place, the moral standard, in refer
ence to which Mill criticises social conditions,
is not strictly hedonistic. Too much, certainly,
might be made of this point; since it may be
argued that, while the tendency of social con
ditions to promote good character is the best
criterion of their value, the goodness of char
acter itself is determined by its hedonic worth.
While, however, this objectivity of the standard
actually applied by Mill to social relations does
not, I think, warrant us in suggesting that he
abandons the hedonistic point of view, it is yet
not without interest. It indicates at least that
other, and more objective, criteria can be applied
to the phenomena in question more readily than
the hedonistic standard; and it leads naturally
to the conclusion that good character is related,
in no merely external way, to the moral end.
It is still more important, however, to remark-
that Mill s whole assertion, that the moral end
must be a
&quot; common
good,&quot; contains the admis
sion (which, indeed, he explicitly makes) that
pleasure requires
&quot; moralisation
&quot; - that mereInclination and Morality 225
satisfaction dues not realise the moral end, but
that the very idea of morality requires a criti
cism of desires.
Mill is, in fact, aware of the slight extent to
which men s actual desires allbrd them moral
guidance, and of the inadequacy of their subjec
tive feelings as a clue to their real good. He
recognises that &quot;life could not go on if it were
not admitted that impulses must be controlled,
and that reason ought to govern our actions;&quot;
1
and he maintains that &quot;the duty of man is the
same in respect to his own nature as in respect
to the nature of all other tilings, namely, not to
follow but to amend it.&quot;- Inclinations cannot
be assumed to be a safe guide for conduct : they
&quot;may be the expression not of the divine will,
but of the fetters which impede its free action
;
and to take hints from these for the guidance




The actual desires of men do not, in fact, rep
resent their real needs : the greatest misfortimes
such as
&quot;
ignorance and want of culture &quot;are
1
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those
&quot; of which the persons suffering from them
are apt to be least aware.&quot;
1 The real value of
things is not always represented in the desire
felt for them. There are things
&quot; of the worth of
which the demand of the market is by no means
a test
; things of which the utility does not con
sist in ministering to inclinations, nor in serving
the daily uses of life, and the want of which is
least felt where the need is greatest. This is
peculiarly true of those things which are chiefly
useful as tending to raise the character of human
beings. The uncultivated cannot be competent
judges of cultivation. Those who most need to
be made wiser and better, usually desire it least,
and if they desired it, would be incapable of find
ing the way to it by their own lights.&quot;- The
utility which Mill makes his moral principle is
&quot;utility in the largest sense, grounded on the
permanent interests of a man as a progressive
being.&quot;
3
This sense of the limitations of subjective feel
ing as a guide for conduct determines one of
Mill s most significant differences from Bentham.
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. p. 28.
- Political Economy, p. 575.
:!
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Bentham had denied all qualitative distinction
between pleasures: pleasures differed, for him,
only in quantity in their intensity, that is to
say, and in their duration. They differed also,
when regarded as motives, in their nearness or
remoteness, and their certainty or uncertainty.
Considered as furnishing a criterion for conduct,
they could also be compared in respect of their
tendency to be followed by pleasant and not to
be followed by painful feelings their .fecundity,
and purity; and when they were considered in&quot;
7
relation to a number or community of persons,
it became necessary to ask by how many they
could be enjoyed. But all this is-, for Bentham,
a purely quantitative estimate of pleasure.
1
MilLon the other hand, maintains that
&quot;
it is
quite compatible with the principle of utility to
recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure
are more desirable and more valuable than
others.&quot;
- &quot;
It would be absurd,&quot; he says,
&quot; that
. . . the estimation of pleasures should be sup
posed to depend on quantity aloiie.&quot;
3 He points
to the fact that &quot;there is no known Epicurean
1 Bentham s Principles of Morals and Legislation, chap. iv.
2
Utilitarianism, p. 11. 3
Ibid., p. 12.228 John Stuart Mill
theory of life which does not assign to the
pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and
imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a
much higher value as pleasures than to those
of mere sensation
;
&quot; * and he asserts that
&quot; the
feelings and judgment of the experienced
&quot;
&quot; declare the pleasures derived from the higher
faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the
question of intensity, to those of which^ the
animal nature, disjoined from the higher facul
ties, is susceptible.&quot; This reference to the
&quot;feelings and judgment of the experienced&quot;






pleasures, and for the
preference which the very act of distinguishing
them gives to the higher.
&quot; On a question,&quot; he
says,
&quot; which is the best worth having of
two pleasures, or which of two modes of exist
ence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart
from its moral attributes and from its conse
quences, the judgment of those who are qualified
by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of
the majority among them, must be admitted as
final.&quot;






Ibid., p. 15.77/6 Judgment of the Wise 229
faculties have been trained are capable of esti
mating tlio relative value of different kinds of
pleasure; and he commits the judgment of the
worth of things to the wise and good, so com
pletely that it would not
&quot; be easy, even for an
unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule
of virtue from the abstract into the concrete,
than to endeavour so to, live that Christ would
approve our life.&quot;
l
The mode in which Mill proposes to test the
relative value of different classes of pleasure
suggests the real nature of those distinctions of
kind which he asserts to exist among them. It
indicates that he is serious in distinguishing
those differences of kind from any merely quan
titative variations such as JJentlmm s theory had
considered: it implies that pleasures are distin
guished by another criterion than that of pleas
antness alone.
It is hardly possible to suspect Mill of author
ising one man to judge what is actually most
pleasant for another. In respect of their mere
pleasantness to him, each man must be allowed
to be the best judge of his own enjoyments: so230 John Stitart Mill
much of liberty can hardly be refused even to
the most foolish
; and if the saint or the sage
professed to compare the pleasantness of higher
and lower enjoyments, he might lay himself open
to the retort that he did not adequately appreciate





have, indeed, no special auth
ority to pronounce impartially upon the pleasant-
ness of different feelings ; for it
is_the yej^jDriyi-
lege of virtue not to crave for vice, and not to
desire its joys. The authority of the wise is in a
different sphere. Mill s appeal to their judgment
is indeed not to be gainsaid
: it has its credentials
not only in Plato and Aristotle, and in Stoicism,
but, under more or less disguise, in all ethical
theory that keeps contact with the issues of the
moral life; it expresses the human personal
quality of all moral judgment, which has no value
as a dead code but only as a living intuition.
But the judgment of the experienced applies
to pleasure only because pleasure is not what
hedonism sometimes takes it to be an isolated
mental state, unrelated to personal qualities, and
capable of being fully calculated in time and
intensity. The judgment of the wise, and indeedPleasure and Character
*&quot; O
the moral judgment, applies to pleasures in
respect not of their mere pleasantness, but of
other relations from which their moral signi
ficance is really derived: it applies to them as
satisfactions of desire, or as results of conduct,
and, in either case, as related to the character
which action and desire express.
This is implied in Mill s own contention that the
judgment of the wise approves the type of char




it is not a set of pleasures, but a
kind of person, that is preferred by &quot;the feelings
and judgment of the experienced ;
&quot; and the pre
ference is thus not simply hedonistic. The same
view of the distinction of kind among pleasures
is conveyed in Mill s insistence on the relativity
of pleasures to character and faculty;
2 and it is
even more evident in the judgment that &quot;it is
better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig-
satisfied
; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a
fool satisfied.
&quot;
;; In such a statement, &quot;better,&quot;
plainly, does not mean more pleasant. The idea of
pleasure or happiness as the end has given place
to a criterion of another kind. The desire that
1
Utilitarianism, p. Hi. ^
j],;^ j,_ n.
:i
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is satisfied by the
&quot; sense of dignity
&quot;
or personal
wortKIs a desire that depends on the individual s
consciousness of himself as a moral agent and a
member of society.
1
The same sense of the inadequacy of simple
hedonism determines Mill s assertion of the ne










2 He criticises Bentham s
omission, from his theory of conduct, of all
regard for anything except its outward conse
quences ; and he insists on the applicability of
other criteria, which express the worth of conduct
in relation, not to its consequences, but to the
character from which it proceeds.
The actual development, then, of Mill s ethical
theory makes large inroads upon his official
hedonism. His universalistic conception of the
moral end, and his recognition of a distinc
tion of kind among pleasures, are two qualifica
tions of his general theory of moral good,
which are identical in principle, and which are
inconsistent no less with the logical use than
1
Utilitarianism, p. 13; cf. p. 18.
- Dissertations and Discussions, vol. i. pp. 386-388.Qualification of Hedonism 233
with the psychological basis of the hedonistic
criterion.
In regarding the &quot;greatest happiness of the
greatest number
&quot;
as the end which should deter
mine conduct, he makes the moral good of the
individual agent consist not in the enjoyment
but in the production of pleasure ; and, however
much he may be disposed to believe in the actual
coincidence of private and general happiness, he
does not hesitate, in case of conflict, to make the
common good the criterion of conduct. This,
however, is to make the moral good of the
individual consist, not in a state of feeling, but in
a kind of activity or personal character. Simi
larly, the distinction of kind among pleasures
depends upon their relation to the objective life
of character; and by this distinction, and by the
non - hedonistic preference of higher to lower
pleasures, the good, whether of single individuals
or of the greatest number, is made to consist not
in pleasure or satisfaction but in qualities of
personal life. This conception of the moral end
derives no support from the doctrine that only
pleasure is desired
; it may rather be said to be
inconsistent with that doclrine. and to depend234 John Stuart Mill
for its legitimacy upon a less abstract notion of
desire.
The far-reaching qualification of hedonism,
which is conveyed in making the moral end for
individuals a common good, and in establishing
qualitative differences among pleasures, is fatal
also to that logical use of the hedonistic prin
ciple, as a moral calculus, which largely deter
mined Mill s belief in its scientific value. If
moral good depends upon character, and if their
relation to character determines the worth of
pleasures themselves, then the detail of the moral
life cannot be regulated by mere calculation of
pleasant feelings in the abstract.
We have already seen that it is this conception
of moral good, as a state of character, which Mill
actually employs as a criterion of economic con
ditions and of social institutions
; and the same
idea of the moral end determines his appreciation
of individuality and independence of character.
He regards strength of disposition and character
as itself a good.
&quot; Desires and impulses are as




&quot;strong impulses are but
1
Liberty, p. 35.L iberty 235
another name for energy.&quot;
1 The vigorous and
active character is not only most powerful for
good as well as for evil, but is also that which is
most likely to develop breadth of interests, and
the capacity for adapting itself to the conditions
of life :
2
it is &quot;not only intrinsically the best, but
is the likeliest to acquire all that is really excel
lent or desirable in the opposite type.&quot;
-
The worth of individuality thus consists in its
being the condition of self-development ; and the
supreme value of character is also the reason why
&quot; mankind are greater gainers by suffering each
other to live as seems good to themselves, than
by compelling each to live as seems good to the
rest.&quot;
4 Mill s belief that, &quot;among the works of
man, . . . the first in importance surely is man
himself,&quot;
r&amp;gt;
is the motive that leads him to defend
that
&quot;
circle around every individual human
being, which no government, be it that of one, of
a few, or of the many, ought to be permitted to
overstep.&quot; Interference with the liberty of any











&quot; Political Economy, p.
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of others : it is justified because
&quot;
all that makes
existence valuable to any one, depends on the en
forcement of restraints upon the actions of other
people ;
&quot; x and its limits are set by the same ethi
cal principle from which it derives its authority.
Wherever no interests but those of the agent are
involved, interference with freedom of action be
comes not only needless but hurtful;
2 for &quot;human
nature is not a machine to be built after a model,
and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but
a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself
on all sides, according to the tendency of the in
ward forces which make it a living thing.&quot;
3 The
character of each individual member of society
is^not simply a means to social prosperity, and a
part of the social whole : it is this, but it is also_
itself a whole, with its own laws and qualities,
and its own ends determined by these. On this
account,
&quot;if a person possesses any tolerable
amount of common-sense and experience, his own
mode of laying out his existence is the best, not.
1
Liberty, p. 3.
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because it is the best in itself, but because it is
his own mode.&quot;
1
Liberty is, indeed, defended by Mill on hedon
istic grounds. Differences of individual tempera
ment must condition differences in the sources of
pleasure, and each man is therefore likely to be
best able to secure his own happiness ;
2 freedom
itself, too, is the most essential of human satis
factions, and nothing can compensate for its
absence
;
3 but the chief moral necessity for it
consists in the fact that all development and all
individuality of personal character depend upon
it
;
4 and it is because these arc threatened, by
the despotism of government and public opinion,
that Mill insists on the need for
&quot; a great social
support for ideas and opinions different from
those of the mass.&quot;
J
Mill s argument for liberty, vitiated as it may
1
Liberty, p. 39 ; cf. Subjection ot \Vomeii, pp. 159 11 .
2
Liberty, p. 40.
:i Cf. Subjection of Women, p. 178 and p. 1S2
; Political
Economy, pp. 129 ff.
4 Political Economy, p. 570
; Liberty, esp. pp. 36, 37. and
41
; Representative Government, p. 48.
3 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. ii. p. 73 ; cf. vol. i. pp.
188, 380.238 John Stuart Mill
be in some respects by an abstract individual-
isiu, is thus, in the main, a, rlaiin for all possible
freedom of action, on the ground that such frees,
dom affords the only hope of moral development.
His conviction of the worth of human personal
ity is the idea which guides that sober stren
uous liberalism, of which he is the philosopher
as well as the
&quot;
saint.&quot;
J He sees, in human
character and conduct, possibilities of worth such
as belong to nothing else
; and with magnificent
hopefulness, he regards these possibilities as the
promise of a perfect life in a perfect society
: he
finds in their development the highest human
task, and in their realisation the supreme good.
Such realisation, however, is not to be brought
about by external forces and influences : it can
only come as a spontaneous growth from within.
All that can be done to develop character from
without is to remove the obstructions that arise
from bad conditions, physical or moral. In itself
the realisation of the moral end the perfecting
of personal life must be self-realisation : it can
1
&quot; I used familiarly to call him the Saint of Rationalism,&quot;-
Mr Gladstone, in a letter quoted in Mr W. L. Courtney s Life
of John Stuart Mill, p. 142.Self -realisation. 239
lie nothing else; for character cannot be manu
factured, and its perfection is essentially its own
growth.
Mill is therefore one of those who find in per
sonal life, rightly understood, its own law. lie
regards the self-development of character as the
moral end. We have seen by what vague and
partly incoherent hints he suggests this con
clusion; but it is a conclusion which at all
events represents his real ethics better than the
hedonism, which is generally regarded as his
theory of moral good. His modifications of the
doctrine that pleasure is the end of conduct are
so large and so significant as to deprive that doc
trine of any consistent influence on his thinking.
His idea of self -consciousness and its relation
to character does not, indeed, authorise any
ethical theory which asserts the inner unity of
conduct with its end
; but it is hardly possible





most fitting interpretation for utility
&quot;
grounded




MILL S intellectual work is so deeply influenced
by philosophical ideas, that it is surprising
to discover how little of a metaphysician he
really is. He never raises metaphysical prob
lems independently, and on their own account;
and, even in his logical discussions, he takes
pains to evade metaphysical issues whenever
he can do so. His interest is in the concrete
relations of things, rather than in their ultimate
meaning ; and metaphysical construction is alien
to his mental habit. There are probably few
other thinkers whose intellectual attitude is so
directly dependent upon philosophical theories,
and who have, at the same time, done so little in
the way of discussing philosophical principles./ 7ic Order of Nature 24 1
1 his is all the more singular because Mill s
speculation contains two elements which raise
the problem of metaphysic in the most definite
way. It develops, on the one hand, the idea of
an order of natural relations, and, on the other
hand, a real sense of practical and moral in
terests. Xow these are the two leading factors
in the metaphysical problem ; and the extent to
which they occupy Mill s mind makes his ab
stinence from metaphysical discussion hard to be
understood.
In the first place, Mill s consciousness of an
order of nature is more than nominal. There is
nothing to invalidate it in his
&quot;psychological&quot;
conception of matter, as merely &quot;permanent
possibilities of sensation
&quot;
; and, while it is not
easy to see how the idea of a system of natural
relations can be reconciled with the doctrine
that causality is only invariable or unvarying
sequence, yet the conception of the causal rc!
lation which underlies .Mill s theory of Induction
-that of unconditional dependence defines,
as well as asserts, the reality of nature. Mill
entertains and investigates the idea of the natural
order, which the explanations of physical science
Q242 John Stuart Mill
imply
: his theory of Induction expresses that
conception of Nature which makes it objective
and capable of being known.
It is still more significant, as a motive for
metaphysical speculation, that, for Mill, man
himself, no less than the conditions of his life,
is part of the natural order, and a real object
of knowledge: the fact that human knowledge
and conduct form his main topic implies the
presence in his theory of metaphysical issues;
and their presence is all the more obvious be
cause he discusses the/value
as well as the nature
of mental facts.
His consciousness of nature, as a system of
objective relations, and of man s place within
that system, does nothing to weaken his ideal
interests, or to impair his sense of the moral
issues that are involved in human character and
conduct.
&quot; It is only to a very vulgar type of
mind,&quot; he says,
&quot; that a grand or beautiful object
loses its charm when it loses some of its mystery,
through the unveiling of a part of the process
by which it is created in the secret recesses of
Nature.&quot;
J He recognises that the notion,
&quot; that
1 Dissertations and Discussions, vol. iii. p. 111.Ideal Interests 243
no causes can give rise to products of a more
precious or elevated kind than themselves/
&quot;
is at
variance with the known analogies of Nature.&quot;
1
He distinguishes sharply, too, between the
natural and the moral order; and he does not




to fashion his idea of the relations that ought
to obtain. The claims of ideal interests have
never found a more convinced or more strenuous
advocate than Mill of their validity and inde
pendence.
Now, the ideal interests and the effort that
they symbolise are the chief motive of philosophy:
philosophy depends on the unceasing contest be
tween human intelligence and the dulness of
earthly fact. In whatever degree all the details
of human life may have been fashioned by the
forces and pressures of nature, it is yet never
without determination by the consciousness of
ideals ; and because it is, in this way, an effort,
it is also an enigma. He who &quot;seeks a country&quot;
must
&quot; confess that he is a stranger.&quot; The earth
is a riddle to man, just in proportion as his
affections arc
&quot;
set on things above.&quot; The world
1
Essays on .Religion, p. 15244 John Stuart Mill
suggests a good that it does not realise; it
rouses anticipations that it does not satisfy ; and
so it becomes a problem. The fact that Mill
recognises the ideal as well as the natural aspect
of things might lead us to expect more interest
in this problem that he actually shows.
All theory is based on practice. Our traffic
with the world gives us experiences and defines
our wants
; and, both to satisfy our wants and
to combine our experiences, we are impelled to
theorise. Our conduct burdens us with the need
of asking what things are, or how they behave.
We ask these questions about the things that we
have to do with
; and the answers that we find
make up the sciences of these things.
But the fact that experience comes to us in the
course of an effort imposes on us the necessity
of asking a further question about things of
asking not only what they are but also what
they mean. It must not be supposed that this,
which is the problem of philosophy, can be
separated in any absolute sense from that in
quiry into the nature of things which is prose
cuted by the special sciences. The investigation
of the meaning of things implies that there isThe Problem of Philosophy 245
a meaning which is positively and
objectively
theirs, and which is not a mere play of fancy
on their surface. Philosophy assumes that things
form in themselves an intelligible unity; and its
problem is to discover the principle on which
this unity depends. That meaning of things
which philosophy investigates is thus not alien
to their nature : it is simply the things them
selves, understood in their fulness, or in the
system of their relations to one another. On
the other hand, in so far as the special sciences
investigate certain abstracted elements or aspects
of reality, they are prevented from giving a com
plete account of things: their function is to
analyse things, and to express them in terms of
their parts; but mere analysis can never give
a complete explanation-for, even if carried to
the furthest extent, it cannot render tilings per
fectly intelligible. The meaning of things is
their relation to the system to which they be
long ; and they can only be explained in terms
of the principle by which that system is deter
mined. Ultimate explanation is not of the
whole by the parts, but of the part by the
whole.246 John Stuart Mill
The demand for this kind of explanation, and
with it the problem of philosophy, originates in
the fact that experience is conditioned by activity
and by the attempt to realise ideals. It is from
these that experience derives its meaning: in
proportion as it lends itself to them, it is sig
nificant ; and in proportion as it fails to realise
them, it is a problem which impels us to philoso
phise. In man s consciousness of ideals, and in
the effort wherein he daily disowns anew that
supremacy over him which things seem to claim,
is the motive of his wonder the mystery of
his fate. For if personal life culminates in
ideals, they limit even while they affirm its
worth. They are our only clue to the explan
ation of reality ; but, even while we affirm our
selves in them, in them also we become aware
of our inadequacy of the very partial and
limited character of that satisfaction which we
are in a position to demand. They assert, even
while they seem to abrogate, human finitude.
They affirm that man has a meaning for himself
;
but none the less clearly do they mark the fact
that that meaning is partly hid from him
; and
so they generate philosophy.The Demandfor System 247
The singleness of conscious life, determines us
to look for system in the world of our ex
periences
: wo inevitably demand system ; our
search for it is expressed in our ideas of worth;
and the failure of things, as we know them, to
correspond to these ideas our inability to discern
system in things impels us in two directions.
In the first place, we cannot but objectify our
ideal conceptions. The demands that we make
upon things possess for us a reality which is
in a certain sense greater than that of anything
else. The system, of which these demands ex
press our consciousness, is a necessity of thought.
Failing to find it in the world of our experi
ences, we make it an object in itself; and we do
so the more inevitably the more our search for
it is foiled in tilings. The idea of it rouses
feelings in us, impels us to activities, determines
our relation to the objects of our knowledge.
Religious experience knows it, and names it
&quot;
God.&quot; Thinking it in terms of our ideals,
and of whatever experiences answer best to
them, and most inevitably in terms of that
self-consciousness which determines our demand
for it, we set it over against the things that248 John Stuart Mill
fail to belong to onr idea of it. Faith becomes
&quot; the evidence of things not seen
&quot;
: the unyield
ing strength of our demand upon nature compels
us to the recognition of a reality which for us,
at least the world does not altogether contain.
But this attitude, inevitable as it may be, is
not the whole effect of our attempt to unify
experience. System remains not only the object
of religious faith, but also a problem ; and the
making it a problem is what constitutes philos
ophy. Philosophy is a search for system in the
world of real things. We may, or we may not,
believe that we fully know the principle that
determines things. Perhaps philosophy means
that we do not
;
&quot; for that which a man seeth
why doth he yet hope for ?
&quot; But only in so
far as we are in search of a principle in reality
can we be said to philosophise. Philosophy must
always be the effort to think things as a unity,
or to find in them that system which our ideal
demands upon reality in some degree express.
To abandon the idea of system is to abandon
philosophy itself; and the system that philo
sophy seeks is a system of real relations.
It appears, then, that the problem of philo-Worth and Fact 249
sophy, while in a sense it expresses nothing but
reason s own nature, and the inevitable demand
for a corresponding system, does, at the same
time, arise from a deep-seated contradiction. It
has its roots in the opposition of human person
ality to the world of nature. It originates in
the antithesis of worth and fact, of that which
ought to be and that which actually is. Xow
this opposition, which belongs to the very texture
of experience, since experience is essentially an
attempt to discern unity in things, is most
obvious in the relation of moral life to the
conditions in which it must be realised. The
opposition is indeed evident in all knowledge, so
long as the failure of things to appear as a con
sistent unity rouses a sense of contradictions
that must be resolved
; but it is more definitely
apparent in the antagonism between the purely
theoretic view of things and the practical way
of regarding them as means to an end
; and it
grows into an acute contrast, when the single
subject-matter of human conduct is made the
topic, at once of a science which regards it simply
as experienced fact, to be theoretically explained,
and of judgments which criticise it in relation to250 John Stuart Mill
an end or law which it ought to realise. The
problem of philosophy is thus more directly raised
by the opposition of the ethical and psychological
conceptions of conduct than by any other form
of dualism
; and the impossibility of evading
this problem specially reveals itself in the vital
connection which exists between the terms of the
opposition in question.
On the one hand, Psychology the study of
actual human conduct involves the ethical
point of view. The implication of selfhood in
mental states can only be understood ethically.
Their existence, their positive and special nature,
is determined by their relation to the freedom or
self-distinction of personal life
; but this is only
intelligible or real in relation to the end or law
which ideally determines it
; and it is thus more
evident in the case of mental phenomena than
of any others that they are only understood
when they are conceived in relation to an end.
Until they are so conceived, they remain what
we call &quot;mere&quot; phenomena appearances and not
reality.
On the other hand, it is nowhere more plain
than in the moral judgment of conduct that endsEthics and Psychology 251
only maintain their character as ends, in virtue
of their relation to the positive nature of things.
Teleology implies, as Lotze and Wundt show, an
absolute causal sequence in the world of events :
&quot; a universe which had no necessary connections
between its parts could have no definite or signifi
cant structure as a whole.&quot;
l In the case of ethics,
it is specially evident that selfhood, freedom, and
conformity to moral law can only be significant
or intelligible in relation to those mental facts
which they characterise. Every ethical system
involves a psychology of conduct, and depends
for its development upon its idea of what con
duct actually is. The possibility of a science of
ethics depends upon the discovery, in human
character, of elements that can be made the
means to a realisation of the moral end; and the
denial of such elements invalidates the moral
judgment: an ethic without psychology &quot;swims
in the air.&quot; The actual and the ideal aspects of
conduct are thus related no less by mutual im
plication than by mere antithesis: whichever we
may attempt to isolate involves us in the other.
The problem of philosophy, regarded as the in-
1 Mr Bo.sanquet
ri Logic, vol. ii. p. 82.252 John Stuart Mill
terpretation of experience, is nowhere forced upon
us more definitely or more persistently than in
the relations of psychology and ethics.
Mill s abstinence from metaphysical discussion
is thus something of an anomaly. He is mainly
occupied with ethical and psychological ques
tions
; he is by no means unaware of the radical
distinction between the points of view which
determine them
; he is concerned with the prac
tical difficulties which are involved in that dis
tinction
; and, both in the acceptance and in the
partial surrender of his heritage of individualism,
he is deeply influenced by metaphysical theories.
His neglect of the metaphysical problem demands
explanation.
It has already been suggested that this absence
of purely metaphysical discussion is simply the
negative aspect of Mill s naturalism, and belongs,
in this way, to the practical aim and character
of his intellectual work. It belongs hardly less
to other qualities of his mind to the so
briety which characterises his speculative more
perhaps than his practical tendencies to his
freedom from that craving for systematic unity
and completeness which he finds to be so fatallyIdea of Religion
-&amp;gt;
.; -\ j &amp;lt;j ~ j o
conspicuous in the dogmatic Positivism of Comte.
1
It connects itself, too, we may suppose, with the
absence of nil religious elements from his early
education. He is &quot;one of the very few examples,
in this country, of one who has, not thrown off
religious belief, but never had
it;&quot;- and his
attitude towards religious problems gives the
impression of a sincere but unsuccessful attempt
to understand the religious consciousness. This
absence from his mind of the religious idea has
real significance for his conception of philosophy.
His view of religion suggests, in a striking way,
his limitations in this respect.
Mill does not, indeed, maintain a consistent
notion of what religious experience essentially
is. He wavers, as Mr Morley shows,
3 between
the idea that religion implies a supernatural ob
ject, and the view that its demands arc capable
of being satisfied within the known order of
things
: he does not decide between the idealisa
tion and the abandonment of earthly life. He
wavers no less between the notion that religion254 John Stuart Mill
is simply ethical, and the conception of it as a
knowledge or experience that reflects the pre
sence of a real object ; and he makes, indeed he
attempts, no synthesis of these elements in
the religious consciousness.
On the one hand, he finds





strong and earnest direction of the
emotions and desires towards an ideal object,
recognised as of the highest excellence, and as
rightfully paramount over all selfish objects of
desire
;
&quot; 1 and he sees




&quot; ideal conception of a
Perfect Being
&quot;
to which men may
&quot;
habitually
refer as the guide of their conscience.&quot;
2
. But
this idea of religion, as an imaginative or poetic
reflection upon ideals of personal and especially
of moral life, is replaced in Mill s polemical criti
cism of Hamilton and Mansel by a different con
ception of it. We find him regarding it as an
experience of facts, or a way of conceiving the
nature of things.
&quot; Whatever relates to God,&quot; he
says,
&quot; I hold to be matter of inference
; I would
add. of inference & posteriori.&quot;
8 He maintains,
1
Essays on Religion, p. 109.
-
Autobiography, p. 46.
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against Hamilton s Agnosticism, the possibility of
knowing God positively as &quot;a concrete
reality.&quot;
1
He asserts that the denial of all knowledge of o
God depends upon a deliberate abstraction from
positive and known facts. He contends that
God is known, not indeed &quot;in himself,&quot; but
just as men and nature are known, relatively
or phenomenally, &quot;by his action on the crea




Mill s contention that &quot;all proofs of religion,
natural or revealed, must be derived either from
the testimony of the senses, or from internal feel
ings of the mind, or from reasonings of which one
or other of these sources supplied the premises,&quot;
3
leads him to a conception of religion as itself a
theory, and capable of complete theoretic expres
sion. It becomes, for him, simply an opinion,
capable of proof and disproof; and his human
istic idea of it is replaced by a set of argu
ments which result in a somewhat vague and in
secure Deism. In this less ethical development
of his theory of religion, he regards God primarily
1 Examination of Hamilton, \&amp;gt;.
(&amp;gt;0.
-
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as the Author of Nature
; he makes an individual
istic separation of the divine life from the ideal
experiences of men
; and he leaves the validity of
religious experience wholly problematic, as indeed
such a conception of it must inevitably do.
In this mode of conceiving religious experience,
Mill accepts the traditions of his English prede
cessors. His whole idea of the way in which
religion is to be authenticated recalls Berkeley s
more mystical notion of a &quot;Visible God&quot; a God
whose very nature is revealed in the facts of the
world and the order in which they affect us. The
method, too, of his inquiry into religion has a good
deal in common with that qj Paley s much less
critical investigation. Mill is not, indeed, directed
from the outset, as Paley is, by a preconceived
notion of the conclusion to be reached. His
argument is more free and less conclusive than
that of the famous Natural Theology. But in
Mill s Essays on &quot;Nature&quot; and &quot;Theism,&quot; just
as in Paley s work, there is an attempt to base
the idea of God entirely upon a study of his
doings in the world
; and it is significant of
this agreement in method that both Paley and
Mill exalt that teleological proof which
&quot;
is theReligion as a Theory 257
oldest, the clearest, and that most in
conformity
with the common reason of
humanity.&quot;
*
Now, this attempt to make the idea of God
represent simply the facts of nature must be
admitted to have real validity ami usefulness
as a theological method. On the other hand, it
is apt to involve neglect of the special interest
and point of view of the religious conscious
ness
; and, as a matter of fact, Mill fails to
investigate the idea that determines religious ex
perience. He identifies religion alternately with
morality and with purely cognitive results; and
he never shows how it is to be distinguished from




characterises even- detail of religious doctrine
and practice. Where he makes religion merely
an imaginative treatment of morality, lie treats
the idea of God as accidental, and external to
religion ; and he is thus left to conceive moral
experience, on the one hand, and, on the other,
the idea of God attested by natural facts, in a
mutual isolation, which deprives both of any
definitely religious character.258 John Stuart Mill
The same indifference to the metaphysical
interest, which appears in Mill s failure to in
vestigate the idea of God, is illustrated also by
his neglect of the distinction between science
and philosophy. Philosophy, he tells us, is
&quot; the
scientific knowledge of Man as an intellectual,
moral, and social being ;
&quot; * and
&quot; the philosophy
of a Science thus conies to mean the science
itself, considered not as to its results, the truths
which it ascertains, but as to the processes by
which the mind attains them, the marks by
which it recognises them, and the co-ordinating
and methodising of them with a view to the
reatest clearness of conception and the fullest
O
and readiest availability for use: in one word,
the logic of the science.&quot;
x Now this is a view
of philosophy which entirely fails to distinguish
it from analytical science : it reduces philosophy
to logic, conceived not as a science of truth or
reality but as a statement of mental processes.
It is, indeed, a significant fact that Mill is one




&quot; when they say
&quot; meta
physics.&quot; The idea of explanation as analysis
1 Auguste Comte and Positivism, p. 53.Science and Philosophy 259
- and generally analysis into ideas is one
which he not only defends, but really acts on
and makes use of; and his failure to distinguish
the problems of science and philosophy is due to
this inadequate idea of explanation
: Mill sees in
metaphysie nothing but an abstract statement
of the results of analysis. Xow, while it is
important to remember the scientific character
of philosophy, and even the essential unity
of the philosophical problem with those of the
special sciences on whose results it is based,
yet to reduce interpretation to mere analysis, and
to identify the meaning of things with the process
by which we come to know them, is to abandon the
hope of real explanation. In so far as Mill omits
to mark the distinctive problem of philosophy, he
imposes on himself a limitation which is fatal to
the thoroughness of his speculative work.
But Mill s neglect of metaphysics does not
mean that he denies the significance of nature.
His application of ideal criteria is not limited to
human conduct and character : it seems reason
able to him to look for the value of all actual
things ; and he institutes a moral demand upon
the natural order. His doing so is rooted in his260 John Stuart Mill
recognition of man s presence within that order.
It is because things are related to human wants
and ideals that Mill regards them as significant
:
it is this relation that makes their meaning a
problem. Mill s moral criticism of nature points,
in fact, to the transition which is made in the
development of his empiricism the transition
from the idea of man as a mere subject, isolated
from nature, to that which makes him an object
of knowledge, determined by concrete relations
in the system of reality.
The impossibility of the individualistic assump
tion is a lesson which empiricism is not taught
from without, but learns and develops from within.
Its point of view is not really corrected by the
half-truths of criticism. These may suggest an
unfinished knowledge ; but, at the best, they are
apt to breed that Agnosticism which expresses
the speculative man s sense of sin. Empiricism
remains, despite their force, strong in the sullen
maintenance of its hold upon facts in its con
tact with the real world.
&quot; The sword that gave
the wound must heal it :
&quot;
experience must cor
rect its own errors.
Empiricism owes its development to the factThe Meaning of Nature 261
that our knowledge of nature changes its char
acter as we deepen it. We see at first facts that
follow one another in an endless and unmeaning
series
; and our sense of tragic issues of a worth
and meaning in ourselves all but gives way as
we regard the settled sequence of fact upon fact
in a world of continual change. But the growth
of our knowledge of things makes all this dif
ferent : for it involves the habit of regarding
nature s laws as things that practically concern
us, of reckoning with its forces, and shaping our
conduct to its requirements ; and this, which is
the very mood of empiricism, leads to the dis
covery of a significance in nature. The attempt
to know nature is essentially practical in its
motive
; and the practical attitude, towards nature
is itself an admission of man s membership in
nature s kingdom. Just because his life depends
on nature, natural events are significant for him
;
and it is their significance for him which requires
him to know them.
Little by little, we are compelled to face the
inclusion of human beings within the world of
natural events. As we grow intimate witli nature,
we find it to be not merely man s birthplace and262 John Stuart Mill
his home, but his very life. He becomes for us,
in very truth, part of the order of the world. In
every detail, his personal life derives its content
from natural sources. The attempt to isolate from
nature the larger issues of human growth is but
a temporary shift. It may be required for a
time, to justify that objective and unconcerned
way of regarding nature which the growth of
experience demands
; but it is a way of thinking
which cannot be permanent, and whose doom is
fixed from the first.
But this dependence of man upon nature
this inclusion in it of all his interests recasts
the conception of it. So long as we sever man
from the natural order, it remains possible to re
gard that order as a mere train of consequences,
which reveals no worth, and of which we need not
devise any explanation. But it appears that man
is not thus abruptly dissociated from his world :
his mental life, and his moral faiths, and his
social institutions are all found to be rooted in
the order of material events
; and nature derives
a significance from man s presence within it
which it could not otherwise have had. When]\Taii and Nature 263
we regard human life as continuous with, or an
element in, the natural order, we seem to concede
all that empiricism claims
; in point of fact, we
make its further development consist merely in
the discovery of these concrete facts in which
man is bound up with the world. l&amp;gt;ut when
man is seen as part of nature, nature remains no
longer meaningless, or dead, or unspiritual
: the
significance which man has for himself is im
parted to it. The demand which he makes upon
his own life is transferred or extended to the
whole order of which that life is seen to he a
part: nature becomes a means to an end. Mill
formulates, if he does not satisfy, the demand for
an interpretation of nature; and his doing so is
the result of his strong sense of the connection




It must be remembered that, in making this de
mand upon nature in assuming that it is a signi
ficant system and that its significance belongs to
man s presence in it Mill does not merely reflect
the results of those theories to which we naturally
refer such a point of view : his work is prior to264 John Stuart Mill
the influences by which our idea of the interpre
tation of nature is mainly formed. Our concep
tion of nature as a system, and of man s place in
it, owes its most important development to the
theory of organic evolution
; and the whole idea
of philosophical interpretation has been trans
formed by the influence of critical idealism.
Mill s endeavour to interpret the natural order,
in relation to self-consciousness, is unaffected by
these two factors, which have most to do with
our way of conceiving the problem
: neither the
idea of evolution nor the critical account of ex
perience possessed any central importance for his
mind. His attempt is thus all the more signifi
cant of his own speculative tendency.
On the one hand, we have already seen that he
interprets all good or worth in an ethical sense.
He means by it a contribution to the development
of personal life, or a realisation of personal ideals
;
and it is in this sense that he asks whether, or
how far, the facts of nature justify belief in its
worth as a system or suggest the beneficence of
its Author. He makes the human ideals no less
objective and valid than the experience of facts.
This is the meaning of his demand that the good-The Explanation of Things 265
ness of God shall not be conceived as opposite to
human excellence.
1
On the other hand, it is no less characteristic
of Mill that lie looks for all worth, and so for an
intelligible system, in tilings themselves. He
does not content himself with the idea of a per
fection separate from the experienced facts of the
real world. He owes it to his empiricism that he
never deserts the realm of facts and events to
construct an ideal existence from merely ethi
cal data. In this respect, his is a genuinely
philosophical enterprise. Determined, as it is,
by the consciousness of worth, it is also regu
lated by the facts of experience. It is thus, so
far as it goes, a real attempt to explain things, or
to find an interpretation of them which belongs
to their actual nature.
In all this, Mill gives eilect to the abiding-
interest of philosophy. It is no more open to
philosophy to ignore the nature of things than to
find its term of explanation in anything external
to self - consciousness : it is a surrender of the
problem of philosophy to neglect experience, just
as it is to use principles of explanation that do266 John Stuart Mill
not express the nature of self-conscious thought.
Mill s problem the problem of the relation of
Nature to human ideals is one which the de
velopment of knowledge does nothing to super
sede
; and the whole issue of the relation of Nature
and Spirit is involved in the question whether the
world in which man lives can be made a means to
his spiritual ends. Mill s failure to develop this
wider issue is due to the limitation of his interest
to human affairs. That limitation is not allowed
to suppress the demand for an interpretation of
nature in relation to human ideals, because
Mill s consciousness both of these ideals and of
the system of nature renders the demand in
evitable for him
; but it is sufficiently operative
to confine his inquiry to the relation of nature to
the moral life of man.
The answer to this question, which Mill finds
in the facts of Nature, is of a very tentative and
dubious kind.
&quot; The net results of Natural
Theology
&quot;
yield only the idea of
&quot; a Being of
great but limited power, how or by what limited
we cannot even conjecture ; of great, and perhaps
unlimited intelligence, but perhaps, also, more
narrowly limited than his power ; who desires,Nature and Morals 267
and pays some regard to, the happiness of his
creatures, lint who seems to have other motives
of action which he cares more for, and who can
hardly be supposed to have created the universe
for that purpose alone.&quot;
1 This result is entirely
based upon that examination of the facts of
nature which forms, as we have already seen, the
ground of Mill s idea of Cod
; for Mill refuses
to allow that the existence of ideals can prove
&quot;the reality of a corresponding object;&quot;- and
he points out that the optimism, which makes
human demands an evidence of the reality of
their objects, assumes, and cannot be made to
authenticate, belief in (iod.
::
When he, comes to examine the natural order,
Mill iinds its relation to morality hard to make
out. He sees &quot;no shadow of justice in the
general arrangements of Mature.&quot;
4 He main
tains that nature is an incessant performance of
acts which would be condemned as immoral if
done by a human agent, and that it cannot be
made a law or example for human conduct :
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imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature s
everyday performances.&quot;
1 Nature is reckless,
cruel, and destructive. The natural order is a
source of misery no less than of happiness ; and
its distribution of pain and pleasure cannot
be shown either to secure a balance of well-
being, or to have any tendency to promote
virtue : it
&quot;
is constructed with even less regard
to the requirements of justice than to those of
benevolence.&quot;
~
Nature, as it appears in human character, has
no more authority for conduct than non-human
nature has.
&quot;
Nearly every respectable attribute




&quot; there is hardly a
single point of excellence belonging to human
character, which is not decidedly repugnant to
the untutored feelings of human nature.&quot;
3 Even
such rudiments of virtue as courage, cleanliness,
self-control, and justice are all unnatural or arti
ficial, in the sense of requiring for their develop
ment a discipline of natural inclinations. They
are only established as the result of an effort : in
1
Essays on Religion, p. 28.
~
Ibid., p. 37.
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so far as man is distinguished from nature, thev




conformity to nature has no con
nection whatever with right and wrong;&quot;- and
the fact
&quot; that a feeling is bestowed on us by
Mature, does not necessarily legitimate all its
promptings.&quot;
3 Divine government is carried
on, &quot;not by the mere indulgence of our natural




&quot; the duty of man is the same
in respect to his own nature as in respect to
tlio nature of all other tilings, namely, not to
follow but to amend it.&quot; In fact, Mill s
whole indictment of nature is meant to show-
that nature is not the source of moral law.
When nature is taken to mean the whole
system of things, including man, it is idle to
enjoin conformity to natural laws or to give
them &quot;moral&quot; meaning; and when human efforts
and ideals are excluded from nature, then nature
ceases to be a reliable rmide. &quot;While human
1
Essays on Religion, pp.
4(j-;&amp;gt;j.
Utilitarianism, p. 02.
4 Examination of Hamilton, p. 171.
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action cannot help conforming to Nature in the
one meaning of the term, the very aim and
object of action is to alter and improve Nature
in the other meaning.&quot;
1
The significance of Mill s criticism of nature
appears in this conclusion. Moral good is rela
tive to human needs, and it depends no less on
human exertions. The demand which man makes
upon nature returns upon himself. That limita
tion of the power of the divine beneficence, by
which Mill expresses rather than explains the
mysterious failure of nature, leaves something
for man to do. Apart from man, nature realises
no end, and is capable of no explanation. Mill s
criticism thus proves itself to be double-edged.
Even when it seems to weaken the authority of
moral ideals by finding no ground for them in
nature, it becomes at the same time, in Mill s
hands, an additional necessity for the moral life.
Man can expect nothing from nature on this
theory. Nature is, at best, only the opportunity
of goodness ; and morality will not exist unless
the effort of men originates it. Nor is this all.
Nature s failure to realise that divine end, which
1
Essays on Religion, p. 19.Religious Morality 271
is manifest in the facts of the world as well as
in man s spiritual life, leaves the burden of the
world upon man himself. Only his effort can
give to nature that meaning which he himself
demands in it: only his obedience and faith can
realise the divine purpose, and work out those
ends in relation to which alone the world is
intelligible.
&quot; The earnest expectation of the
creature waiteth for the manifestation of the
sons of God :
&quot;
the moral life is a divine neces
sity a claim which the purpose revealed in
things makes upon the character and person
ality of men. In this, as in other aspects of
his philosophy, Mill betrays his profoundly
ethical interest.
1
On the other hand, this essentially religious
conception of the moral life of man can hardly
be reconciled with the individualistic Deism
which is expressed in Mill s natural theology.
It contains a view of man s relations, both to
the natural world and to the Divine Spirit,
which seems to count tor nothing in the more
official attempt to define those relations. In so
far as human effort is the vehicle or instrument272 John Stuart Mill
of the Divine Spirit, it constitutes a revelation of
divine ends to which Mill gives little heed when
he sets out explicitly to collect evidence for his
theodicy; and, in so far as it is capable of re
deeming the natural order from complete failure,
it must belong to that order in such a way as
to turn the edge of Mill s criticism, and make
it impossible to convict nature of unspirituality.
Mill s assertion that the divine power is
limited, and the indictment of nature on which
that assertion is based, are made in forgetfulness
of his own recognition of man s membership in
the natural order. There is, indeed, nothing in
that order, taken by itself, which can be called
&quot;moral,&quot; except by a figure of speech. Things
must always be without moral significance, ex
cept in so far as they enter into experience, and
become related to self-consciousness. Further, it
may appear that the net result of nature, so far as
experience has access to it, is pain ; and this, if
it be the case, condemns nature absolutely from
a hedonistic point of view. It may appear, too,
that moral failure, no less than virtue, has its
roots in nature
; and this would make it impos
sible to regard nature as a moral example, how-Nature and Spirit 273
ever far the natural pedigree of man s moralities
might be traced back. But that very relation of
man to nature, which makes it possible to criti
cise natural laws and facts as means to an end,
renders the criticism of nature, taken in abstrac
tion from human life, irrelevant and futile. In
so far as nature can be criticised, it must include
all the human facts
; since it is the presence of
man in nature that makes nature significant.
But when the world is seen as the sphere and
opportunity and potency of human life, with its
ideal interests and its divine significance things 7 O
are no longer outside the divine purpose, so far
as that purpose is open to human comprehen
sion. It is true that our experience only gives
effect, in an inadequate and partial way, even to
our most limited ideas of good ; and it can never
be forgotten how little likely these ideas are to
exhaust the demand that might be made upon
tilings. But the inclusion of man in nature is
fatal to that perverse cleavage of reality which
makes the world independent of God.
Man himself, dependent on nature for his very
life, and yet for himself, and first, and finally,
neither machine, nor brute, but spirit, is the
s274 John Stziart Mill
living refutation of all attempts to fix an ab
solute &amp;lt;mlf between the natural order and the o
spiritual interests. So long as he lives by bread,
and hungers still for every word that comes
out of the mouth of God, so long will it be im
possible to persuade him that nature is un-
spiritual ; and it is because Mill s topic is human
life, that the bonds of Deism cannot wholly
restrain him from the attempt to interpret the
natural world in terms of self-conscious reason.
THE END
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ADOLPHUS. Some Memories of Paris. By F. ADOLPIIUS Crown Svo, Gs.
AIRMAN.
Manures and the Principles of Manuring. By C. M. AIRMAN
IXSc., F.R.S.E., &c., Professor of Chemistry, Glasgow Veterinary Colle-c Examiner in Chemistry, University of Glasgow, &c. Crown Svo, (is. Od.
Farmyard Manure : Its Nature, Composition, and Treatment Crown Svo, Is. Od.
AIRD. Poetical Works of Thomas Aird. Fifth Edition with
Memoir of the Author by the Rev. JARDINE WALLACE, and Portrait. Crown Svo,List of Books Published by
ALLARDYCE.
The City of Sunshine. By ALEXANDER ALLARDYCE, Author of
Earlsccmrt, Balmoral: A Romance of the Queen s Country, &c. New and
Revised Edition. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Memoir of the Honourable George Keith Elphinstone, K.B.,
Viscount Keith of Stonehaven, Marischal, Admiral of the Red. 8vo, with Por
trait, Illustrations, and Maps, 21s.
ALMOND. Sermons by a Lay Head-master. By HELY HUTCH-
INSON ALMOND, M.A. Oxon., Head-master of Loretto School. Crown 8vo, 5s.
ANCIENT CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited
by Rev. W. LUCAS COLLINS, M.A. Price 2s. 6d. each. For List ofVols., seep. 2.
ANDERSON. Daniel in the Critics Den. A Reply to Dean
Farrar s Book of Daniel. By ROBERT ANDERSON, LL.D., 13arrister-at-Law,
Assistant Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis; Author of The Coining
Prince, Human Destiny, &c. Post 8vo, 4s. 6d.
AYTOUN.
Lays of the Scottish Cavaliers, and other Poems. By W.
EDMONDSTOUNE AYTOUN, D.C.L., Professor of Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres in the
University of Edinburgh. New Edition. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d.
ANOTHER EDITION. Fcap. Svo, 7s. 6d.
CHEAP EDITION. Is. Cloth, Is. 3d.
An Illustrated Edition of the Lays of the Scottish Cavaliers.
From designs by Sir NOEL PATON. Cheaper Edition. Small 4to, 10s. Cd.
Bothwell : a Poem. Third Edition. Fcap., 7s. 6d.
Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated by Professor
AYTODN and Sir THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. Third Edition. Fcap., 6s.
Bon Gaultier s Book of Ballads. By the SAME. Fifteenth
Edition. With Illustrations by Doyle, Leech, and Crowquill. Fcap. Svo, 5s.
The Ballads of Scotland. Edited by Professor AYTOUN.
Fourth Edition. 2 vols. fcap. Svo, 12s.
Memoir of William E. Aytoun, D.C.L. By Sir THEODORE
MARTIN, K.C.B. With Portrait. Post Svo, 12s.
BACH.
On Musical Education and Vocal Culture. By ALBERT B.
BACH. Fourth Edition. Svo, 7s. 6d.
The Principles of Singing. A Practical Guide for Vocalists
and Teachers. With Course of Vocal Exercises. Second Edition. With Portrait
of the Author. Crown Svo, 6s.
The Art Ballad : Loewe and Schubert. With Musical Illus
trations. With a Portrait of LOEWE. Third Edition. Small 4to, 5s.
BAIRD LECTURES.
Theism. By Rev. Professor FLINT, D.D., Edinburgh. Eighth
Edition. Crown Svo, 7s. Cd.
Anti-Theistic Theories. By the SAME. Fifth Edition. Crown
8vo, 10s. 6d.
The Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. By Rev. ROBERT
JAMIESON, D.D. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
The Early Religion of Israel. As set forth by Biblical Writers
and modern Critical Historians. By Rev. Professor ROBERTSON, D.D., Glasgow.
Fourth Edition. Crown Svo, 10s. Cd.
The Mysteries of Christianity. By Rev. Professor CRAWFORD,
D.D. Crown Svo, 7s. Cd.
Endowed Territorial Work : Its Supreme Importance to the
Church and Country. By Rev. WILLIAM SMITH, D.D. Crown Svo, 6s.
BALLADS AND POEMS. By MEMBERS OF THE GLASGOW
BALLAD CLUB. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.William Blackwood and Sons. 5
BELLAIRS.
The Transvaal War, 1880-81. Edited by Lady BKLLAIRS With a Frontispiece and Map. Svo, 15s.
Gossips with Girls and Maidens, Betrothed and Free. New
Edition. Crown Svo, Hs. r,d. Cloth, extra gilt; ed&quot;e 5s
BELLESHEIM History of the Catholic Church of Scotland. From the Introduction of Christianity to flu: Present Day. By ALPIIOXS BFI-
LESHEIM, D.D., Canon of Aix-la-Chapelle. Translated, with Xotes and Additions, by D. OSWALD HU.VTEK BLAIR, O.S.B., Monk of Fort Augustus. Cheap Edition
Complete in 4 vols. demy Svo, with Maps. Price 21s. net.
BENTINCK. Racing Life of Lord George Cavendish Bentinck, M.P and other Reminiscences. By JOHN KKXT, Private Trainer to the Good wood Stable. Edited by the Hon. FRANCIS LAWLEY. With Twenty-three full-
Plates and Facsimile Letter. Third Edition. Demy Svo, 25s.
The Revolt of Man. By Sir WALTER BI:SAXT. Tenth Edition Crown Svo, 8s. (id.
Readings in Rabelais. Crown Svo, Vs. 6d.
BEVERIDGE.
Culross and Tulliallan
; or Perthshire on Forth. Its History and Antiquities. With Elucidations of Scottish Life and Character from the
Burgh ami Kirk-Session Records of that District. By DAVID BKVEKIDGK. 2 vols
Svo, with Illustrations, 4i s.
Between the Ochils and the Forth
; or, From Stirling Bridge
to Aberdour. Crown Svo Os.
BICKERDYKE. A Banished Beauty. By Jonx BICKERDYKE
Author of Days in Tlnile, with Rod, Gun, and Camera Tl-e Boo
1
,-- of the All- Round Angler, Curiosities of Ale and Beei
, &c. With Illustrations. Crowu
Svo, os.
BIRCH.




, *C By JoilN Bll;c f. Architect, Author of Country Architecture, &c. ^\ ith 30 Plates. Royal Svo, 7s.
Examples of Labourers Cottages, c. With Plans for Im
proving the Dwellings of the Poor in Large Towns. With 34 Plates. Royal Svo,
Picturesque Lodges. A Series of Designs for Gate Lodges
Park Entrances, Keepers , Gardeners
, Bailiffs
, Grooms
, Upper and Under Ser vants Lodges, and other Rural Residences. With 1(5 Plates. 4to, 12s. (id.
BLACK. Heligoland and the Islands of the North Sea. By WILLIAM GKORCE BLACK. Crown Svo, 4s.
BLACKIE.
John Stuart Blackie : A Biography. By Axx\ M. STOOD VPT
With A Plates. Third Edition. &amp;gt;, vols. demy Svo/Bls.
Lays and Legends of Ancient Greece. By Jonx STTJART
BLACKIE, Emeritus Professor of Greek in the University of Edinburgh. Second
Edition. Fcap. Svo, 5s.
The Wisdom of Goethe. Fcap. 8vo. Cloth, extra gilt, 6s.
Scottish Song
: Its Wealth, Wisdom, and Social Significance. Crown Svo. With Music. 7s. (id.
A Song of Heroes. Crown Svo, Gs.
BLACKMORE. The Maid of Sker. By R. 1). BLAOKMORK
Author of Lorna Doone, &c. Ne\v Edition. Crown Svo, Gs. Cheaner Edi
tion. Crown Svo &quot;s. I d.
BLACKWOOD.
Blackwood s Magazine, from Commencement in 1817 to Sep tember ISO&quot;). Xos. 1 to 950, forming 158 Volumes.
Index to Blackwood s Magazine. Vols. 1 to 50. Svo, 15s.JLISI of &OOKS fuousftea by
BLACKWOOD.
Tales from Blackwood. First Series. Price One Shilling each,
in Paper Cover. Sold separately at all Railway Bookstalls.
They may also be had bound in 12 vols., cloth, 18s. Half calf, richly gilt, 30s.
Or the 12 vols. in 6, roxburghe, 21s. Half red morocco, 28s.
Tales from Blackwood. Second Series. Complete in Twenty-
four Shilling Parts. Handsomely bound in 12 vols., cloth, 30s. In leather back,
roxburghe style, 37s. Gd. Half calf, gilt, 52s. 6d. Half morocco, 55s.
Tales from Blackwood. Third Series. Complete in Twelve
Shilling Parts. Handsomely bound in 6 vols., cloth, 15s.; and in 12 vols., cloth,
18s. The 6 vols. in roxburghe, 21s. Half calf, 25s. Half morocco, 28s.
Travel, Adventure, and Sport. From Blackwood s Magazine.
Uniform with Tales from Blackwood. In Twelve Parts, each price Is. Hand
somely bound in 6 vols., cloth, 15s. And in half calf, 25s.
New Educational Series. See separate Catalogue,
New Uniform Series of Novels (Copyright).
Crown Svo, cloth. Price 3s. 6d. each. Now ready :
THE MAID OF SKER. By R. D. Blackmore.
[ REATA. By B. D. Gerard.
WENDERHOLME. By P. G. Hamerton. BEGGAR MY NEIGHBOUR. By the Same.
THE STORY OF MARGKEDEL. By D. Storrar
! THE WATERS OF HERCULES. By the Same.
Meldrum. I FAIR TO SHE. By L. W. M. Lockhart.
Miss MARJORIBANKS. By Mrs Oliphant. \ MINE is THINE. By the Same.
THE PERPETUAL CURATE, and THE RECTOR.
~
By the Same.
SALEM CHAPEL, and THE DOCTOR S FAMILY.
DOUBLES AND QUITS. By the Same.
ALTIORA PETO. By Laurence Oliphant.
PICCADILLY. By the Same. With Illustra-
By the Same.
! tions.
A SENSITIVE PLANT. By E. D. Gerard. THE REVOLT OF MAN. By Walter Besant.
LADY LEE S WIDOWHOOD. By General Sir
j LADY BABY. By D. Gerard.
E. B. Hamley.
I THE BLACKSMITH OF VOE. By Paul Gushing.
KATIE STEWART, and other Stories. By Mrs
i THE DILEMMA. By the Author of The
Oliphant. Battle of Dorking.
VALENTINE, AND HIS BROTHER. By the Same.
! MY TRIVIAL LIFE AND MISFORTUNE. By A
SONS AND DAUGHTERS. By the Same. Plain Woman.
MARMORNE. By P. G. Hamerton. I POOR NELLIE. By the Same.
Others in preparation.
Standard Novels. Uniform in size and binding. Each
complete in one Volume.
FLORIN SERIES, Illustrated Boards. Bound in Cloth, 2s. 6d.
TOM CRINGLE S Loo. By Michael Scott.
THE CRUISE OF THE MIDGE. By the Same.
CYRIL THORNTON. By Captain Hamilton.
ANNALS OF THE PARISH. By John Gait.
THE PROVOST, &c. By the Same.
SIR ANDREW WYLIE. By the Same.
THE ENTAIL. By the Same.
Miss MOLLY. By Beatrice May Butt.
PEN OWEN. By Dean Hook.
ADAM BLAIR. By J. G. Lockhart.
LADY LEE S WIDOWHOOD. By General Sir E.
B. Hamley.
SALEM CHAPEL. By Mrs Oliphant.
THE PERPETUAL CURATE. By the Same.
Miss MARJORIBANKS. By the Same.
JOHN : A Love Story. By the Same.
REGINALD DALTON. By J. G. Lockhart.
SHILLING SERIES, Illustrated Cover. Bound in Cloth, Is. 6d
THE RECTOR, and THE DOCTOR S FAMILY. SIR FRIZZLE PUMPKIN, NIGHTS AT MESS,
By Mrs Oliphant.
j &c.
THE LIFE OF MANSIE WAUCH. By D. M. THE SUBALTERN.
Moir. LIFE IN THE FAR WEST. By G. F. Ruxton.
PENINSULAR SCENES AND SKETCHES. By VALERIUS : A Roman Story. By J. G.
F. Hardman.
i Lockhart.
BON GAULTIER S BOOK OF BALLADS. Fifteenth Edi-
tion. With Illustrations by Doyle, Leech, and Crowquill. Fcap. Svo, 5s.
BONNAK. Biographical Sketch of George Meikle Kemp, Archi
tect of the Scott Monument, Edinburgh. By THOMAS BONNAR, F.S.A. Scot.,
Author of The Present Art Revival, &e. With Three Portraits and numerous
Illustrations. Post Svo, 7s. 6d.wuttam niacKwooa ana sons.
BRADDON. Thirty Years of Shikar. By Sir EDWARD BRADDON,
K.C.M.G. With Illustrations by G. D. Giles, and Map of Ouclh Forest Tracts
and Nepal Terai. Demy Svo, ISs.
BROUGHAM. Memoirs of the Life and Times of Henry Lord
Brougham. Written by HIMSELF. 3 vols. Svo, 2, 8s. The Volumes are sold
separately, pi-ice 10s. each.
BROWN. The Forester : A Practical Treatise on the Planting
and Tending of Forest-trees and the General Management of Woodlands. By
JAMES BROWN, LL.D. Sixth Edition, Enlarged. Edited by JOHN NISBET, D.CEc.,
Author of British Forest Trees,
1
&c. In 2 vols. royal Svo, with 350 Illustra
tions, 42s. net.
BROWN&quot;. Stray Sport. By J. MORAY BROWN, Author of Shikar
Sketches, Powder, Spur, and Spear, The Days when we went Hog-Hunting.
2 vols. post Svo, with Fifty Illustrations, 21s.
BROWN. A Manual of Botany, Anatomical and Physiological.
For the Use of Students. By ROBERT BROWN, M.A., Ph.D. Crown Svo, with
numerous Illustrations, 12s. (id.
BRUCE.
In Clover and Heather. Poems by WALLACE BRUCE. New
and Enlarged Edition. Crown Svo, 4s. 6d.
A limited number ofCopies ofthe First Edition, on large hand-made paper 12s. 6d.
Here s a Hand. Addresses and Poems. Crown Svo, 5s.
Large Paper Edition, limited to 100 copies, price 21s.
BUCHAN. Introductory Text-Book of Meteorology. By ALEX
ANDER BUCHAN, LL.D., F.R.S.E., Secretary of the Scottish Meteorological
Society, &c. New Edition. Crown Svo, with Coloured Charts and Engravings.
[In preparation.
BURBIDGE.
Domestic Floriculture, Window Gardening, and Floral Decora
tions. Being practical directions for the Propagation, Culture, and Arrangement
of Plants and Flowers as Domestic Ornaments. By F. W. BURBIDGE. Second
Edition. Crown Svo, with numerous Illustrations 7s. Cd.
Cultivated Plants : Their Propagation and Improvement.
Including Natural and Artificial Hybridisation, Raising from Seed, Cuttings,
and Layers, Grafting and Budding, as applied to the Families and Genera in
Cultivation. Crown Svo, with numerous Illustrations, 12s. Od.
BURGESS. The Viking Path. A Tale of the White Christ.
By J. J. HAI.DANE BURGESS, Author of Rasmie s Buddie, Shetland Sketches,
&c. Crown Svo, 6s.
BURROWS.
Commentaries on the History of England, from the Earliest
Times to 1805. By MONTAGU BURROWS, Chichele Professor of Modern History
in the University of Oxford; Captain R.N. ; F.S.A., &c.
;
&quot; Ollicier do I lii-
struction Publique,&quot; France. Crown Svo, 7s. (id.
The History of the Foreign Policy of Great Britain. Demy
Svo, 12s.
BURTON.
The History of Scotland : From Agricola s Invasion to the
Extinction of the last Jacobite Insurrection. By JOHN HILL BURTON, D.C.L.,
Historiographer-Royal for Scotland. New and Enlarged Edition, S vols., and
Index. Crown Svo, 3, 3s.
History of the British Empire during the Eeign of Queen
Anne. In 3 vols. Svo. 30s.
The Scot Abroad. Third Edition. Crown Svo, 10s. Gd.
The Book-Hunter. By JOHN HILL BURTON. New Edition.
With Portrait. Crown Svo, 7s. Od.uj DUUK* JT uutitnea uy
BUTE.
The Roman Breviary
: Reformed by Order of the Holy
(Ecumenical Council of Trent ; Published by Order of Pope St Pius V. ; and
Revised by Clement VIII. and Urban VIII. ; together with the Offices since
granted. Translated out of Latin into English by JOHN, Marquess of Bute,
K.T. In 2 vols. crown Svo, cloth boards, edges uncut. 2, 2s.
The Altus of St Columba. With a Prose Paraphrase and
Notes. In paper cover, 2s. 6d.
BUTT.
Theatricals : An Interlude. By BEATRICE MAY BUTT. In 1
vol. crown Svo. [In the press.
Miss Molly. Cheap Edition, 2s.
Eugenie. Crown Svo, 6s. 6d.
Elizabeth, and other Sketches. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Delicia. New Edition. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
CAIRD.
Sermons. By JOHN CAIRD, D.D., Principal of the University
of Glasgow. Seventeenth Thousand. Fcap. Svo, 5s.
Religion in Common Life. A Sermon preached in Crathie
Church, October 14, 1855, before Her Majesty the Queen and Prince Albert.
Published by Her Majesty s Command. Cheap Edition, 3d.
CALDER. Chaucer s Canterbury Pilgrimage. Epitomised by WILLIAM CALDER. With Photogravure of the Pilgrimage Company, and other
Illustrations, Glossary, &c. Crown Svo, gilt edges, 4s. Cheaper Edition with
out Photogravure Plate. Crown Svo. 2s. 6d.
CALDWELL. Schopenhauer s System in its Philosophical Sig
nificance (the Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1893). By WILLIAM CALDWELL, M.A.
D.Sc., Professor of Moral and Social Philosophy, North Western University,
U.S.A. ; formerly Assistant to the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics, Edin. ;
and Examiner in Philosophy in the University of St Andrews. 1 vol. demy Svo.
[In the press.
CAMPBELL. Critical Studies in St Luke s Gospel
: Its Demon-
ology and Ebionitism. By COLIN CAMPBELL, D.D., Minister of the Parish of Dun
dee, formerly Scholar and Fellow of Glasgow University. Author of the Three
First Gospels in Greek, arranged in parallel columns. Post Svo, 7s. 6d.
CAMPBELL. Sermons Preached before the Queen at Balmoral.
By the Rev. A. A. CAMPBELL, Minister of Crathie. Published by Command of
Her Majesty. Crown Svo, 4s. 6d.
CAMPBELL. Records of Argyll. Legends, Traditions, and Re
collections of Argyllshire Highlanders, collected chiefly from the Gaelic. With
Notes on the Antiquity of the Dress, Clan Colours, or Tartans of the Highlanders.
By Lord ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL. Illustrated with Nineteen full-page Etchings.
4to, printed on hand-made paper, 3, 3s.
CANTON. A Lost Epic, and other Poems. By WILLIAM
CANTON. Crown Svo. 5s.
CARSTAIRS.
Human Nature in Rural India. By R. CARSTAIRS. Crown
8vo, 6s.
British Work in India. Crown Svo, 6s.
CAUVIN. A Treasury of the English and German Languages.
Compiled from the best Authors and Lexicographers in both Languages. By JOSEPH CAUVIN, LL.D. and Ph.D., of the University of Gottingen, &c. Crown
Svo, 7s. (5d.
CHARTERIS. Canonicity ; or, Early Testimonies to the Exist
ence and Use of the Books of the New Testament. Based on Kirchhoffer s
Quellensammlung. Edited by A. H. CHARTERIS, D.D., Professor of Biblical
Criticism in the University of Edinburgh. Svo, 18s.CHENNELLS. Ixecollections of an Egyptian Princess. By her English Governess (Miss E. CIIKN-XELI.S). Being a Record of Five Years
Residence at the Court of Isinael Pasha, Khedive. Second Edition. With Three
Portraits. Post Svo, Vs. (id.
CHESNEY. The Dilemma. By General Sir GKORGK CHESNEY,
K.C.B., M.P., Author of The Battle of Dorking, &c. Now Edition. Crown
Svo, 3s. (id.
CHRISTISOX. Life of Sir Robert Christison, Bart., M.D.,
D.C.L. Oxon., Professor of Medical Jurisprudence in the University of Edin
burgh. Edited by his SONS. In 2 vols. Svo. Vol. I. Autobiography. 10s.
Vol. II. Memoirs. 10s.
CHURCH. Chapters in an Adventurous Life. Sir Richard
Church in Italy and Greece. By E. M. CHURCH. With Photogravure
Portrait. Demy Svo, 10s. (id.
CHURCH SERVICE SOCIETY.
A Book of Common Order : being Forms of Worship issued
by the Church Service Society. Sixth Edition. Crown Svo, (is. Also in 2 vols.
crown Svo, (is. 6d.
Daily Ollices for Morning and Evening Prayer throughout
the Week. Crown Svo, 3s. Od.
Order of Divine Service for Children. Issued by the Church
Service Society. With Scottish Hymnal. Cloth, 3d.
CLOUSTOX. Popular Tales and Fictions: their Migrations
and Transformations. By W. A. CLOCSTOX, Editor of Arabian Poetry for Eng
lish Readers, &c. 2 vols. post Svo, roxburghe binding, 25s.
COCHRAX. A Handy Text-Book of Military Law. Compiled
chiefly to assist Officers preparing for Examination ; also for all Oilicers of the
Regular and Auxiliary Forces. Comprising also a Synopsis of part of the Army
Act. By Major F. COCHHAN, Hampshire Regiment Garrison Instructor, North
British District. Crown Svo, 7s. (id.
COLQUHOUX. The Moor and the Loch. Containing Minute
Instructions in all Highland Sports, with Wanderings over Crag and Corrie,
Flood and Fell. By JOHN CoLyuiioux. Cheap Edition. With illustrations.
Demy Svo, 10s. Od.
COLVILE. Round the Black Man s Garden. By Lady Z. COL-
VII.K, F.R.G.S. With 2 Maps and 50 Illustrations from Drawings Ly the
Author and from Photographs. Demy Svo, 16s.
CONSTITUTION&quot; AND LAW OF THE CHURCH OF
SCOTLAND. With an Introductory Note by the late Principal Tulloch. New
Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Crown Svo, 3s. Od.
COTTERILL. Suggested Reforms in Public Schools. By C. C.
COTTKHILL, M.A. Crown Svo, 3s. Cd.
CRAXSTOUX.
The Elegies of Albius Tibullus. Translated into English
Verso, with Life of the Pott, and Illustrative Notes. J5y JAMHS CRANSTOUN,
LL.D., Author of a Translation of Catullus. Crown Svo, (is. Od.
The Elegies of Sextus Propertius. Translated into English
Verse, with Life of the Poet, and Illustrative Notes. Crown Svo, 7s. (id.
CRAWFORD. An Atonement of East London, and other Poems.
By HOWARD CRAWFORD, M.A. Crown Svo, us.
CRAWFORD. Saracinesca. By F. MARION CRAWFORD, Author
of Mr Isaacs, &c., &c. Eighth Edition. Crown Svo, Cs
CRAWFORD.
The Doctrine of Holy Scripture respecting the Atonement.
By the late THOMAS J. CRAWFORD, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University
of Edinburgh. Fifth Edition. Svo, 12s.CRAWFORD.
The Fatherhood of God, Considered in its General and Special
Aspects. Third Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, 9s.
The Preaching of the Cross, and other Sermons. 8vo, 7s. 6d.
The Mysteries of Christianity. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
CROSS. Impressions of Dante, and of the New World
; with a
Few Words on Bimetallism. By J. W. CROSS, Editor of George Eliot s Life, as
related in her Letters and Journals. Post 8vo, 6s.
CUMBERLAND. Sport on the Pamirs and Turkistan Steppes.
By Major C. S. CUMBERLAND. With Map and Frontispiece. Demy Svo, 10s. Gd.
CURSE OF INTELLECT. Third Edition. Fcap Svo, 2s. 6d. net.
CUSHING.
The Blacksmith of Voe. By PAUL GUSHING, Author of The
Bull i th
1
Thorn, Cut with his own Diamond. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
DAVIES.
Norfolk Broads and Rivers ; or, The Waterways, Lagoons,
and Decoys of East Anglia. By G. CHRISTOPHER DAVIES. Illustrated with
Seven full-page Plates. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.
Our Home in Aveyron. Sketches of Peasant Life in Aveyron
and the Lot. By G. CHRISTOPHER DAVIES and Mrs BROUGHALL. Illustrated
with full-page Illustrations. Svo, 15s. Cheap Edition, 7s. 6d.
DE LA WARR. An Eastern Cruise in the Edeline. By the
Countess DE LA WARR. In Illustrated Cover. 2s.
DESCARTES. The Method, Meditations, and Principles of Philo
sophy of Descartes. Translated from the Original French and Latin. With a
New Introductory Essay, Historical and Critical, on the Cartesian Philosophy.
By Professor VEITCH, LL.D., Glasgow University. Tenth Edition. 6s. 6d.
DOGS, OUR DOMESTICATED : Their Treatment in reference
to Food, Diseases, Habits, Punishment, Accomplishments. By MAGENTA.
Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
DOUGLAS. John Stuart Mill. A Study of his Philosophy.
By CHARLES DOUGLAS, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer in Moral Philosophy, and Assistant
to the Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the University of Edinburgh. Crown
Svo, 4s. 6d. net.
DOUGLAS. Chinese Stories. By ROBERT K. DOUGLAS. With
numerous Illustrations by Parkinson, Forestier, and others. New and Cheaper
Edition. Small demy Svo, 5s.
DU CANE. The Odyssey of Homer, Books I.-XII. Translated
into English Verse. By Sir CHARLES Du CANE, K.C.M.G. Svo, 10s. 6d.
DUDGEON. History of the Edinburgh or Queen s Regiment
Light Infantry Militia, now 3rd Battalion The Royal Scots ; with an Account of
the Origin and Progress of the Militia, and a Brief Sketch of the Old Royal
Scots. By Major R. C. DUDGEON, Adjutant 3rd Battalion the Royal Scots.
Post Svo, with Illustrations, 10s. 6d.
DUNCAN. Manual of the General Acts of Parliament relating
to the Salmon Fisheries of Scotland from 1828 to 1S82. By J. BARKER DUNCAN.
Crown Svo, 5s.
DUNSMORE. Manual of the Law of Scotland as to the Rela
tions between Agricultural Tenants and the Landlords, Servants, Merchants, and
Bowers. By W. DUNSMORE. Svo, 7s. 6d.wuiiam tiiacKwooa ana sons. n
ELIOT.
George Eliot s Life, Related in Her Letters and Journals.
Arranged and Edited by her husband, J. W. CROSS. With Portrait and other
Illustrations. Third Edition. 3 vols. post Svo, 42s.
George Eliot s Life. (Cabinet Edition.) With Portrait and
other Illustrations. 3 vols. crown Svo, 15s.
George Eliot s Life. With Portrait and other Illustrations.
New Edition, in one volume. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Works of George Eliot (Standard Edition). 21 volumes,
crown Svo. In buckram cloth, gilt top, 2s. Gd. per vol.; or in Roxburghe
binding, 3s. Gd. per vol.
Ready.
ADAM BEDK. 2 vols. -Tin-: MILL ox THE FLOSS. 2 vols. FKMX HOLT, the
Radical. 2 vols. ROMOT.A. 2 vols. SCENES OF CLERICAL LIFE. 2 vols.
MlDDI.EMAUCH. 3 Vols. DANIEL DEUONDA. 3 Vols.
In preparation.
SILAS MARNI;R, and JUBAL. 2 vols. TOE SPANISH GIPSY, and ESSAYS.
2 vols. TiiEoi iiRASTUS Sucn. 1 vol.
Works of George Eliot (Cabinet Edition). 21 volumes,
crown Svo, price 5, 5s. Also to be had handsomely bound in half and full calf.
The Volumes are sold separately, bound in cloth, price 5s. each.
Novels by George Eliot. Cheap Edition.
Adam Bede. Illustrated. 3s. Gd., cloth. The Mill on the Floss. Illus-
trated. 3s. Gd., cloth. Scenes of Clerical Life. Illustrated. 3s., cloth.
Silas Marner: the Weaver of Raveloe. Illustrated. 2s. Gd., cloth. Felix
Holt, the Radical. Illustrated. 3s. Gd., cloth. Romola. With Vignette.
3s. Gd., cloth.
Middlemarch. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Daniel Deronda. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Essays. New Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
Impressions of Theophrastus Such. New Edition. Crown
Svo, 5s.
The Spanish Gypsy. New Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
The Legend of Jubal, and other Poems, Old and New.
New Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
Wise, Witty, and Tender Sayin gs, in Prose and Verse. Selected
from the Works of GEORGE ELIOT. New Edition. Fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d.
The George Eliot Birthday Book. Printed on fine paper,
with red border, and handsomely bound in cloth, gilt. Fcap. Svo, 3s. Gd. And
in French morocco or Russia, 5s.
ESSAYS ON SOCIAL SUBJECTS. Originally published in
the Saturday Review.
1 New Edition. First and Second Scries. 2 vols. crown
Svo, Gs. each.
FAITHS OF THE WORLD, The. A Concise History of the
Great Religious Systems of the World. By various Authors. Crown Svo, 5s.
FALKXER. The Lost Stradivarius. By J. MKADI: FALKNEE.
Crown Svo, Gs.
FERGUSON. Sir Samuel IVvguson in the Ireland of his Day.
By LADY I- KROPSON, Author of The Irish before the Conquest, Lifeof William




Philosophical Works of the late James F. -terrier LA.
Oxon.f Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy, fet
Anrtic-^. New Edition. Edited by Sir ALEXANDER GRANT, Bart., D.G.L., and Profe
LUSHINGTON. 3 vols. crown Svo, 34s. 6d.oy
FERRIER.
Institutes of Metaphysic. Third Edition. 10s. 6d.
Lectures on the Early Greek Philosophy. 4th Edition. 10s. 6d.
Philosophical Remains, including the Lectures on Early Greek Philosophy. New Edition. 2 vols. 24s.
FITZROY. Dogma and the Church of England. By A. I.
FiizRoY. Post 8vo, 7s. 6d.
FLINT.
Historical Philosophy in France and French Belgium and
Switzerland. By ROBKRT FLINT, Corresponding Member of the Institute of
* ranee, Hon. Member of the Royal Society of Palermo, Professor in the Univer
sity of Edinburgh, &c. 8vo, 21s.
Agnosticism. Being the Croall Lecture for 1887-88.
Theism. Being the Baird Lecture for 1876. Eighth Edition,
Revised. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
Anti-Theistic Theories. Being the Baird Lecture for 1877.
Fifth Edition. Crown 8vo 10s. 6d.
FOREIGN CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS. Edited
by Mrs OLIPHANT. Price 2s. 6d. For List of Volumes, see page 2.
FOSTER. The Fallen City, and other Poems. By WILL FOSTER.
Crown 8vo, 6s.
FRANCILLON. Gods and Heroes ; or, The Kingdom of Jupiter. By R. E. FRANCILLON. With 8 Illustrations. Crown Svo, 5s.
FRASER. Philosophy of Theism. Being the Gifford Lectures
delivered before the University of Edinburgh in 1894-95. First Scries By ALEXANDER CAMPBELL FRASER, D.C.L., Oxford; Emeritus Professor of Lo^ic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Post Svo. 7s. Cd. net
FULLARTON.
Merlin : A Dramatic Poem. By RALPH MACLEOD FULLAR
TON. Crown Svo, 5s.
Tanhauser. Crown 8vo, 6s.
Lallan Sangs and German Lyrics. Crown Svo, 5s.
GALT.
Novels by JOHN GALT. With General Introduction and
Prefatory Notes by S. R. CROCKETT. The Text Revised and Edited by D
bTORRAR MELDRUM, Author of The Story of Margredel. With Photogravure
Illustrations from Drawings by John Wallace. Fcap. Svo, 3s. net each vol.
Annals of the Parish, and The Ayrshire Legatees. 2 vols.
Sir Andrew Wylie. 2 vols.
The Entail. 2 vols.
The Provost, and The Last of the Lairds. 2 vols. [in the press.
See also STANDARD NOVELS, p. 6.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
Scottish Hymnal, With Appendix Incorporated. Published
for use in Churches by Authority of the General Assembly. 1. Large type,
cloth, red edges, 2s. 6d.; French morocco, 4s. 2. Bourgeois type, limp cloth, Is.; French morocco, 2s. 3. Nonpareil type, cloth, red edges, Cd.; French morocco
- 4d. 4. Paper covers, 3d. 5. Sunday-School Edition, paper covers, Id.,
cloth, 2d. No. 1, bound with the Psalms and Paraphrases, French morocco 8s
NO. 2, bound with the Psalms and Paraphrases, cloth, 2s.; French morocco, 3s.
Irayers for Social and Family Worship. Prepared by a
Special Committee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Entirely Pvew Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Fcap. Svo, red edges, 2s.William Blackwood and Sons, 13
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.
Prayers for Family Worship. A Selection of Four Weeks
Prayers. New Edition. Authorised by the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland Fcap. Svo, red edges, Is. Gd.
One Hundred Prayers. Prepared by a Committee of the Gen
eral Assembly of the Church of Scotland, IGmo, cloth limp, Gd.
GERARD.
Reata : What s in a Name. By E. D. GERARD. Cheap
Edition. Crown Svo, Ss. Gd.
Beggar my Neighbour. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
The Waters of Hercules. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
A Sensitive Plant. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
GERARD.
A Foreigner. An Anglo-German Study. By E. GERARD. In
1 vol. crown Svo. [In the press.
The Land beyond the Forest. Facts, Figures, and Fancies
from Transylvania. With Maps and Illustrations. 2 vols. post Svo, 25s.
Bis : Some Tales Retold. Crown Svo, Gs.
A Secret Mission. 2 vols. crown Svo, 17s.
GERARD.
The Wrong Man. By DOROTHEA GERARD. Crown Svo, Gs.
Lady Baby. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
Recha. Second Edition. Crown Svo, Gs.
The Rich Miss Riddell. Second Edition. Crown Svo, Gs.
GERARD. Stonyhurst Latin Grammar. By Rev. JOHN GERARD.
Second Edition. Fcap. Svo, 3s.
GILL.
Free Trade : an Inquiry into the Nature of its Operation.
By RICHARD GILL. Crown Svo, 7s. Gd.
Free Trade under Protection. Crown Svo, 7s. Gd.
GOETHE. Poems and Ballads of Goethe. Translated by Pro-
fessor AYTOUN and Sir THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. Third Edition. Fcap. Svo, (is.
GOETHE S FAUST. Translated into English Verse by Sir
THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. Part I. Second Edition, crown Svo, Os. Ninth Edi
tion, fcap., 3s. (id. Part II. Second Edition, Revised. Fcap. Svo, 6s.
GORDON GUMMING.
At florae in Fiji. By C. F. GORDON GUMMING. Fourth
Edition, post Svo. With Illustrations and Map. 7s. Gd.
A Lady s Cruise in a French Man-of-War. New and Cheaper
Edition. Svo. With Illustrations and Map. 12s. (id.
Fire-Fountains. The Kingdom of Hawaii : Its Volcanoes,
and the History of its Missions. With Map and Illustrations. 2 vols. Svo, 25s.
Wanderings in China. New and Cheaper Edition. Svo, with
Illustrations, 10s.
Granite Crags
: The Yo-semite Region of California. Illus
trated with S Engravings. New and Cheaper Edition. Svo, Ss. (id.
GRAHAM. Manual of the Elections (Scot.) (Corrupt and Illegal
Practices) Act, 1890. With Analysis, Relative Act of Sedenint, Appendix con
taining the Corrupt Practices Acts of 1SS3 and 1SS5, and Copious Index. By J.
EDWAKD GRAHAM, Advocate. Svo, -is. Gd.
GRAND.
A Domestic Experiment. By SARAH GRAND, Author of
The Heavenly Twins, Idcala : A Study from Life. Crown Svo, Gs.
Singularly Deluded. Crown Svo, 6s.
GRANT. Bush-Life in Queensland. By A. C. GRANT. New
Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.14 List oj JDOORS Published by
GRANT. Life of Sir Hope Grant. With Selections from his
Correspondence. Edited by HENRY KNOLLYS, Colonel (H.P.) Royal Artillery his former A.D.C., Editor of Incidents in the Sepoy War ; Author of Sketches
of Life in Japan, &c. With Portraits of Sir Hope Grant and other Illus
trations. Maps and Plans. 2 vols. demy 8vo, 21s
GRIER. In Furthest Ind. The Narrative of Mr EDWARD CAR-
LYON of Ells-wether, in the County of Northampton, and late of the Honourable
East India Company s Service, Gentleman. Wrote by his own hand in the year of grace 1697. Edited, with a few Explanatory Notes, by SYDNEY C. GRIER
Post Svo, 6s.
GUTHRIE- SMITH. Crispus
: A Drama. By H. GUTHRIE-
SMITH. Fcap. 4to, 5s.
HAGGARD. Under Crescent and Star. By Lieut.-Col. ANDREW
HAGGARD, D.S.O., Author of Dodo and I, Tempest Torn. &c. With a
Portrait. Crown Svo, 6s.
HALDANE. Subtropical Cultivations and Climates. A Handy Book for Planters, Colonists, and Settlers. By R. C. HALDANE Post Svo 9s HAMERTON.
Wenderholme: A Story of Lancashire and Yorkshire Life
By P. G. HAJHERTON, Author of A Painter s Camp. New Edition. Crown
Svo, 3s. 6d.
Marmorne. New Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
HAMILTON.
Lectures on Metaphysics. By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON,
Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh
Edited by the Rev. H. L. HANSEL, B.D., LL.D., Dean of St Paul s; and JOHN
VEITCH, M.A., LL.D., Professor of Logic and Rhetoric, Glasgow. Seventh
Edition. 2 vols. Svo, 24s.
Lectures on Logic. Edited by the SAME. Third Edition
_ Revised. 2 vols., 24s.
Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and
University Reform. Third Edition. Svo, 21s.
Memoir of Sir William Hamilton, Bart., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. By Professor VEITCU of the
University of Glasgow. Svo, with Portrait, 18s.
Sir William Hamilton : The Man and his Philosophy. Two
Lectures delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution, January and
February 1883. By Professor VEITCH. Crown Svo, 2s.
HAMLEY.
The Life of General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, K.C B
K.C.M.G. By ALEXANDER INNES SHAND. With two Photogravure Portraits and other Illustrations. 2 vols. demy Svo, 21s.
The Operations of War Explained and Illustrated. By General Sir EDWARD BRUCE HAMI.EY, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Fifth Edition, Revised
throughout. 4to, with numerous Illustrations, 30s.
National Defence
; Articles and Speeches. Post Svo, 6s.
Shakespeare s Funeral, and other Papers. Post Svo, 7s 6d.
afe?
Carlyle
: An Essay- Second Edition. Crown Svo,
On Outposts. Second Edition. Svo, 2s.
W^Jington s^
Career
; A Military and Political Summary.
Lady Lee s Widowhood. New Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d





r Relations- A Philozoic Essay. With Illustrations,
TT A -n-n -rv y Ernest Grise
.t- Crown Svo, cloth gilt, 3s. 6d. MAKE. Down the Village Street : Scenes in a West Country Hamlet. By CHRISTOPHER HARE. Crown Svo, 6s.William Blackwood and Sons. 15
HARRADEN. In Varying Moods : Short Stories. By BEATRICE
HARRADEN-, Author of Ships that Pass in the Night. Eleventh Edition.
Crown Svo, 3s. Od.
HARRIS.
Tatilet. The Narrative of a Journey of Exploration to the
Atlas Mountains and the Oases of the North-West Sahara. By WALTER B.
HARRIS, F.R.G.S., Author of The Land of an African .Sultan; Travels in
Morocco, &c. With Illustrations by Maurice Romberg from Sketches and
Photographs by the Author, and Two Maps. Demy Svo, ll s.
A Journey through the Yemen, and some General Remarks
upon that Country. With 3 Maps and numerous Illustrations by Forestier and
Wallace from Sketches and Photographs taken by the Author. Demy Svo, llis.
Danovitch, and other Stories. Crown Svo, (5s.
HAWKER, The Prose Works of Rev. R. S. HAWKER, Vicar of
Morwenstow. Including Footprints of Former Men in Far Cornwall. Re-edited,
with Sketches never before published. With a Frontispiece. Crown Svo, 3s. Cd.
HAY. The Works of the Right Rev. Dr George Hay, Bishop of
Edinburgh. Edited under the Supervision of the Right Rev. Bishop STRAIN.
With Memoir and Portrait of the Author. 5 vols. crown Svo, bound in extra
cloth, 1, Is. The following Volumes may be had separately viz. :
The Devout Christian Instructed in the Law of Christ from the Written
Word. 2 vols., Ss. The Pious Christian Instructed in the Nature and Practice
of the Principal Exercises of Piety. 1 vol., 3s.
HEATLEY.
The Horse-Owner s Safeguard. A Handy Medical Guide for
every Man who owns a Horse. By G. S. HKATLEY, M.R.C.V.S. Crown Svo,
&quot;&amp;gt;s.
The Stock-Owner s Guide. A Handy Medical Treatise for
every Man who owns an Ox or a Cow. Crown Svo, 4s. 6d.
HEDDERWICK. Lays of Middle Age ; and other Poems. By
JAMKS HKDDKRWICK, LL.D., Author of Backward Glances. Price 3s. Od.
HEMANS.
The Poetical Works of Mrs Hemans. Copyright Editions.
Royal Svo, 5s. The Same with Engravings, cloth, gilt edges, 7s. (id.
Select Poems of Mrs Hemans. Fcap., cloth, gilt edges, 3s.
HERKLESS. Cardinal Beaton : Priest and Politician. By
JOHN HERKLESS, Professor of Church History, St Andrews. With a Portrait.
Post Svo, 7s. (id.
HEWISON. The Isle of Bute in the Olden Time. With Illus
trations, Maps, and Plans. By JAMES KING HKWISOX, M.A., F.S.A. (Scot.),
Minister of Rothesay. Vol. I., Celtic Saints and Heroes. Crown 4to, 15s. net.
Vol. II., The Royal Stewards and the Brandanes. Crown 4to, 15s. net.
HOME PRAYERS. By Ministers of the Church of Scotland
and Members of the Church Service Society. Second Edition. Fcap. Svo, 3s.
HOMER.
The Odyssey. Translated into English Verse in the Spen
serian Stanza. By PHILIP STANHOPE WORSLEY. New and Cheaper Edition.
The Iliad!
&quot;&quot;
Translated by P. S- WORSLEY and Professor CON-
INGTON. 2 vols. crown Svo, 21s.
HUTCHINSON. Hints on the Game of Golf. By HORACE G.
HUTCIIINSON. Eighth Edition, Enlarged. Fcap. Svo, cloth, Is.
HYSLOP. The Elements of Ethics. By JAMES H. HYSLOP,
Ph.D., Instructor in Ethics, Columbia College, Xew York, Author of The
Elements of Logic. Post Svo, 7s. Od. net.
IDDESLEIGH.
Lectures and Essays. By the late EARL of IDDESLEIGH,
G.C.B., D.C.L., &c. Svo, 10s.
Life, Letters, and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote, First
Earl of Iddesleigh. By ANDREW LANG. With Three Portraits and a View of
Pvnes. Third Edition. 2 vols. post Svo, 31s. Od.lo List of Books Published by
INDEX GEOGRAPHICUS : Being a List, alphabetically ar-
ranged, of the Principal Places on the Globe, with the Countries and Subdivisions
of the Countries in which they are situated, and their Latitudes and Longitudes.
Imperial Svo, pp. 076, 21s.
JEAN JAMBON. Our Trip to Blunderland
; or, Grand Ex
cursion to Blundertown and Back. By JEAN JAMBON. With Sixty Illustrations
designed by CHARLES DOYLE, engraved by DALZIEL. Fourth Thousand. Cloth
gilt edges, (5s. 6d. Cheap Edition, cloth, 3s. Gd. Boards, 2s. 6d.
JEBB. A Strange Career. The Life and Adventures of JOHN
GLADWYN JEBB. By his Widow. With an Introduction by II. RIDER UAGOARD, and an Electrogravure Portrait of Mr Jebb. Third Edition. Demy Svo, 10s 6d CHEAP EDITION. With Illustrations by John Wallace. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d
JENNINGS. Mr Gladstone : A Study. By Louis J. JENNINGS,
M.P., Author of
. Republican Government in the United States, The Croker
Memoirs, &c. Popular Edition. Crown Svo, Is.
JERNINGHAM.
Reminiscences of an Attache . By HUBERT E. H. JERNINGHAM.
Second Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
Diane de Breteuille. A Love Story. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
JOHNSTON.
The Chemistry of Common Life. By Professor J. F. W.
JOHNSTON. New Edition, Revised. By ARTHUR HERBERT CHURCH, M.A. Oxon.;
Author of Food : its Sources, Constituents, and Uses, &c. With Maps and 102
Engravings. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Elements of Agricultural Chemistry. An entirely New
Edition from the Edition by Sir CHARLES A. CAMERON, M.D., F.R.C.S.I., &c.
Revised and brought down to date by C. M. AIKMAN, M.A.,- B.Sc., F.R.S.E.,
Professor of Chemistry, Glasgow Veterinary College. Crown Svo, 6s. 6d.
Catechism of Agricultural Chemistry. An entirely New-
Edition from the Edition by Sir CHARLES A. CAMERON. Revised and Enlarged
by C. M. AIRMAN, M.A., &c. 92d Thousand. With numerous Illustrations.
Crown Svo, Is.
JOHNSTON. Agricultural Holdings (Scotland) Acts, 1883 and
1S89 ; and the Ground Game Act, 1SSO. With Notes, and Summary of Procedure,
&c. By CHRISTOPHER N. JOHNSTON, M.A., Advocate. Demy Svo, 5s.
JOKAI. Timar s Two Worlds. By MAURUS JOKAI. Authorised
Translation by Mrs HEGAN KENNARD. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.
KEBBEL. The Old and the New : English Country Life By
T. E. KEBBEL, M.A., Author of The Agricultural Labourers,
1
Essays in History and Politics, Life of Lord Beaconsfleld. Crown Svo, 5s.
KERR. St Andrews in 1645-46. By D. R. KERR. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
KING. The Metamorphoses of Ovid. Translated in English
Blank Verse. By HENRY KINO, M.A., Fellow of Wadham College, Oxford, and of
the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. Crown Svo, 10s. 6d.
KINGLAKE.
History of the Invasion of the Crimea. By A. W. KINGLAKE.
Cabinet Edition, Revised. With an Index to the Complete Work. Illustrated
with Maps and Plans. Complete in 9 vols., crown Svo, at 6s. each.
History of the Invasion of the Crimea. Demy 8vo. Vol. VI.
Winter Troubles. With a Map, 16s. Vols. VII. and VIII. From the Morrow of
Inkerman to the Death of Lord Raglan. With an Index to the Whole Work.
With Maps and Plans. 28s.
Eothen. A New Edition, uniform with the Cabinet Edition
of the History of the Invasion of the Crimea. 6s.
KIRBY. In Haunts of Wild Game: A Hunter- Naturalist s
Wanderings from Kahlamba to Libombo. By FREDERICK VAUGHAN KIRBY,
F.Z.S. (Maqaqamba). With numerous Illustrations by Charles &quot;VVhymper, and a
Map. 1 vol. large demy Svo. [In the press.William Blackwood and Sons, 17
KLEIN.
V
- . As Tested through more than
of
LAMINGTON. In the Days of the Dandies/ By the late Lord LAMIXOTON. Crown Svo. Illustrated cover, Is.; cloth, Is. Gd





POPULAR EDITION. With Portrait and View of Pynes. Post Svo, 7s Cd
LEES. A Handbook of the Sheriff and Justice of Peace Small Debt Courts. With Notes, References and ForWnv T v T
Sheriff of Stirling Dumbarton, and cfackmanran; 8vo% Gd!
Advocat(1





Fair to See. New Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. fid.
Mine is Thine. New- Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d. LOCKHART.













&quot;lld D:ltRS - y W!VMAM LOCKHAR?
A.5L, D.D., F.S A. Scot., Minister of Colinfon Parish. 2d Edition. Svo Cs ..,
. . ., rs. on. Svo Cs
T rvnr
Stes : Sermons for Seasons of Sorrow. Crown Svo, 6s. LOU LM liii.
The Institutes of Law : A Treatise of the Principles of Juris-
prudence as determined by Nature. By the late JAMES T.ORIMER, Professor of Public Law and of the Law of Nature and Nations in the University of Edin-
burgh. New Edition, Revised and much Enlarged. Svo, ISs
The Institutes of the Law of Nations. A Treatise of the
Jural Relation of Separate Political Communities. In 2 vols. Svo. Volume I
price 16s. Volume II., price
-_&amp;gt;0s.












HI&amp;gt;, Captain Norfolk Regiment. With 1..0 Illustrations from Drawings an-1 Photographs under the personal
superintendence of the Author, and it specially prepared Maps In
&amp;gt; vols lar- -P
demy Svo, 42s.
M CHESNEY. Kathleen Clare: Tier- IJook, H537-J1. Edited by I)OR\ GRRRNWELL M CHESNEY. With Frontispiece, and live full-pa- e Illustra
tions by .fames A. Shearman. Crown Svo, fis.
M COMBIE. Cattle and Cattle-Breeders. Ey WILLIAM M COMBIK
Tillyfour. New Edition, Enlanr-d, with Memoir of the Author by JAMES
MACDONALD, F.R.S.E., Secretary Hi-hland and Agricultural Sx iety of Scotland Crown Svo, :is. 6s
1
..1 8 List of Books Published by
M CRIE.
Works of the Rev. Thomas M Crie, D.D. Uniform Edition.
4 vols. crown Svo, 24s.
Life of John Knox. Crown Svo, 6s. Another Edition, 3s. 6d.
Life of Andrew Melville. Crown Svo, 6s.
History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reformation
in Italy in the Sixteenth Century. Crown Svo, 4s.
History of the Progress and Suppression of the Reformation
in Spain in the Sixteenth Century. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
M CRIE. The Public Worship of Presbyterian Scotland. Histori
cally treated. With copious Notes, Appendices, and Index. The Fourteenth
Series of the Cunningham Lectures. By the Rev. CHARLES G. M CRIE, D.D.
Demy Svo, 10s. Gd.
MACDONALD. A Manual of the Criminal Law (Scotland) Pro
cedure Act, 18S7. By NORMAN DORAN MACDONALD. Revised by the LORD
JUSTICE-CLERK. Svo, 10s. 6d.
MACDONALD.
Stephens Book of the Farm. Fourth Edition. Revised and
in great part Rewritten by JAMES MACDONALD, F.R.S.E., Secretary, Highland
and Agricultural Society of Scotland. Complete in 3 vols., bound with leather
back, gilt top, 3, 3s. In Six Divisional Vols., bound in cloth, each 10s. 6d.
Stephens Catechism of Practical Agriculture. New Edition.
Revised by JAMES MACDONALD. With numerous Illustrations. Crown Svo, Is.
Pringle s Live Stock of the Farm. Third Edition. Revised
and Edited by JAMES MACDONALD. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
M Combie s Cattle and Cattle - Breeders. New Edition,
Enlarged, with Memoir of the Author by JAMES MACDONALD. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
History of Polled Aberdeen and Angus Cattle. Giving an
Account of the Origin, Improvement, and Characteristics of the Breed. By JAMES
MACDONALD and JAMES SINCLAIR. Illustrated with numerous Animal Portraits.
Post Svo, 12s. 6d.
MACDOUGALL AND DODDS. A Manual of the Local Govern
ment (Scotland) Act, 1S94. With Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and Copious
Index. By J. PATTEN MACDOUGALL, Legal Secretary to the Lord Advocate, and
J. M. DODDS. Tenth Thousand, Revised. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d. net.
MACINTYRE. Hindu
- Koh : Wanderings and Wild Sports on
and beyond the Himalayas. By Major-General DONALD MAOINTYRE, V.C., late
Prince of Wales Own Goorkhas, F.R.G.S. Dedicated to H.R.H. The Prince of
Wales. New and Cheaper Edition, Revised, with numerous Illustrations. Post
Svo, 3s. 6d.
MACKAY.
A Manual of Modern Geography ; Mathematical, Physical,
and Political. By the Rev. ALEXANDER MACKAY, LL.D., F.R.G.S. llth
Thousand, Revised to the present time. Crown Svo, pp. 688, 7s. 6d.
Elements of Modern Geography. 55th Thousand, Revised to
the present time. Crown Svo, pp. 300, 3s.
The Intermediate Geography. Intended as an Intermediate
Book between the Author s Outlines of Geography and Elements of Geo
graphy. Seventeenth Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, pp. 238, 2s.
Outlines of Modern Geography. 191st Thousand, Revised to
the present time. 18mo, pp. 128, Is.
First Steps in Geography. 105th Thousand. 18mo, pp. 56.
Sewed, 4d. ; cloth, 6d.
Elements of Physiography. New Edition. Rewritten and
Enlarged. With numerous Illustrations. Crown Svo. [In the, press.William Blackwood and Sons. 19
MACKENZIE. Studies in Roman Law. With Comparative
Views of the Laws of France, England, and Scotland. By Lord MACKENZIE,
one of the Judges of the Court of Session in Scotland. Sixth Edition, Edited
by JOHN KIRKPATRICK, M.A., LL.B., Advocate, Professor of History in the
University of Edinburgh. Svo, 12s.
MACPHERSON. Glimpses of Church and Social Life in the
Highlands in Olden Times. By ALEXANDER MACPHERSON, F.S.A. Scot. With
6 Photogravure Portraits and other full-page Illustrations. Small 4to, 25s.
M PHERSON. Golf and Golfers. Past and Present. By J.
GOIIUON M PiiERSON, Ph. P., F.R.S.E. With an Inlvodnction by the Right Hon.
A. J. BALFOUR, and a Portrait of the Author. Fcap. Svo, Is. tjd.
MACRAE. A Handbook of Doer-Stalking. By ALEXANDER
MACRAE, late Forester to Lord Henry Bentinck. With Introduction by Horatio
Ross, Esq. Fcap. Svo, with 2 Photographs from Life. 3s. Od.
MAIN&quot;. Three Hundred English Sonnets. Chosen and Edited
by DAVID M. MAIN. Fcap. Svo, Os.
MAIR. A Digest of Laws and Decisions, Ecclesiastical and
Civil, relating to the Constitution, Practice, and Allaire of the Church of Scot
land. With Notes and Forms of Procedure. By the Rev. WILLIAM MAIR, D.D.,
Minister of the Parish of Earlston. New Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, 9s. net.
MARCHMONT AND THE HUMES OF POLWARTH. By
One of their Descendants. With numerous Portraits and other Illustrations.
Crown 4to, 21s. net.
MARSHMAN. History of India. From the Earliest Period to
the present time. By JOHN CLARK MARSHMAN, C.S.I. Third and Cheaper
Edition. Post Svo, with Map, 6s.
MARTIN.
Goethe s Faust. Part I. Translated by Sir THEODORE MARTIN,
K.C.B. Second Edition, crown Svo, c-s. Ninth Edition, fcap. Svo, 3s. (id.
Goethe s Faust. Part II. Translated into English Verse.
Second Edition, Revised. Fcap. Svo, Os.
The Works of Horace. Translated into English Verse, with
Life and Notes. 2 vols. New Edition. Crown Svo, 21s.
Poems and Ballads of Heinrich Heine. Done into English
Verse. Third Edition. Small crown Svo, 5s.
The Song of the Bell, and other Translations from Schiller,
Goethe, Uhland, and Others. Crown Svo, 7s. Od.
Madonna Pia : A Tragedy ; and Three Other Dramas. Crown
Svo, 7s. 6d.
Catullus. With Life and Notes. Second Edition, Revised
and Corrected. Post Svo, 7s. (id.
The Vita Nuova of Dante. Translated, with an Introduction
and Notes. Third Edition. Small crown Svo, 5s.
Aladdin : A Dramatic Poem. By ADAM OEHLENSCHLAEGER.
Fcap. Svo, 5s.
Correggio
: A Tragedy. By OEHLENSCHLAEGER. AVith Notes.
Fcap. Svo, 3s.
MARTIN. On some of Shakespeare s Female Characters. By
HELENA FAUCIT, Lady MARTIN. Dedicated by permission to Her Most Gracious
Majesty the Queen. Fifth Edition. With a Portrait by Lehmann. Demy
Svo, 7s. Od.
MARWICK. Observations on the Law and Practice in regard
to Municipal Elections and the Conduct of the Business of Town Councils and
Commissioners of Police in Scotland. By Sir JAMES D. MARWICK, L.L.D.,
Town-Clerk of Glasgow. Royal Svo, 30s.2O List of Books Published by
MATHESON.
Can the Old Faith Live with the New ? or, The Problem of
Evolution and Revelation. By the Rev. GEORGE MATHESON, D.D. Third Edi
tion. Crown 8vo, 7s. 6d.
The Psalmist and the Scientist
; or, Modern Value of the Reli-
gious Sentiment. Third Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
Spiritual Development of St Paul. Third Edition. Cr. Svo, 5s.
The Distinctive Messages of the Old Eeligions. Second Edi
tion. Crown Svo, 5s.
Sacred Songs. New and Cheaper Edition. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
MAURICE. The Balance of Military Power in Europe. An
Examination of the War Resources of Great Britain and the Continental States.
By Colonel MAURICE, R.A., Professor of Military Art and History at the Royal
Staff College. Crown Svo, with a Map, 6s.
MAXWELL.
A Duke of Britain. A Romance of the Fourth Century.
By Sir HERBERT MAXWELL, Bart., M.P., P.S.A., &c., Author of Passages in
the Life of Sir Lucian Elphin.
1 Fourth Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.
Life and Times of the Rt. Hon. William Henry Smith, M.P.
With Portraits and numerous Illustrations by Herbert Railton, G. L. Seymour,
and Others. 2 vols. demy Svo, 25s.
POPULAR EDITION. With a Portrait and other Illustrations. Crown Svo, Ss. 6d.
Scottish Land Names : Their Origin and Meaning. Being
the Rhind Lectures in Archeology for 1S93. Post Svo, 6s.
Meridiana : Noontide Essays. Post Svo, 7s. 6d.
Post Meridiana : Afternoon Essays. Post Svo, Gs.
MELDRUM.
The Story of Margredel : Being a Fireside History of a Fife-
shire Family. By D. STORRAR MELDRUM. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo. 3s. 6d.
Grey Mantle and Gold Fringe. 1 vol. crown Svo. [in the press
MICHEL. A Critical Inquiry into the Scottish Language. With
the view of Illustrating the Rise and Progress of Civilisation in Scotland. By
FRANCISQUE-MICHEL, P\S.A. Lond. and Scot., Correspondant de 1 Institut de
France, &c. 4to, printed on hand-made paper, and bound in roxburghe, 66s.
MICHIE.
The Larch : Being a Practical Treatise on its Culture and
General Management. By CHRISTOPHER Y. MICHIE, Forester, Cullen House.
Crown Svo, with Illustrations. New and Cheaper Edition, Enlarged, 5s.
The Practice of Forestry. Crown Svo, with Illustrations. 6s.
M1DDLETON. The Story of Alastair Bhan Comyn ; or, The
Tragedy of Dunphail. A Tale of Tradition and Romance. By the Lady MIDDLE-
TON. Square Svo, 10s. Cheaper Edition, 5s.
MINTO.
A Manual of English Prose Literature, Biographical and
Critical : designed mainly to show Characteristics of Style. By W. MINTO,
M.A., Hon. LL.D. of St Andrews ; Professor of Logic in the University of Aber
deen. Third Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Characteristics of English Poets, from Chaucer to Shirley. New Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
Plain Principles of Prose Composition. Crown Svo, Is. 6d.
The Literature of the Georgian Era. Edited, with a Bio
graphical Introduction, by Professor KNIGHT, St Andrews. Post Svo, 6s.William blackwood and Sons. 21
MOIR. Life of Mansie Wauch, Tailor in Dalkeitli By D M
5
,
r 1^ Wj,* 9RUIK
?HANK S Illustratins. Cheaper Edition. Crown 8vo 2s. Od Another Edition, without Illustrations, leap. Svo, Is. Gd.
MOLE. For the Sake of a Slandered Woman Bv Al \PIO\ MOLK. Fcap. Svo, 2s. Gd. net.
MOMERIE.
Defects of Modern Christianity, and other Sermons Bv ALFRED WILLIAMS MOMKKIK, M.A., D.iSc., LL.D. Fifth Edition. Crowu
o\ O, OS,
The Basis of Religion. Being an Examination of Natural
Helicon. Ihird Edition. Crown Svo, 2s. (Id.
The Origin of Evil, and other Sermons. Eighth Edition,
Enlarged. Crown Svo, 6s.
Personality. The Beginning and End of Metaphysics, and
CrownTvo
1^
8 1&quot; 111^ 011 &quot; M Positivo 1&amp;gt;hn so l
;iy. Fifth Edition, Revised.
Agnosticism. Fourth Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, 5s.
1 reaching and Hearing ; and other Sermons. Fourth Edition
Enlarged. Crown Svo, 5s.
Belief in God. Third Edition. Crown Svo, 3s.
Inspiration ; and other Sermons. Second Edition. Enlarged Crown Svo, 5s.
Church and Creed. Third Edition. Crown Svo, 4s. Gd.
The Future of Religion, and other Essays. Second Edition
Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
MOXCREIFF. The X Jewel. A Scottish Romance of the Days
ol James \ I. By the Hon. FREDERICK ;\IO.\CI;F,IFF. In 1 vol. crown Svo.
[//i the i/rcss.
MONTAGUE. Military Topography. Illustrated by Practical
Examples of a Practical Subject, By JIajor-General W. E. MONTAGUE, C.B
P.S.C., late Garrison Instructor Intelligence Department, Author of Cann&amp;gt;ai&quot;u-
ing in South Africa. With Forty-one Diagrams. Crown Svo, js.
MONTALEMBERT. Memoir of Count de Montalcmbert. A
Chapter of Ilecent French History. By Mrs OLIPIIAM-, Author of the Life of
Edward Irving, &c. 2 vols. crown Svo, 1, -is.
MORISON.
Doorside Ditties. By JEANIE Moiusox. With a Frontis
piece. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
^Eolus. A Romance in Lyrics. Crown Svo, 3s.
There as Here. Crown Svo, 3s.
*** A limited impression on hand-made jvi.pcr, liuvnd in vellum, 7i. (Jd,
Selections from Poems. Crown 8vo, 4s. Gd.




Fifine at the Fair,&quot;
&quot; Christmas Eve and Easter Day,&quot;
and other of Mr Browning s Poems. Crown Svo, 3s.
The Purpose of the Ages. Crown Svo, 9s.
Gordon : An Our-day Idyll. Crown Svo, 3s.
Saint Isadora, and other Poems. Crown Svo, Is. Gd.
Snatches of Song. Paper, Is. Gd.
; Cloth, 3s.
Pontius Pilate. Paper, Is. Gd.
; Cloth, 3s.
Mill o Forres. Crown Svo, Is.
Ane Booke of Ballades. Fcap. 4to, Is.22 L,lSt Of J500KS
MOZLEY. Essays from Blackwood. By the late ANNE
MOZLEY, Author of Essays on Social Subjects ; Editor of The Letters and
Correspondence of Cardinal Newman, Letters of the Rev. J. B. Mozley, &c.
With a Memoir by her Sister, FANNY MOZLEY. Post Svo, 7s. 6d.
MUNRO. Rambles and Studies in Bosnia
- Herzegovina and
Dalmatia. With an Account of the Proceedings of the Congress of Arclueolo-
gists and Anthropologists held at Sarajevo in 1894. By ROBERT MUNRO, M.A.,
M.D.
, F.R.S.E., Author of The Lake-Dwellings of Europe, &c. With numerous
Illustrations. 1 vol. demy 8vo. [In the press.
MUNRO. On Valuation of Property. By WILLIAM MUNRO,
M.A., Her Majesty s Assessor of Railways and Canals for Scotland. Second
Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, 3s. Od.
MURDOCH. Manual of the Law of Insolvency and Bankruptcy
:
Comprehending a Summary of the Law of Insolvency, Notour Bankruptcy,
Composition
- contracts, Trust - deeds, Cessios, and Sequestrations ; and the
Winding-up of Joint-Stock Companies in Scotland ; with Annotations on the
various Insolvency and Bankruptcy Statutes ; and with Forms of Procedure
applicable to these Subjects. By JAMES MURDOCH, Member of the Faculty of
Procurators in Glasgow. Fifth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 8vo, 12s. net.
MY TRIVIAL LIFE AND MISFORTUNE: A Gossip with
no Plot in Particular. By A PLAIN WOMAN. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
By the SAME AUTHOR.
POOR NELLIE. Cheap Edition. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
MY WEATHER-WISE COMPANION. Presented by B. T.
Fcap. Svo, Is. net.
NAPIER. The Construction of the Wonderful Canon of Loga
rithms. By JOHN NAPIER of Merchiston. Translated, with Notes, and a
Catalogue of Napier s Works, by WILLIAM RAE MACDONALD. Small 4to, 15s.
A few large-paper copies on Whatman paper, 30s.
NEAVES.
Songs and Verses, Social and Scientific. By An Old Con
tributor to Maga. By the Hon. Lord NEAVES. Fifth Edition. Fcap. Svo, 4s.
The Greek Anthology. Being Vol. XX. of Ancient Classics
for English Readers. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
NICHOLSON.
A Manual of Zoology, for the use of Students. With a
General Introduction on the Principles of Zoology. By HENRY ALLEYNE
NICHOLSON, M.D. D.Sc., F.L.S., F.G.S., Regius Professor of Natural History in
the University of Aberdeen. Seventh Edition, Rewritten and Enlarged. Post
Svo, pp. 956, with 555 Engravings on Wood, 18s.
Text-Book of Zoology, for Junior Students. Fifth Edition,
Rewritten and Enlarged. Crown Svo, with 358 Engravings on Wood, 10s. 6d.
Introductory Text-Book of Zoology, for the use of Junior
Classes. Sixth Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with 166 Engravings, 3s.
Outlines of Natural History, for Beginners
: being Descrip
tions of a Progressive Series of Zoological Types. Third Edition, with
Engravings, Is. 6d.
A Manual of Palaeontology, for the use of Students. With a
General Introduction on the Principles of Palaeontology. By Professor H.
ALLEYNE NICHOLSON and RICHARD LYDEKKER, B.A. Third Edition, entirely
Rewritten and greatly Enlarged. 2 vols. Svo, 3, 3s.
The Ancient Life-History of the Earth. An Outline of the
Principles and Leading Facts of Palaeontological Science. Crown Svo, with 27G
Engravings, 10s. 6d.
On the &quot;Tabulate Corals&quot; of the Palaeozoic Period, with
Critical Descriptions of Illustrative Species. Illustrated with 15 Lithographed
Plates and numerous Engravings. Super-royal Svo, 21s.vvtutam biacKivooa ana Sons. 23
NICHOLSON.
Synopsis of the Classification of the Animal Kingdom. 8vo,
with 106 Illustrations, 6s.
On the Structure and Affinities of the Genus Monticulipora
and its Sub-Genera, with Critical Descriptions of Illustrative Species. Illustrated
with numerous Engravings on Wood and Lithographed Plates. Super-royal
8vo, 18s.
NICHOLSON.
Thoth. A Romance. By JOSEPH SHIELD NICHOLSON, M.A.,
D.Sc., Professor of Commercial and Political Economy and Mercantile Law in
the University of Edinburgh. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, 4s. Ud.
A Dreamer of Dreams. A Modern Romance. Second Edi
tion. Crown Svo, 6s.
NICOLSON AND MURE. A Handbook to the Local Govern-
ment (Scotland) Act, 1SS9. With Introduction, Explanatory Notes, and Index.
By J. BADKNACH NICOLSON, Advocate, Counsel to the Scotch Education
Department, and W. J. MURE, Advocate, Legal Secretary to the Lord Advocate
for Scotland. Ninth Reprint. Svo, 5s.
OLIPHANT.
Masollam : A Problem of the Period. A Novel. By LAURENCE
OLIPIIANT. 3 vols. post Svo, 25s. (id.
Scientific Religion ; or, Higher Possibilities of Life and
Practice through the Operation of Natural Forces. Second Edition. Svo, 16s.
Altiora Peto. Cheap Edition. Crown Svo, boards, 2s. 6d. ;
cloth, 3s. Gd. Illustrated Edition. Crown Svo, cloth, 6s.
Piccadilly. With Illustrations by Richard Doyle. New Edi
tion, 3s. 6d. Cheap Edition, Dards, -2s. (id.
Traits and Travesties ; Social and Political. Post Svo, 10s. Gd.
Episodes in a Life of Adventure
; or, Moss from a Rolling
Stone. Cheaper Edition. Post Svo, 3s. 6d.
Haifa : Life in Modern Palestine. Second Edition. Svo, 7s. 6d.
The Land of Gilead. With Excursions in the Lebanon.
With Illustrations and Maps. Demy Svo, 21s.
Memoir of the Life of Laurence Oliphant, and of Alice
Oliphant, his Wife. By Mrs M. O. W. OLIPIIANT. Seventh Edition. 2 vols.
post Svo, with Portraits. 21s.
POPULAR EDITION. With a New Preface. Post Svo, with Portraits. , s. 6d.
OLIPHANT.
Who was Lost and is Found. By Mrs OLIPHANT. Second
Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.
Miss Marjoribanks. New Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
The Perpetual Curate, and The Rector. New Edition. Crown
Svo, 3s. Gd. T-IT.L
Salem Chapel, and The Doctor s Family. New Edition.
Katie Stewart, and other Stories. New Edition. Crown Svo,
cloth, 3s. Gd.
Valentine and his Brother. New Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
Sons and Daughters. Crown Svo, 3s. (id.
Katie Stewart. Illustrated boards, 2s. Gd.
Two Stories of the Seen and the Unseen. The Open Door
Old Lady Mary. Paper covers, Is.
OLIPHANT. Notes of a Pilgrimage to Jerusalem and the Holy
Laud. By F. R. OLIPHANT. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
OSWALD. By Fell and Fjord ; or, Scenes and Studies in Ice
land. By E. J. OSWALD. Post Svo, with Illustrations. 7s. Gd,PAGE.
Introductory Text-Book of Geology. By DAVID PAGE, LL.D.,
Professor of Geology in the Durham University of Physical Science, Newcastle,
and Professor LAPWORTH of Mason Science College, Birmingham. With Engrav
ings and Glossarial Index. Twelfth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. 3s. 6d.
Advanced Text-Book of Geology, Descriptive and Industrial.
With Engravings, and Glossary of Scientific Terms. New Edition, by Professor
LAPWOETH. [In preparation.
Introductory Text-Book of Physical Geography. With Sketch-
Maps and Illustrations. Edited by Professor LAPWORTH, LL.D., F.G.S., &c.,
Mason Science College, Birmingham. Thirteenth Edition, Revised and Enlarged.
2s. Gd.
Advanced Text-Book of Physical Geography. Third Edition.
Revised and Enlarged by Professor LAPWORTH. With Engravings. 5s.
PATON.
Spindrift. By Sir J. NOEL PATON. Fcap., cloth, 5s.
Poems by a Painter. Fcap., cloth, 5s.
PATON. Body and Soul. A Ptomance in Transcendental Path
ology. By FREDERICK NOEL PATON. Third Edition. Crown 8vo, Is.
PATRICK. The Apology of Origen in Reply to Celsus. A
Chapter in the History of Apologetics. By the Rev. J. PATRICK, B.D. Post Svo,
7s. 6d.
PAUL. History of the Royal Company of Archers, the Queen s
Body-Guard for Scotland. By JAMES BALFOUR PAUL, Advocate of the Scottish
Bar. Crown 4to, with Portraits and other Illustrations. 2, 2s.
PEILE. Lawn Tennis as a Game of Skill. By Lieut.-Col. S. C.
F. PEILE, B.S.C. Revised Edition. Fcap., cloth, Is.
*
PETTIGREW. The Handy Book of Bees, and their Profitable
Management. By A. PETTIGREW. Fifth Edition. Enlarged, with Engravings.
Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
PFLEIDERER. Philosophy and Development of Religion.
Being the Edinburgh Gifford Lectures for 1894. By OTTO PFLEIDERER, D.D
Professor of Theology at Berlin University. In 2 vols. post Svo, 15s. net.
PHILOSOPHICAL CLASSICS FOR ENGLISH READERS.
Edited by WILLIAM KNIGHT, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of St Andrews. In crown Svo volumes, with Portraits, price 3s. &amp;lt;5d.
[For Lisi of Volumes, see page 2.
POLLARD. A Study in Municipal Government : The Corpora
tion of Berlin. By JAMES POLLARD, C.A., Chairman of the Edinburgh Public
Health Committee, and Secretary of the Edinburgh Chamber of Commerce.
Second Edition, Revised. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
POLLOK. The Course of Time : A Poem. By ROBERT POLLOK, A.M. Cottage Edition, 32mo, 8d. The Same, cloth, gilt edges, Is. 6d. Another
Edition, with Illustrations by Birket Foster and others, fcap., cloth. 3s. 6d or
with edges gilt, 4s.
PORT ROYAL LOGIC. Translated from the French
; with
Introduction, Notes, and Appendix. By THOMAS SPENCER BAYNES, LL.D., Pro
fessor in the University of St Andrews. Tenth Edition, 12mo, 4s.
POTTS AND DARNELL.
Aditus Faciliores : An Easy Latin Construing Book, with
Complete Vocabulary. By A. W. POTTS, M.A., LL.D., and the Rev. C. DARNELL, M.A.
, Head-Master of Cargiliield Preparatory School, Edinburgh. Tenth Edition,
fcap. Svo, 3s. 6d.wunam HiacRwooa and sons. 25
POTTS AND DARNELL.
Aditus Faciliores Gracci. An Easy Greek Construing Book
with Complete Vocabulary. Fifth Edition, Revised. Fcap. Svo, :js.
POTTS. School Sermons. By the late ALEXANDER WM. POTTS
LL.D., First Head-Master of Fettes College. With a Memoir and Portrait Crown Svo, 7s. (id.
PRINGLE. The Live - Stock of the Farm. By ROBFRT O
PBINGLE. Third Edition. Revised and Edited by JAMES MACDONALD. Crown
Svo,
i s. 6d.
PRYDE. Pleasant Memories of a Busy Life. By DAVID PRYDE
M. A., LL.D., Author of Highways of Literature, Great Men in European His
tory, Biographical Outlines of English Literature, &c. With a Mezzotint Tor-
trait. Post Svo, Os.
PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES AFFECTING SCOTLAND
from 1707 to 1847, with Chronological Table and Index. 3 voLs. Lir-e Svo 3 Ss
PUBLIC GENERAL STATUTES AFFECTING SCOTLAND, COLLECTION OF. Published Annually, with General Index.
RAE. The Syrian Church in India. By GEORGE MILNE RAE,
M.A., D.D., Fellow of the University of Madras; late Professor in the Madras
Christian College. With full-page Illustrations. Post Svo, 10s. Od.
RAMSAY. Scotland and Scotsmen in the Eighteenth Century.
Edited from the MSS. of JOHN RAMSAY, Esq. of Oehtertyre, by ALEXANDER
ALLARDYCE, Author of Memoir of Admiral Lord Keith, K.B. , &c. 2 vols
Svo, 31s. Od.
RANKIN. The Zambesi Basin and Nyassaland. By DANIEL J.
RANKIN, F.R.S.G.S., M.R.A.S. With 3 Maps and 10 full-page Illustrations.
Post Svo, 10s. Od
RANKIN.
A Handbook of the Church of Scotland. By JAMES RANKIN,
D.D., Minister of Muthill ; Author of Character Studies in the Old Testament,
&c. An entirely New and much Enlarged Edition. Crown Svo, with 2 Maps,
7s. Od.
The First Saints. Post Svo, Ts. Cd.
The Creed in Scotland. An Exposition of the Apostles
Creed. With Extracts from Archbishop Hamilton s Catechism of 1552, John
Calvin s Catechism of 1550, and a Catena of Ancient Latin and other Hymns.
Post Svo, 7s. Od.
The Worthy Communicant. A Guide to the Devout Obser
vance of the Lord s Supper. Limp cloth, Is. 3d.
The Young Churchman. Lessons on the Creed, the Com
mandments, the Means of Grace, and the Church. Limp cloth, Is. 3d.
First Communion Lessons. 25th Edition. Paper Cover, 2d.
RECORDS OF THE TERCENTENARY FESTIVAL OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH. Celebrated in April 1SS4. Published under
the Sanction of the Senatus Academicus. Large 4to, 2, 12s. Od.
ROBERTSON. The Early Religion of Israel. As set forth by
Biblical Writers and Modern Critical Historians. Being the Baird Lecture for
1SSS-S9. By JAMES ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor of Oriental Languages in the
University of Glasgow. Fourth Edition. Crown Svo, 10s. Cd.
ROBERTSON.
Orellana, and other Poems. By J. LOGIE ROBERTSON,
M.A. Fcap. Svo. Printed on hand-made paper. Os.
A History of English Literature. For Secondary Schools.
With an Introduction by Professor MASSON, Edinburgh University. Cr. Svo, 3s.
English Averse for Junior Classes. In Two Parts. Crown Svo.
[/yt the prexs.20 List of HOOKS fuDlts/iea by
ROBERTSON&quot;. Our Holiday among the Hills. By JAMES and
JANET LOOIE ROBERTSON. Fcap. 8vo, 3s. 6d.
ROBERTSON. Essays and Sermons. By the late W. ROBERT-
SON, B.D., Minister of the Parish of Sprouston. With a Memoir and Portrait.
Crown 8vo, 5s. 6d.
ROBINSON&quot;. The Saviour in the Newer Light
: A Present Day
Study of Jesus Christ. By ALEXANDER ROBINSON, B.D., Minister of the Parish
of Kilmun. Demy 8vo, 7s. 6d. net.
RODGER. Aberdeen Doctors at Home and Abroad. The Story
of a Medical School. By ELLA HILL BURTON RODGER. Demy 8vo, 10s. 6d.
ROSCOE. Rambles with a Fishing-Rod. By E. S. ROSCOE.
Crown Svo, 4s. 6d.
ROSS AND SOMERVILLE. Beggars on Horseback : A Riding
Tour in North Wales. By MARTIN Ross and B. (E. SOMERVILLE. With Illustra
tions by E. CE. SOMERVILLE. Crown 8vo, 3s. 6d.
RUTLAND.
Notes of an Irish Tour in 1846. By the DUKE OF RUTLAND,
G.C.B. (Lord JOHN MANNERS). New Edition. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
Correspondence between the Right Honble. William Pitt
and Charles Duke of Rutland, Lord
- Lieutenant of Ireland, 1781-1787. With
Introductory Note by JOHN DUKE OF RUTLAND. Svo, 7s. 6d.
RUTLAND.
Gems of German Poetry. Translated by the DUCHESS OF
RUTLAND (Lady JOHN MANNERS). [New Edition in preparation.
Impressions of Bad-Homburg. Comprising a Short Account
of the Women s Associations of Germany under the Red Cross. Crown Svo, Is. 6d.
Some Personal Recollections of the Later Years of the Earl
of Beaconsfield, K.G. Sixth Edition. 6d.
Employment of Women in the Public Service. 6d.
Some of the Advantages of Easily Accessible Reading and
Recreation Rooms and Free Libraries. With Remarks on Starting and Main
taining them. Second Edition. Crown Svo, Is.
A Sequel to Rich Men s Dwellings, and other Occasional
Papers. Crown Svo, 2s. 6d.
Encouraging Experiences of Reading and Recreation Rooms,
Aims of Guilds, Nottingham Social Guide, Existing Institutions, &c., &c.
Crown Svo, Is.
SALMON. Songs of a Heart s Surrender, and other Verse.
By ARTHUR L. SALMON. Fcap. Svo, 2s.
SCHEFFEL. The Trumpeter. A Romance of the Rhine. By
JOSEPH VICTOR VON SCHEFFEL. Translated from the Two Hundredth German
Edition by JESSIE BKCK and LOUISA LORIMER. With an Introduction by Sir
THEODORE MARTIN, K.C.B. Long Svo, 3s. 6d.
SCHILLER. Wallenstein. A Dramatic Poem. By FRIEDRICH
VON SCHILLER. Translated by C. G. N. LOCKHART. Fcap. Svo, 7s. 6d.
SCOTCH LOCH FISHING. By &quot;BLACK PALMER.&quot; Crown Svo,
interleaved with blank pages, 4s.
SCOTT. Tom Cringle s Log. By MICHAEL SCOTT. New Edition.
With 19 Full-page Illustrations. Crown Svo, 3s. Gd.
SCOUGAL. Prisons and their Inmates
; or, Scenes from a
Silent World. By FRANCIS SCOUGAL. Crown Svo, boards, 2s,William Blackwood and Sons. 27
SELLAR S Manual of the Acts relating to Education in Scot
land. By J. EDWARD GRAHAM, B.A. Oxon., Advocate. Ninth Edition. Demy
Svo, 12s. Od.
SETH.
Scottish Philosophy. A Comparison of the Scottish and
German Answers to Hume. Balfour Philosophical Lectures, University of
Edinburgh. By ANDREW SETH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and Metaphysics m
Edinburgh University. Second Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
Hegelianism and Personality. Balfour Philosophical Lectures.
Second Series. Second Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
SETH. A Study of Ethical Principles. By JAMES SETH, M.A.,
Professor of Philosophy in Brown University, U.S.A. Second Edition, Revised.
Post Svo, 10s. (id. net.
SHADWELL. The Life of Colin Campbell, Lord Clyde. Illus
trated by Extracts from his Diary and Correspondence. By Lieutenant-Gcueral
SIIADWELL, C.B. With Portrait, Maps, and Plans. 2 vols. Svo, 30s.
SHAXD
The Life of General Sir Edward Bruce Hamley, K.C.B.,
K C &amp;gt;[ G By ALEX. IXNES SIIAND, Author of Kilcarra, Against Time, &c.
With two Photogravure Portraits and other Illustrations. 2 vols. demy Svo, 21s.
Half a Century ; or, Changes in Men and Manners. Second
Edition. Svo, l^s. Oil. .
Letters from the West of Ireland. Reprinted from the
Times. Crown Svo, 5s.
SHARPE. Letters from and to Charles Kirkpatrick Sharpe.
Edited by ALEXANDER ALLARDYCE, Author of Memoir of Admiral Lord Keith,
K.B., &c. With a Memoir by the Rev. W. K. R, BEDFORD. In 2 vols. Svo.
Illustrated with Etchings and other Engravings. 2, 12s. 6d.
SIM. Margaret Sim s Cookery. With an Introduction by L. B.
WALFOHD, Author of Mr Smith : A Part of his Life, &c. Crown Svo, as.
SIMPSOX. The Wild Rabbit in a New Aspect ; or, Rabbit-
Warrens that Pay A book for Landowners, Sportsmen, Land Agents, Farmers,
Gamekeepers, and Allotment Holders. A Record of Recent Expenments con
ducted on the Estate of the Right Hon. the Earl of Wharnclitle at Wortley Hall.
By J. SIMPSON. Second Edition, Enlarged. Small crown Svo, 5s.
SKELTOX.
The Table-Talk of Shirley. By JOHN SKELTON, Advocate
C.B., LL.D., Author of The Essays of Shirley. With a Frontispiece. Fourth
Edition. Post Svo, 7s. Oil. - r c
,
Maitland of Lethington ; and the Scotland of Mary Stuart.
A History. Limited Edition, with Portraits. Demy Svo, 2 vols., 28s. net.
The Handbook of Public Health. A Complete Edition of the
Public Health and other Sanitary Acts relating to Scotland. Annotated, and
with the Rules, Instructions, and Decisions of the Board of Supervision brought
up to date with relative forms. Second Edition. With Introduction, containing
the Administration of the Public Health Act in Counties. Svo, 8s. fad.
The Local Government (Scotland) Act in Relation to Public
Health. A Handy Guide for County and District Councillors, Mo,l.ca 1
^
OHi-i s,
Sanitary Inspectors, and Members of Parochial Boards. Second Edition. \V itn
a new Preface on appointment of Sanitary Officers. Crown Svo, to.
SKRIXE. Columba : A Drama. By JOHN HUXTLEY SKRINE
Warden of Glenalmoud ; Author of A Memory of Edward Thr.ng. I cap. 4to, Gs.
SMITH ^
Thorndale ; or, The Conflict of Opinions. By WILLIAM SMITH,
Author of A Discourse on Ethics, &c. Xew Edition. Crown Svo, 10s. 6d
Gravenhurst ; or, Thoughts on Good and Evil. Second Edi
tion. With Memoir and Portrait of the Author. Crown Svo, 88.List of Books Published by
SMITH.
The Story of William and Lucy Smith. Edited by GEORGE
MEERIAM. Large post Svo, 12s. 6d.
SMITH. Memoir of the Families of M Combie and Thorns
originally M Intosh and M Thomas. Compiled from History and Tradition Bv WILLIAM M COMBIE SMITH. With Illustrations. Svo, 7s. 6d.
SMITH. Greek Testament Lessons for Colleges. Schools, and
Private Students, consisting chiefly of the Sermon on the Mount and the Parables
or our Lord \\ith Notes and Essays. By the Rev. J. HUNTER SMITH, M A ,
King Edward s School, Birmingham. Crown Svo, 6s.
SMITH. The Secretary for Scotland. Being a Statement of the
Powers and Duties of the new Scottish Office. With a Short Historical Intro
duction, and numerous references to important Administrative Documents By W. C. SMITH, LL.B., Advocate. Svo, 6s.
&quot;SON OF THE MAKSHES, A.&quot;
From Spring to Fall
; or, When Life Stirs. By
&quot; A SON OP
_THE MARSHES.&quot; Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
Within an Hour of London Town : Among Wild Birds and
tj
helr Haunts. Edited by J. A. OWEN. Cheap Uniform Edition. Crown Svo,
With the Woodlanders, and By the Tide. Cheap Uniform
Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
On Surrey Hills. Cheap Uniform Edition. Crown Svo 3s 6d
Annals of a Fishing Village. Cheap Uniform Edition. Crown
Svo, 3s. 6d.
SORLEY. The Ethics of Naturalism. Being the Shaw Fellow
ship Lectures, 1SS4. By W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cam
bridge, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen Crown
Svo, 6s.
SPEEDY. Sport in the Highlands and Lowlands of Scotland
with Rod and Gun. By TOM SPEEDY. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged
With Illustrations by Lieut. -General Hope Crealocke. C.B., C.M.G., and others
Svo, 15s.
SPROTT. The Worship and Offices of the Church of Scotland.
By GEORGE W. SPROTT, D.D., Minister of North Berwick. Crown Svo, 6s.
STATISTICAL ACCOUNT OF SCOTLAND. Complete, with
Index. 15 vols. Svo, 16, 16s.
STEPHENS.
The Book of the Farm
; detailing the Labours of the Farmer,
Farm-Steward, Ploughman, Shepherd, Hedger, Farm-Labourer, Field-Worker, and Cattle-man. Illustrated with numerous Portraits of Animals and Engravings of Implements, and Plans of Farm Buildings. Fourth Edition. Revised, and
in great part Rewritten by JAMES MACDONALD, F.R.S.K., Secretary, Highland and Agricultural Society of Scotland. Complete in Six Divisional Volumes, bound in cloth, each 10s. 6d., or handsomely bound, in 3 volumes, with leather
back and gilt top, 3, 3s.
Catechism of Practical Agriculture. New Edition. Revised
by JAMES MACDONALD, F.R.S.E. With numerous Illustrations. Crown Svo, Is.
The Book of Farm Implements and Machines. By J. SLIGHT
and R. SCOTT BURN, Engineers. Edited by HENRY STEPHENS. Large Svo, 2, 2s.
STEVENSON. British Fungi. (Hymenomycetes.) By Rev.
JOHN STEVENSON, Author of Mycologia Scotica, Hon. Sec. Cryptogamic Society of Scotland. Vols. I. and II., post Svo, with Illustrations, price 12s. 6d. net each.William Blackwood and Sons. 29
STEWART.
Advice to Purchasers of Horses. By JOHN STEWART, V S
New Edition. L s. Cxi.
Stable Economy. A Treatise OH the Management of Horses
in relation to Stablin?, Grooming, Feeding, Watering, and Working. Seventh
Edition. Fcap. Svo, 6s. tid.
STEWART. A Hebrew Grammar, with the Pronunciation, Syl
labic Division and Tone of tlio Words, and Quantity of the Vowels. By Rev.
DUNCAN STEWART, D.D. Fourth Edition. Svo,
&quot;s. (id.
STEWART. Boethius : An Essay. By HUGH ERASER STEWART,
M.A., Trinity College, Cambridge. Crown Svo, 7s. (Id.
STODDART. Angling Songs. By THOMAS TOD STODDART.
Xew Edition, with a Memoir by ANNA M. STODDART. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
STODDART.
John Stuart Blaclde : A Biography. By AXXA M. STODDART.
With :? Plates. Third Edition. 2 vols. demy Svo, 21s.
Sir Philip Sidney
: Servant of God. Illustrated by MARGARET
L. HIT:(;INS. With a Xew Portrait of Sir Philip Sidney. Small -Ito, with a
specially designed Cover. 5s.
STOBMONTH.
Etymological and Pronouncing Dictionary of the English
Language. Including a very Copious Selection of Scientific Terms. For use in
Schools and Colleges, and as a Book of General Reference. By the Rev. JAMES
STORMONTH. The Pronunciation carefully revised by the Rev. P. H. PIIELP, M.A.
Cantab. Eleventh Edition, with Supplement. Crown Svo, pp. 800. 7s. 6d.
Dictionary of the English Language, Pronouncing, Etymo
logical, and Explanatory. Revised by the Rev. P. H. PIIF.I.P. Library Edition.
Xew and Cheaper Edition, with Supplement. Imperial Svo, handsomely bound
in half morocco, ISs. net.
The School Etymological Dictionary and Word-Book. Fourth
Edition. Fcap. Svo, pp. J54. 2s.
STORY.
Nero; A Historical Play. By W. W. STORY, Author of
Roba di Roma. Fcap. Svo, (is.
Vallombrosa. Post Svo, 5s.
Poems. 2 vols., 7s. 6d.
Fiammetta. A Summer Idyl. Crown Svo, 7s. fid.
Conversations in a Studio. 2 vols. crown Svo, 12s. (id.
Excursions in Art and Letters. Crown Svo, 7s. (id.
A Poet s Portfolio : Later Readings. ISmo, 3s. Cd.
STRACHEY. Talk at a Country House. Fact and Fiction.




John-a-Dreams. A Tale. By JULIAN STURGIS. New Edi
tion. Crown Svo, 3s. fid.
Little Comedies, Old and Xew. Crown Svo, 7s. Gd.
SUTHERLAND (DUCHESS OF). How I Spent my Twentieth
Year. Being a Record of a Tour Round the World, 1PS&amp;lt;&amp;gt;-S7. By the DUCHESS
OF SUTHERLAND (MARCHIONESS OF STAFFORD). With Illustrations. Crown Svo,
SUTHERLAND. Handbook of Hardy Herbaceous and Alpine
Flowers, for Grneral Garden Decoration. Containing Descriptions of upwards
of 1000 Species of Ornamental Hardy Perennial and Alpine Hants; along with
Concise and Plain Instructions for their Propagation and Culture. By WILLIAM
SUTHERLAND, Landscape Gardener; formerly Manager of the Herbaceous Depart
ment at Kew. Crown Svo, 7s. Cd.30 List of Books Published by
TAYLOR. The Story of my Life. By the late Colonel
MEADOWS TAYLOR, Author of The Confessions of a Thug, &c., &c. Edited by
his Daughter. New and Cheaper Edition, being the Fourth. Crown 8vo, 6s.
THOMSON&quot;.
The Diversions of a Prime Minister. By Basil Thomson.
With a Map, numerous Illustrations by J. W. CAWSTON and others, and Repro
ductions of Rare Plates from Early Voyages of Sixteenth and Seventeenth Cen
turies. Small demy Svo, 15 s.
South Sea Yarns. With 10 Full-page Illustrations. Cheaper
Edition. Crown Svo, 3s. Cd.
THOMSON.
Handy Book of the Flower-Garden : being Practical Direc
tions for the Propagation, Culture, and Arrangement of Plants in Flower-
Gardens all the year round. With Engraved Plans. By DAVID THOMSON,
Gardener to his Grace the Duke of Buccleuch, K.T., at Drumlanrig. Fourth
and Cheaper Edition. Crown Svo, 5s.
The Handy Book of Fruit - Culture under Glass : being a
series of Elaborate Practical Treatises on the Cultivation and Forcing of Pines,
Vines, Peaches, Figs, Melons, Strawberries, and Cucumbers. With Engravings
of Hothouses, &c. Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged. Crown Svo, 7s. 6d.
THOMSON. A Practical Treatise on the Cultivation of the
Grape Vine. By WILLIAM THOMSON, Tweed Vineyards. Tenth Edition. Svo, 5s.
THOMSON. Cookery for the Sick and Convalescent. With
Directions for the Preparation of Poultices, Fomentations, &c. By BARBARA
THOMSON. Fcap. Svo, Is. 6d.
THORBURN. Asiatic Neighbours. By S. S. THORBURN, Bengal
Civil Service, Author of Banmi; or, Our Afghan Frontier,&quot; David Leslie:
A Story of the Afghan Frontier, Musalmans and Money-Lenders in the Pan-
jab. With Two Maps. Demy Svo, 10s. Cd. net.
THORNTON. Opposites. A Series of Essays on the Unpopular
Sides of Popular Questions. By LEWIS THORNTON. 8vo, 12s. 6d.
TRANSACTIONS OF THE HIGHLAND AND AGRICUL
TURAL SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND. Published annually, price 5s.
TRAVEL, ADVENTURE, AND SPORT. From Blackwood s
Magazine.&quot; Uniform with Tales from Blackwood.&quot; In 12 Parts, each price Is.
Handsomely bound in 6 vols., cloth, 15s. ; half calf, 25s.
TRAVERS. Mona Maclean, Medical Student. A Novel. By
GRAHAM TRAVERS. Eleventh Edition. Crown Svo, 6s.
TULLOCH.
Rational Theology and Christian Philosophy in England in
the Seventeenth Century. By JOHN TULLOCH, D.D., Principal of St Mary s Col
lege in the University of St Andrews ; and one of her Majesty s Chaplains in
Ordinary in Scotland. Second Edition. 2 vols. Svo, 16s.
Modern Theories in Philosophy and Religion. Svo, 15s.
Luther, and other Leaders of the Reformation. Third Edi
tion, Enlarged. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
Memoir of Principal Tulloch, D.D., LL.D. By Mrs OLIPHANT,
Author of Life of Edward Irving. Third and Cheaper Edition. Svo, with
Portrait, 7s. 6d.
TWEEDIE. The Arabian Horse: His Country and People.
By Major
- General W. TWEEDIE, C.S.I., Bengal Staff Corps; for many years
H.B.M. s Consul-General, Baghdad, and Political Resident for the Government
of India in Turkish Arabia. In one vol. royal 4to, with Seven Coloured Plates
and other Illustrations, and a Map of the Country. Price 3, 3s. net.William Blackwood and Sons. 31
VEITCH.
The History and Poetry of the Scottish Border : their Main
Features and Relations. By JOHN VEITCH, LL.D., Professor of Logic and
Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Xew and Enlarged Edition. 2 vols.
demy Svo, 16s.
Institutes of Logic. Post Svo, 12s. 6d.
The Feeling for Nature in Scottish Poetry. From the Ear
liest Times to the Present Day. 2 vols. fcap. Svo, in roxburghe binding, 15s.
Merlin and other Poems. Fcap. Svo, 4s. Od.
Knowing and Being. Essays in Philosophy. First Scries.
Crown Svo, 5s.
Dualism and Monism ; and other Essays. Essays in Phil
osophy. Second Series. With an Introduction by R. M. Wenley. Crown Svo,
4s. Gd. net,
VIRGIL. The vEneid of Virgil. Translated in English Blank
Verse by G. K. RICHARDS, M.A., and Lord RAVEXSWORTH. 2 vols. fcap. Svo, 10s.
WAGE. Christianity and Agnosticism. Reviews of some Recent
Attacks on the Christian Faith. By HENRY WACE, D.D., Principal of King s
College, London ; Preacher of Lincoln s Inn ; Chaplain to the Queen. Second
Edition. Post Svo, 10s. Od. net.
WADDELL. An Old Kirk Chronicle : Being a History of Auld-
hame, Tyninghame, and Whitckirk, in East Lothian. From Session Records,
ItilS to 1850. By Rev. P. HATELY WADDEI.L, B.D., Minister of the United
Parish. Small Paper Edition, 200 Copies. Price 1. Large Paper Edition, 50
Copies. Price 1, 10s.
WALFORD. Four Biographies from Blackwood : Jane Taylor,
Hannah More, Elizabeth Fry, Mary Somerville. By L. B. WALFORD. Crown
Svo, 5s.
WARREN S (SAMUEL) WORKS:
Diary of a Late Physician. Cloth, 2s. 6d.
; boards, 2s.
Ten Thousand A-Year. Cloth, 3s. 6d.
; boards, 2s. Gd.
Now and Then. The Lily and the Bee. Intellectual and
Moral Development of the Present Age. 4s. (id.
Essays
: Critical, Imaginative, and Juridical. 5s.
WEBSTER, The Angler and the, Loop
- Rod. By DAVID
WEBSTER. Crown Svo, with Illustrations, 7s. Gd.
WENLEY.
Socrates and Christ : A Study in the Philosophy of Religion.
By R. M. WEXI.EV, M.A., D.Sc., Lecturer on Mental and Moral Philosophy in
Queen Margaret College, Glasgow ; formerly Examiner in Philosophy in the
University of Glasgow. Crown Svo, Gs.
Aspects of Pessimism. Crown Svo, 6s.
WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY. Minutes of the Westminster
Assembly, while engaged in preparing their Directory for Church Government,
Confession of Faith, and Catechisms (November 1G44 to March ItH .i). Edited
by the Rev. Professor ALEX. T. MITCHELL, of St Andrews, and the Rev. JOHN
STRUTIIERS, LL.D. With a Historical and Critical Introduction by Professor
Mitchell, Svo, 15s.
WHITE.
The Eighteen Christian Centuries. By the Rev. JAMES
WHITE. Seventh Edition. Post Svo, with Index, Gs.
History of France, from the Earliest Times. Sixth Thousand.
Post Svo, with Index, 6s.
Archaeological Sketches in Scotland Kintyre and Knapdale.
By Colonel T. P. WHITE, R.E., of the Ordnance Survey. With numerous Illus
trations. 2 vols. folio, 4, 4s. Vol. L, Kintyre, sold separately. 2, 2s.32 Rooks Published by William Blackwood and Sons.
WHITE.
The Ordnance Survey of the United Kingdom. A Popular Account. Crown 8vo, 5s.
WILLIAMSON. The Horticultural Handbook and Exhibitor s
Guide. A Treatise on Cultivating, Exhibiting, and Judging Plants, Flowers
Fruits, and \egetables. By W. WILLIAMSON, Gardener. Revised by MALCOLM
DUNN, Gardener to his Grace the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensbcrry, Dalkeith
1th 2 d
a ld Cheaper Edition
&amp;gt; enlarged. Crown Svo, paper cover, 2s. ;
WILLIAMSON&quot;. Poems of Nature and Life. By DAVID R
WILLIAMSON-, Minister of Kirkmaiden. Fcap. Svo, 3s.
WILLIAMSON. Light from Eastern Lands on the Lives of
Abraham, Joseph, and Moses. By the Rev. ALEX. WILLIAMSON, Author of The
Missionary Heroes of the Pacific, Sure and Comfortable Words, Ask and
Receive, &c. Crown Svo, 3s. 6d.
WILLS. Behind an Eastern Veil. A Plain Tale of Events
occurring in the Experience of a Lady who had a unique opportunity of observ
ing the Inner Life of Ladies of the Upper Class in Persia. By C. J. WILIS Author of In the Land of the Lion and Sun, Persia as it is, &c., &c Cheaper Edition. Demy Svo, 5s.
WILLS AND GREENE. Drawing-Room Dramas for Children
By W. G. WILLS and the Hon. Mrs GREENE. Crown Svo, 6s.
WILSON.
Works of Professor Wilson. Edited by his Son -in -Law, irofessor FERRIER. 12 vols. crown Svo, 2, Ss.
Christopher in his Sporting-Jacket. 2 vols., 8s.
Isle of Palms, City of the Plague, and other Poems. 4s.
Lights and Shadows of Scottish Life, and other Tales. 4s.
Essays, Critical and Imaginative. 4 vols., 16s.
The Noctes Ambrosianee. 4 vols., 16s.
Homer and his Translators, and the Greek Drama. Crown
Svo, 4s.
WORSLEY.
Poems and Translations. By PHILIP STANHOPE WORSLEY M.A. Edited by EDWARD WORSLEY. Second Edition, Enlarged Fcap Svo 6s Homers Odyssey. Translated into English Verse in the
Spenserian Stanza. By P. S. Worsley. New and Cheaper Edition. Post Svo
t s. 6(1. net.
Homer s Iliad. Translated by P. S. Worsley and Prof Con-
ington 2 vols. crown Svo, 21s.
YATE. England and Russia Face to Face in Asia. A Record of
Travel with the Afghan Boundary Commission. By Captain A. C. Y VTE Bombay
Staff Corps. Svo, with Maps and Illustrations, 21s.
YATE. Northern Afghanistan; or, Letters from the Afghan
Boundary Commission. By Major C. E. YATE, C.S.I.. C.M.G. Bombay Staff
Corps, F.R.G.S. Svo, with Maps, ISs.
YULE. Fortification : For the use of Officers in the Army and
Readers of Military History. By Colonel YULE, Bengal Engineers. Svo with Numerous Illur rations, 10s.
11/95.iy/o
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
Douglas, Charles Mackinnon
1607 John Stuart Mill
D6
cop. 3